

The Second Congress of our Party completely routed the political line of Reformism through a period of ten long years had vitiated our policy and practice. The economic and political analysis of the New Thesis had sounded the call to the Party to break from the old reformist past of trailing behind the bourgeoisie, of withholding and lagging and of decrying the revolutionary fighting initiative of the toiling masses.

However, even though routed, reformism was by no means completely eliminated. After the second Congress, it is no longer possible to openly advocate the policy of reformism, to directly challenge or repudiate the revolutionary Marxist line laid down in the Political Thesis. But it continues to raise its head in daily practice, on the eve of every struggle, in the matter of estimates about the present upsurge. It manifests itself under various garbs or pleas - all of which serve to cover up the fear of participating in and leading the growing fight of the masses, the panicky flight from the concrete task of building the struggles.

The Report of the PB "On the Tactical Line" in the present phase of our struggle, has brilliantly unmasked the right reformism and petty bourgeois revolutionism, as evinced in our understanding and practice following upon the Party Congress. It has struck a decisive blow at all open or covert attempts to negate the revolutionary line laid down in the Political Thesis, and to drag the Party back into the old reformist period. It has exposed the social roots of these deviations which continue to hold the Party back in the following words:-

"One of the legacy of the reformist period is the overwhelmingly petty bourgeois composition of the Party....As a logical consequence of the reformist policy the Party was based on the wrong class. The working class, the poor peasant and the agricultural workers were in the main neglected - so far as recruitment inside the Party was concerned. In the name of non-sectarianism, bourgeois and petty bourgeois intellectuals untempered by Marxist education were encouraged with all their faults; they themselves were prevented from taking a firm stand against capitalists, reformists and often denounced as terrorists, bhadralog etc. when their anti-imperialist instincts drove them to take a correct stand." (p.10).

Everything that is said in "the Tactical Line", with regard to the manifestation of right reformism and petty bourgeois revolutionism elsewhere, applies with redoubled force to our province. The PB in its letter to the members of the C.P. P.C. has summed it up by pointing out that, "in your province vacillations in conducting struggles are not only not uncommon but must be frequent".

This is so, because the Party in C.P. & Berar, especially its leading organs, are overwhelmingly petty bourgeois in composition. It is drawn mainly from ex-students and the urban middle class, who in the entire period of reformism, have not gone through the school of Marxism. Not having imbibed the revolutionary teachings of Marxism, never tempered in the course of any wide mass movement, leave alone any militant mass class struggles, they have failed to shake themselves free from all traces of their class origin.

Under the ideological and practical influence of Mote, their bourgeois outlook, instead of being eliminated, has only been hardened, leading to the chronic disease of the petty-bourgeoisie - viz. right reformism masquerading behind left phrases, sneering at the revolutionary initiative of the masses by dubbing them as "economism", talk about revolution in abstract, while fearing to organise struggles in the concrete, and panicky withdrawal at the first bourgeois attack.

The war declared against reformism by the Second Congress and the call given in the Thesis to liquidate the social and class roots of reformism, has not been carried forward uptill now in our province. No serious attempts have even been made to re-educate the entire Party on the basis of the Second Congress Thesis, so as to break with the old understanding and practice. Furthermore, no honest attempt has been made to review our own past to see where our mistakes lay, to go to the roots of these mistakes, and thus bar the door against the repetition of such mistakes under different guises. The PB in its letter has given a timely warning by pointing out that -

"Reformism is a disease which dies hard and it must be pulled out by roots, and it is understood best in relation to our work and current struggles - and not in abstraction."

If the Party in our province is to turn ~~thax~~ its wheels from the slipping path of reformism on to the path of revolutionary struggle, it must objectively and earnestly undertake a self-critical review of its past at least from the time of the first big post-war upsurge of the working class in our province during March-April, 1947.

II. In March, 1947, the textile-workers, sweepers and primary teachers - numbering about 60,000 went on province-wide general strikes. So profound was the revolutionary upsurge, that for nearly a whole month the working class stood upto the bourgeois terror - hundreds went to jail, and faced all repression. Even the so-called "backward" sweepers, under our lead, displayed marvels of heroism and initiative. Sweeper women fought back

police repression. Their bold fight called forth the spontaneous support of the middle class and other sections of the working class. Strike-breaking attempts of the Ministry and the black-legs, were foiled by their cooperation.

But called upon to play a leading role in the sweepers' strike, Com. M.D.'s knees began to shake. In the midst of the developing struggle, he began to raise panicky demands for its unconditional withdrawal under bogus pleas of not losing people's support; not jeopardising the health of the people, of saving the Party from a smash-up etc. He made vigorous efforts to call off the strike. It is significant that in this, Mote who had just then been released from jail, lent him his full support. The efforts of both these comrades were rebuffed by the other comrades who had the responsibility of conducting this struggle and especially by Com. Brahma. So immersed was Com. M.D. in his reformist understanding, and so utterly blind to his anti-struggle, anti-working class deviation, that in a subsequent P.O.C. meeting where he was called to order, he threatened to stake his Party card and stayed out of the rest of the meeting, going completely inactive for a long period of 8 months.

But M.D. was not alone in this anti-struggle trend. During this time 5 members of the then P.O.C. (B.N., H.K., Mote, ABB, and Diwanjee) were in jail along with 9 other comrades. The Security prisoners had given notice of a hunger strike for the fulfilment of their demands. It was the first time Communists in jail were directly challenging the Ministry's policy of humiliating the leaders of the working class movement, of trying to crush their morale. However, just on the eve of that all the members of the P.O.C. led by Mote initiated its withdrawal.

The P.O.C. meeting held soon afterwards (i.e. in April-May, 1947) - after all the comrades had been released from detention, brought forward the extent of this reformist understanding in all the members of the P.O.C. without exception. This was the period when Joshi through his Pol.-Org. letter had launched his open attack against the August resolution of the C.C. characterising all struggles as vanguardist, explaining repression as being precipitated by our adventurist and sectarian actions - thus giving a clean alibi to the bourgeoisie, refusing to see the upsurge and the maturity of the revolutionary crisis. The understanding of the C.P., P.C. at this time, fully coincided with the gross reformist estimates put forward by Joshi in his Pol.-Org. letter.

The withdrawal of the hunger strike in jail was upheld, - the tactics of hunger-strike in jail being berated as "adventurist" and "provocative". In a resolution on kisans who had in the Chandur Taluq bravely faced the most brutal police terror in contrast to certain leaders like D.J. and Dighade who had deserted their posts, repression was estimated as being precipitated by our vanguardist actions. In typical fashion the resolution visualised a perspective of constructive approach to the Ministry, on the basis of its election pledges, and a campaign to win over the Congress masses for demanding a Land Commission which would investigate into the land-relations, the distribution of holdings etc., in C.P. and Berar! Thus, not the building of a struggle for land to the tiller, but a campaign for a "Land Commission to investigate into land-holdings" - such was the bankrupt lead (!!) given by this resolution.

The resolution on the textile front similarly put forward a policy of joining forces with the Socialists and Rulkarites. It estimated that a situation had developed where it is possible to have a united front with all these reformists, while the danger of INTUC was not even taken note of. Politically too, there was an idea of having a united front with Socialists.

In short, the May P.O.C. meeting revealed the following elements in the understanding of the P.O.C. members:-

(i) Repression is being precipitated by our vanguardist and adventurist actions, in conducting for example an intensive agitation on the slogan of "land to the tillers" in kisans, in organising Government employees like peons, Government Press workers, etc., and of leading their actions. By these actions, it was estimated, the Party had "invited" repression on its head.

(ii) A more positive approach to the Ministry and the Congress is possible and must be undertaken, after the Ministry had already passed the M.P.O. Act and Black Act!

(iii) The Party must try and have a united front with Socialists and Rulkarites in trade union and political field. It must approach them and join hands with them.

This amounted to a policy of complete abjuration of any struggle and a liquidation of the Party. In the name of "saving the Party" it advocated a cowardly retreat before repression, when it is known that the Party of the working class grows and develops not by retreating before repression, but by fighting back bourgeois terror, by rousing the working class and through it, the other sections of the people to resistance.

Clearly, the members of the P.O.C. had learned nothing from the biggest struggle fought by the working class till then in C.P., from the heroic way in which the entire working class and the kisans of Chandur had faced repression - one-tenth of which would have demoralised them in any other period. Just because they failed either then or later on, to draw the necessary conclusion from this about the extent of the upsurge in the maturing revolutionary crisis, and to review the roots of their mistakes they remained sunk to a very large extent in their reformism even in the subsequent period.

III. From the time of the May, 1947 meeting to the Party Congress - Feb. 1948, the P.O.C.

makes no efforts either at revising or rejecting the outlook of the May, 1947 meeting. But faced with the actual discontent of the masses, a minority section does begin to take an attitude of leading struggles and agitation on these lines. Thus:-

In the kisans there is practically no movement. With the perspective of organising any struggle or conducting any agitation on the central slogan of "land to the tillers" !, completely abjured, there was of course no question of doing anything on this front. Faced with a reality totally different from anything visualised in the P.C.C. resolution, the Kisan Party members, did not know what to do. They became demoralised, went inactive, and in the prevailing atmosphere, disruptive tendencies set in.

In the sweepers, even after the brave struggle fought by them, we completely gave up all concrete agitation and exposure. ~~Succumb~~

So scared were we of the perspective of organising struggles, which would inevitably be more bitter and fierce - at any place, that in the name of "demoralisation" of the sweepers, we took up an attitude of almost "servile ~~begging~~ begging" before the Government. The sweepers, - who had only recently demonstrated their fighting capacity, beyond any expectations entertained by us, and who had unmistakably proved that they were NOT demoralised even after three weeks of struggle, (as is clear from the fact that when Com. Chouthmal was treacherously arrested following upon the withdrawal of the strike, 1000 sweepers in Nagpur, within one hour rallied from the bustees, marched in a demonstration and surrounded the Kotwali demanding and forcing the Government to concede his release) - now began to be slandered as being "backward" and "demoralised". These were the usual slanders of the working class with which on several occasions reformism covered up its fear and incapacity of organising mass actions and leading struggles. This anti-working class and anti-struggle outlook went to such an extent that when the Provincial Government published bulletins falsely asserting that it had done a lot for the sweepers and brazenly forwarded them to the Union for distribution, our comrades, particularly Com. Chouthmal, not only did not react indignantly at this shameless hoax and failed to realise the need for coming out with an exposure handbill to call their bluff, but were on the point of obliging the Government.

fee-reduction

In students, we started by taking up the issue of ~~fee-reduction~~ ~~education~~, and launched our campaign by ~~organising~~ organising jointly with the Students Congress a province-wide one-day protest strike and demonstrations at the very beginning of the session. We also forced the Students Congress to agree to a joint call for a continuous strike from the month of August. Independently of the S.C., the P.S.F. went on building up an agitation amongst the students through a number of fee-reduction conventions, signature campaigns and meetings and even setting up of Councils of Action at some places. The sweep of the movement, for the first time drew in the vast mass of school students, and roused them for struggle. But it was the time when reformist illusions on the matter of unity with the ~~xxix~~ A.I.S.C. were at a height, and on this issue, the PSF in the name of Joint Action, went on trailing behind the S.C., whose leaders were not prepared for struggle, who only wanted to secure some concessions through the good offices of certain citizens and by utilising the pressure of the mass movement, in order then to deceive the masses and disrupt their movement. Completely under-estimating the extent of the upsurge amongst students, and afraid of leading it all on our own despite the sabotaging role of the S.C., Balram displayed tremendous vacillations when the S.C. leaders proposed the first postponement of the strike for a period of one month. Instead of starting an exposure and independent mobilisation for struggle, he ultimately lined up with them. But the Ministry well-understood the meaning of this upsurge, and therefore after a number of procrastinations it offered a paltry and bogus concession, after which the S.C. called for the withdrawal of the strike. The P.C.C. which was in session in those days, sharply drew the attention of Balram to his trailing behind the S.C. even at that stage, and asked him not to associate the SF with the withdrawal. A statement was then issued by the PSF refusing to be a party to commend this bogus concession to the students, and dissociating itself from the S.C. But it was no longer possible to come out with an independent call of strike-action. The previous attitude which was in effect an attitude not of leading struggles but of warding them off, had succeeded in scattering the upsurge, and in destroying the confidence of the mass in the student organisations.

In the textiles, despite the utterly reformist line given by the May POC meeting, ~~fronted~~ ~~fronted~~ fronted with the practical issues agitating the textile-workers, we took the initiative in formulating and putting before the court the basic demands of the working class, such as living wage, minimum wage, standardised wages, and full D.A., utilising to the full the ~~xxxxx~~ experience of Com. Sule in this respect. We correctly understood our participation in the Court proceedings, as part of our agitation to rouse the textile-workers behind these basic demands. Through all this, we even forced Ruikar to accept at least in words, the demands formulated by us and compelled him to agree to the call of a General Strike in October against the interim award. When the Government then came forward with a communique putting the question of living wage etc. before the Tribunal, (thus partially conceding the demand), but at the same time included the question of surplus labour as a term of reference, we correctly pointed out that this presaged retrenchment and unemployment and therefore did not agree to a withdrawal of the strike-call till this question was dropped. The fact that Ruikar, however, wriggled out of the strike-call, was utilised by us to expose his treachery.

It is to be noted that Com. Keshav on all these issues maintained and worked for a correct line, while members of the P.C.C. like Ram and Sudam, were of the view that by

calling the Sule and by our agitation we precipitated Ruiker's rift from the A.I.T.U.C. Ram even maintained that our strike-call in October was incorrect; Sudam criticised the handbill that was issued attacking Ruiker, as being unnecessarily sharp. In reality, if the work on the textile-front during this period is to be criticised, it is from the very opposite angle. For, the defects in our agitation and outlook precisely lay in the fact that we failed to understand the Court proceedings and all the manoeuvres of the capitalists and their Government as mere smoke-screens to cover up their attempts at passing the burdens of the crisis on the working class, that therefore we conducted our agitation only as partial struggle and did not link it up with the growing economic crisis and the workers' way out of it viz. nationalisation and workers' control; that consequently we also failed to conduct a general, all-round consistent and vigorous exposure of the reformist's betrayal. These defects in fact, hampered the task of isolating the reformists, of building our cadres and following, and of sufficiently orientating them towards the independent leadership of struggles. But the criticisms levelled at Com. Keshav's work in that period, reveal, that the critiques only wanted to drag the textile-front still deeper into reformism.

In this period the Indian bourgeoisie launched its most vicious attack against the living standards of the people by introducing decontrol. In the Nagpur textile fraction and the Nagpur Trade Union Council, the need to fight this bourgeois attack was realised. The Provincial fraction also decided to make the PTUC give a call for a one-day protest strike on 15th December. The PTUC General Council issued this call. It was one of the most significant independent political action that the working class at that stage was called upon to lead. The fact that later on Ruiker came out frontally in opposition to the strike, only meant that there was to be an open race between us and the working bourgeois-reformists for winning over the working class. But so strong was the pull of reformism that leading members of the POC opposed this strike and called for its withdrawal under various pretexts. None of these comrades would see the indignation which was already growing in the minds of the working class and other sections of the people against bourgeois policy and their urge to resist it. In the Nagpur D.C., Balram led the discussion for its withdrawal, on the plea that after Ruiker's opposition and with the existing "inadequate preparation" (In Nagpur because of Ruiker's opposition and in Jabulpore because of our own D.C.'s unwillingness) a strike on our own would only "disunite the workers". He advocated the observance of a protest day as in Bihar instead of a protest-strike.

It is in the struggle against the bourgeoisie, the working class is more and more won away from reformist influence, and its revolutionary unity is forged. Thus the talk of withdrawing an action, in the name of preserving the unity of the working class, is alien to Marxism, and a cloak for not fighting the bourgeoisie.

The reformist understanding of a majority of the D.C. members almost made them fall a victim to Balram's stand. They even began seriously discussing the ways by which the strike could be withdrawn. It was only the firm stand of Keshav, which ultimately prevented the D.C. from giving up this strike.

Com. Azad, who had been a party to the decision in the Provincial Fraction, did not even give a call for strike in Rajpur.

While, Com. S.D. of Jabulpore, who had similarly participated in the Fraction meeting, was guilty of the gross anti-Party crime of issuing a public statement dissociating from the strike, from the office of the City Superintendent where he had gone for permission to hold a meeting. Thus, it is clear, that in our practice, on the question of struggles, two attitudes begin to be taken up inside the Party and its leadership - one, an attitude which decries struggles or vacillates before them, the other which puts its face towards them.

It shows the pull of reformism on our work, and in varying degrees on the P.C. leaders in this period. It shows the forms in which it expresses itself in each, which serve as a key to understand the development and transformation in each, in the subsequent period.

IV. Discussions on the new line and Party Congress:

The discussions held in the POC on the draft document revealed that a substantial section of POC members, had at that stage broken from the old reformist understanding on major questions of national politics. They positively sided with the document in estimating the collaborationist role of the bourgeoisie. They rejected the line of those who maintained that a certain section of the bourgeoisie (of whom Nehru was supposed to be the symbol) was still playing an oppositional role. They supported the slogan of "overthrow of the Bourgeois Government" and the strategy of building a new class alliance - the Democratic Front. They are able to criticise the failings of the December document on such issues as the characterisation of the C.S.P. and other left parties, the differential approach towards Nehru and Patel, and the conception of the Democratic Front. M.D. and Joshi, for a long time took up the position that the small bourgeoisie is still oppositional. Mohite, opposed the slogan of "overthrow of the Government" on grounds of "tactics" (which also explains his subsequent defection). As for Mote and D.J. and Huddar - they completely revealed their "petty bourgeois revolutionist" stand. They indulged in lots of radical phrase-

mongering to mask their own reformist conscience, to cover up the traces of their right reformist sins. The C.C. line was criticised from the left. But this trend exposed itself when taking a stand on the crucial issue of the maturing revolutionary crisis and the perspectives of developing struggles. The prominent left critiques - Note and D.J. attacked the falling of the C.C. line by calling it "economist" - which is the typical excuse to wriggle out of the developing struggles, which completely underestimates the revolutionary significance of partial struggles in the context of a maturing crisis - and which is thus the line of those who in concrete, oppose and sabotage all struggles, while all the time, mouthing revolutionary phrases. The rest of the members, unable to make a complete break with reformism, could not demarcate themselves from these anti-Party formulations. Though, when Note decried all partial struggles and quoted the December 29th strike in Bombay, the breaking of ban by the A.I.S.F. workers, etc. as instances of "vanguardism" and "economism", there was strong opposition from some comrades.

But the fact that reformism was not only not being liquidated, but was sought to be screened and given a new lease of life, is evident from this that while the members of the P.O.C. posed as fighting reformists on an all-India plane, while they attacked the reformism of the old C.C., they avoided all discussions of the deep-rooted reformism in our own province in our understanding and practice in the entire preceding period. That is why, the P.O.C. takes a non-political attitude and completely capitulates to reformists in its own midst. Confirmed reformists who had hardened into disruptive anti-Party elements, like Note, D.J. and Huddar came in the forefront, posing as revolutionary fighters on the basis of their radical left talk, shrewdly trying to explain away and even justifying their entire past. Com. M.D. - whose immediate past was his panicky flight during the sweepers strike, followed by a period of total inactivity, was rehabilitated in the leadership.

This capitulation to reformism is clearly reflected in the resolution on P.O.C. Org. passed in this very meeting, which brushes aside the entire reformist practices, as only being a "negative attitude to Party forms" (!!), and tries to make the entire past look something like a "closed chapter", the omissions and commissions of which have been mutually forgiven and forgotten.

It is further reflected in the election of delegates to the Party Congress at the Jubbulpore convention, where Coms. D.J. and M.D. - are elected as 2 out of 5 delegates.

Same attitude towards reformism is also seen in Keshav's attempts to reach compromises and agreements with Ruiker on the T.U. field, instead of a bold attack against his treachery (betrayal of struggle) and his disruptive activities (The Workers' United Front), and in agreeing to restrict and confine criticism.

It is therefore clear that the C.P.F.C. does not draw any conclusions from the fight against reformism launched by the Party, in terms of its own practice, and its understanding. Naturally, when faced with the first attack and a developing struggle, vacillations and anti-struggle tendencies prominently raise their head, close on the heels of the Party Congress; e.g. on the issue of the 16th March strike.

V. 16th March Strike.

The bitter experience of various sections of the workers about the working of tribunals, the attack on their standards through decontrol, and the increasing repression on every strike, had given rise to growing discontent amongst the workers all over the province. The working class demanded action. So strong was the urge, that even reformists like Ruiker and the Socialists came forward for a general strike during the PTUC Conference held in Feb. The PTUC gives a correct lead to the workers by calling for a province-wide strike on 16th March. The extent of the upsurge is seen in the sweep of the strike-wave unleashed by this call. Actually the biggest strike action takes place in the province, in which the working class faces the most wide-spread repression and victimisation. Against this unprecedented terror, and with practically no lead at most of the centres, the working class fights back.

In Nagpur, the textile-workers left leaderless and arrested in scores, hold on for 4 days. Against victimisation, the sweepers continue the fight for 3 days. At Jubbulpore, pottery workers carry on the fight for a week taking up other issues. At Rajnandgaon where there was no organisation and no independent work of the Party, where our comrade throughout preceding period, had only acted as a lieutenant of Ruiker, the workers after the arrest of the whole Ex.Committee of the Union, spontaneously resort to new militant forms of resisting police terror by surrounding the Kotwali, and attacking the jail. For the first time in the history of the working class movement of our province, 2 workers are martyred in this fight.

And yet, how does the Party react ?

Long before the strike started some comrades notably Ram and D.J. opposed it. Unmoved by the spontaneous fight of the Nagpur working class against repression and victimisation after the 16th March and instead of boldly coming forward to lead it, the majority of Sectt. members (in a meeting held on 19th) - D.J., B.N., A.B., and Mohite, with D.J. as the spokesman, for a long time press for its withdrawal. The latter 3 ultimately veered

round to Keshav's demand for continuation of the strike. The fact that the textile workers were not in a position to continue the strike after the 21st and that at that moment to have stuck on to the slogan of continuing the strike would have been a mistake, /is of course another question. The point is to see the anti-struggle outlook betrayed by the comrades in the midst of a big strike-action, when their first concern should have been to think of how to continue and develop the strike.

At many of our centres, e.g. Radnera and Jubbulpore, we did nothing for the strike and some of our comrades instead of directly organising the workers and leading their fight, readily surrendered to the reformist-dominated executives of unions. At Rajnandgaon, when the workers had "gheraod" the jail demanding release of their leaders, braving bullets, and the police in panic was hastening to remove the prisoners elsewhere, Com. Kastur who had been brought out of the jail, proceeded to render a service to the authorities by asking workers to disperse peacefully and not fall a prey to provocation.

At various places, individual comrades - prominent among them being Abaji and Kohite, display panic and cowardice before police terror.

The extent of the reformism in majority of the POC comrades is revealed in the April meeting of the POC where the 16th March strike and the coming perspectives were reviewed.

Keshav submitted a report strongly defending the call of the 16th March strike. He outlined the coming perspective, visualising the bourgeois offensive in textiles and sweepers, under cover of the Mangalmurti and Sarwate tribunals. He put forward the task of specific agitation to prepare the working class for resisting it.

Note, M.D., and Ram oppose the 16th March call as vanguardist and economist, the first two even branding it as agent-provocatourism. In the name of political work of exposure, Party's unpreparedness, the inner-Party crisis etc., they advocated a line of no struggle, of abatement of all struggles, in a situation when the working class was coming forward for the boldest actions. It was a policy of open betrayal.

Balram and Shyam, oppose the call on the 16th March, on the basis of lack of adequate preparations, advocating that it would perhaps have been more expedient, say on the 16th April. How is one to understand the unprincipled stand of these two comrades, excepting as an attitude of surrendering to the previous section, as an attitude which in effect turns out to be the same? The inconsistency and vacillation of Balram stand out, when it is noted that just before this he had along with Com. Azad personally visited Rajnandgaon, suggested to the local militants to continue the struggle, with the issue of victimisation which was still then causing intense agitation, wrote out a handbill for them along these lines, and even sent Masurkar to help in leading the struggle.

With regard to the coming perspectives and our tasks outlined, Note again attacks it as "economism" as running away with spontaneous discontent etc. Once again we find M.D. rallying to Note, and only after violent discussion, is he made to formally agree with the perspectives and tasks posed by other comrades.

Thus the reformism and the vacillations, expressed in the comrades ~~mentioned~~ mentioned, stood exposed as downright anti-struggle tendencies. The spurious excuse and dubious stand of these comrades, of opposing struggles with the plea of inner-Party crisis, of saving cadres etc. when the working class was coming forward to fight intense battles, even after the Party Congress, showed that though the Thesis was being accepted formally, it was being completely negated in practice.

However, even after the discussion regarding the coming perspectives, reformist illusions continue to haunt our practice which showed that the understanding was formal. Soon afterwards Ruiker started his hunger-strike in jail. Most of the POC members correctly assessed it, as a prelude to his betrayal, but there was marked hesitation and reluctance to concretely expose this treachery before the mass of the workers and to forewarn them, so as to rescue them from reformist ~~and~~ deception as for instance the handbill issued by the Nagpur Textile Fraction. After Ruiker's undertaking to the Government accepting industrial truce, Black Act etc. and promising servile cooperation with the tribunals, the members of the POC who were present (Ram, Keshav, Balram and Shyam) gauged the complete betrayal of Ruiker and even formally acknowledged that the bourgeoisie and its henchmen are out to isolate the Communists as the most consistent fighters of the working class movement and to behead them. But even then the majority of the Sectl. members, Keshav, Balram and Shyam, harboured almost childish illusions of legality, wrongly estimated that for a few days at least there would be a respite and that the Government would keep to its declaration at least in the case of the President of the PTUC. As is known, such illusions were promptly smashed by the Govt. when it arrested Keshav, who had on that understanding, emerged from underground. A statement for the press drafted by M.D. after Keshav's arrest, even failed to sharply condemn Ruiker's betrayal which had paved the way to this treachery, and took a stand of condemning the arrests etc. on the basis of the agreement. This actually meant surreptitiously accepting this agreement.

We now proceed to review our practice on all major fronts and issues, in the more recent period - i.e. from June onwards, when the Party recovered from the initial disorganisation caused by repression, and re-established its links.

VI. As visualised, the Assessors' Committee report and the Mangalmurti Award, heralded the bourgeois offensive on the textile-workers of this province. In Nagpur a correct attitude is taken up to this question in the matter of exposing the nature of this offensive, in denouncing the treacherous role of the reformists who had been parties to the award, in pointing the real revolutionary way-out of the crisis viz., nationalisation and workers' control, living wage etc., and in giving the call for united mass resistance to every aspect of the bourgeois attack despite their reformist leaders. Through a series of handbills this line is put forward amongst the textile-workers of Nagpur. Simultaneously, on the basis of an estimate of the growing upsurge amongst the textile-workers, and the treacherous and disruptive role of all the 4 reformist unions, the slogan is put forward for a "United Textile Workers' Committees" as an organiser of the struggle, and a prelude to the "re-unification of the working class under Communist leadership" i.e. as the starting point for a United Trade Union under our lead. Thus, when the owners put up a notice in Nagpur about implementing the Award, the workers spontaneously go on general strike from August 2 despite the vigorous strike-breaking activities of all the 4 reformist unions, and look to us expectantly, even if not confidently, for lead. A number of militants come together to form the UTWC. As a result of this immediate strike action, the workers forced the Govt. the owners and the reformist leaders after 3 days, to postpone the implementation of the work-schedule pending the final award. This act too, was immediately exposed as a ruse to gain time and disrupt the working class, the workers were warned that the final award would be nothing different, and they were therefore called upon to prepare for struggle and not to slacken their vigilance. As expected, the bourgeoisie launched its attack after a few days, and again the workers went on a strike in many departments of the Express Mills. Once again we boldly came forward to participate in the strike, attacking the reformists' role, and independently gave a call for one-day strike against the mass repression which Government had started by them. Because of the unprecedented mass terror against all workers, and especially the members of the UTWC, there was of course a temporary setback, even a partial loss of confidence by the worker in his own fighting capacity. Hence the tactics of rallying the workers, through participation in the Works Committee election, while at the same time exposing its nature, and calling upon the workers to unite for struggle for their basic demands, was adopted. Many members of the local textile fraction, overwhelmed by the bourgeois terror, and stunned by Mohite's defection at that period, betrayed considerable vacillation in boldly agitating on this programme and in conducting the election campaign, which explains the failure to rally any section worth the name round the UTWC in this period. History proved within a month the correctness of the lead given by the Nagpur D.C. to these comrades, that under conditions of a maturing revolutionary crisis any setback can only be at best temporary, that the working class would come forward into the battle again and again, every time more steeled, and that therefore it would be impermissible to disorientate ourselves from the path of struggles - partial or general, on the plea that the workers are "demoralised", and so on. Some comrades, who in the face of this clear direction, nevertheless flunked when called upon to lead agitation and strikes in their department, e.g. Meshram and Nakhle, or baffled by the initial difficulties which the UTWC is bound to encounter, have advocated driving it "underground" as it were, have rightly deserved the censure of the Party, though the D.C. has upto now neglected the task of liquidating such trends and eliminating such elements, and has even shown some indulgence towards them.

Lack of clarity about the marx perspectives of the developing struggle, and therefore negligence of the task of concrete exposure at certain moments, for instance, when the court was in its final session, however prevented the mobilisation of militants round the UTWC, and was even responsible for the "demoralisation" which for sometime overtook a few fraction comrades. But if such has been our practice, in the main, in Nagpur - the centre of reformist influence amongst the textiles-workers, what has been our practice in the 3 Berar centres - where we are the leading force, and where at one centre we have unchallenged sway? One must analyse the estimate of the situation or the attitude towards concrete issues of struggle, which the leaders of the Amraoti D.C. from time to time maintained, as well as their work in this period, to answer this question.

After his release in May end, Com. Sudam first of all put forward views with regard to increased work-load and retrenchment, which basically coincided with those held by Ruiker. The attention of the Amraoti D.C. was immediately drawn to these erroneous views held by the leading comrades on textiles in Berar, through a letter addressed by Balram on behalf of the Nagpur D.C. The Amraoti D.C. instead of seriously undertaking a fight against such views and of calling Sudam to order, satisfied itself by asking Sudam and Balram to meet together, and thrash out the points, as if it was some thing concerning them mutually. With the publication of the Award, Comrades Sudam and S.K. in response to an invitation by Ruiker, participated in a Conference. In this meeting, Sudam not only did not attack the Award and the part played by Ruiker in foisting it on the workers, but on the contrary almost approved of it, with certain minor and petty reservations (e.g. the lowness of the piece-rates). Both these comrades even accepted positions in a sub-committee set up at this Conference by Ruiker, the object of which was to suggest insignificant alterations within the framework of the Award and to throw dust in the eyes of the workers. Com. S.K. at that stage, disapproved of Sudam's position and realised very soon that the participation in such a sub-committee was a reformist blunder. An informal meeting of leading comrades on the textile-front, where for a considerable time Balram argued with Sudam, revealed among other things that Sudam completely underestimated the

the attack of retrenchment and increased work-load, and he had no faith that the worker could or would resist it. He made an anti-working class distinction between badli and permanent workers, casually remarking that the Award would only mean more enforced leave for the badli workers about whom the owners have no obligation to give work, and that the permanent workers will not fight against this. It is with similar arguments, Ruiker and his agents in Nagpur tried to screen the bourgeois offensive, to whitewash the Award and to divide the badli from the permanent workers. In this Sudam was nowhere in advance of Ruiker, or of the consciousness of the most backward worker.

The roots of Sudam's reformist understanding, lay in his refusal to see the economic crisis, his denial of the bourgeois offensive, and his failure to see the growing working class upsurge against this offensive - his lack of faith in the working class. That is, in short, his denial of every element of the maturing revolutionary crisis.

Even after the above discussion even though Sudam formally resiled from his previous position, it is clear he did not change. For as it transpires he advocated similar views in his talks with the comrades at Ellichpur, on the above, as well as on the question of third shift - which had already been sufficiently exposed by articles in the PA and the Azadi.

Throughout this period, all struggles have been continuously avoided and sabotaged at all the 3 Berar centres. The strikes fought by the Nagpur and Pulgaon workers in August were on basic issues affecting the entire working class. Yet nothing was done in the Berar centres to draw the workers into the struggle, which would have considerably deepened and intensified the fight against the award right at that stage. Workers at other centres resist the "piece-rates" and "difference" arising from the Award, but at these centres the owners successfully introduced these measures, without any opposition on our part, even though workers are considerably dissatisfied. At Ellichpur on 2 or 3 occasions strikes spontaneously break out in some departments but at our instance they are withdrawn. In the name of a general concerted struggle on all fundamental issues, which is supposed to break out at some future date (perhaps after we had "reorganised ourselves!"), partial struggles are withheld, even though this wrong distinction between "partial" and "general struggles" was already debunked in a Fraction meeting in September. When a "general struggle" does actually break out (much sooner than we expected), it finds ~~very~~ these very comrades completely unwilling to lead or organise it.

The gathering discontent of the working class against the attack on its standards, reached bursting point after the arrogant refusal of the owners to grant 3 months' bonus. This indignation compelled even the arch traitor - Ruiker, to talk the language of strike and even serve notice for it, if only to cover up his inevitable compromise on this issue and to divert and canalise the workers' discontent. The Berar Council of Action of our 3 unions, also served a notice of strike linking up the demand of bonus with the other basic issues of the workers. The Provincial handbill clearly warned the workers against Ruiker's game, exposed his manoeuvre, pointed out that he does not mean to launch any ~~unint~~ strike, and called on workers to rally in local and Provincial Joint Councils of Action. The resolution passed by the POC visualised all this and pointed to our primary responsibility of leading it locally and provincially. The resolution and the discussions underlined the connection between the general strike for bonus with the wider general strike against work-load, retrenchment and for living wage, full DA etc. emphasising that a bold leadership in the first phase would alone rouse the working class to the next higher phase of struggle. True, it did not 'predict' that ~~for~~ the owners themselves would precipitate the struggle against ~~the~~ increased work-load, almost at once, within a day of the commencement of the strike for bonus. but that could cause no misgiving or confusion in the mind of anyone who had grasped the depth of the working class upsurge ~~noted~~ and had orientated himself to the task of leading this upsurge and of developing it.

However, even before they heard of Ruiker's withdrawal of the strike, and in complete opposition to the entire line put forward by the POC the Amraoti D.C. in its meeting held on 11th December had already decided on backing out of the strike, for this is the essence of the following long passage from the report of the Amraoti D.C.:-

"....it was decided that whether Nagpur continues or not our centres go on strike on 15th Dec. Akola and Badnera resume after a day but Ellichpur continues for a few days more and ~~then~~ withdraws. But if Nagpur continues, Ellichpur too continues till the end. D.C. however thought that in view of the attitude of Government, Ruiker may not succeed in his negotiation and province-wide struggle was likely to develop. In that case it was decided to make proper arrangements at Akola and Badnera to carry vigorous agitation to draw workers in line with the provincial workers."

What had happened within the week which intervened between the POC meeting referred to before the Amraoti DC meeting? The only "change in the situation" was the arrest of a few comrades at Akola and later on at Badnera.

Despite the instructions conveyed to the leaders of the Amraoti DC by Keshav and Balram to reverse this policy of sabotage, on the very eve of a big struggle, they would not change. The letter sent by Balram pointed out to them that their line meant a precipitate retreat before the first attack, that by deciding in advance for withdrawal (instead of

seriously planning how to conduct the strike despite repression), they were letting down the entire working class of the province, and so on.

We must take detailed note of the entire understanding and practice revealed by the leaders of the Amraoti DC in this matter, for there are 5 members of the POC amongst them, and the Berar textile workers are an important section of the working class movement in our province.

Consider the grimness of the fight that has been waged by the textile-workers since December 15. For nearly 2 months now, against all the strike-breaking efforts of reformists, and the cunning manoeuvres of the bourgeoisie, facing mass dismissal etc. the workers of Nagpur are holding on to the fight. Workers of Ellichpur have written glorious pages of history by standing up to the most vicious terror - massed police raids on bustees, arrests of more than 150, cases against scores and so on. They spurned contemptuously the INTUC strike-breakers and displayed militant initiative. In this, most of our working class comrades have been in the fore. But in nauseating contrast, look at the strike-breaking activity which Sudam started even before the strike actually commenced. Then later, on, on the 18th, and subsequently at every stage. The roots of this are to be found of course, in the entire attitude of the Amraoti DC. It would be permissible here to quote at length from a report submitted by Com. Shanker Rao Kadam, Secretary, Ellichpur Taluka Committee of the CPI with the approval of Com. Madhukar Vaidya (member, Prov. Textile Fraction) from Ellichpur:-

"On 15th December the workers of the Vidharbha Mills Ellichpur struck work for the demand of 3 months bonus and on 21st, the strike was unconditionally withdrawn and the workers resumed work. Subsequently the owners started a bitter attack on the workers.

Prior to this on the 28th November there was a meeting of the DC and the following decision was taken. If there is a strike in Nagpur (on 15th) the Ellichpur workers also to come out on strike and at Badnera and Akola if there is a one-day strike Ellichpur also to come out on strike.

On this basis the Ellichpur T.C. held a party meeting on the 13th December. In that meeting Com. Sudam was of the opinion that Ellichpur should also have one day or two days strike and then withdraw the strike. The second trend was which advocated that from 15th December the workers of Ellichpur as per their notice should go on a continuous strike for their demands. There was a section in this trend which said that if we go on strike let there be a continuous one or else let us not have even one day strike; and for this let a comrade be sent to Nagpur who should go and see the situation re. the strike there and send a telegram whether Ellichpur should have a strike or not. The reason they gave was that even if we have one day strike there is bound to be repression, arrests etc. So why not have continuous strike. Finally this itself became the decision of the meeting.

As per decision one comrade went to Nagpur but his telegram instead of reaching on the 14th by 5.30 reached on the 15th at 3 PM. By that time the strike had started. The strike was to have started on the 15th as per notice, but a new situation developed on the 14th.

On the 14th December as usual the workers went on work. The Police in utter disregard of the rules under the factories act (of course with the consent of the Manager - nay, in conspiracy with the manager) started going from Dept. to Dept. and began to ask (by name) for the militant workers and members of the managing committee. The workers got infuriated, at once stopped work and marched in a demonstration on the office of the manager and demanded of him explanation as to how the police got in. Seeing the mood of the workers the manager came down and apologised to the workers. Later the police got out of the factory gate, but they cordoned off the gates from outside. The workers who had by then restarted work, immediately struck work again, and condemning the management marched out; They marched throughout the city in a procession, giving slogans of condemning the repression and shouting Jai of the Red Flag. Thus it was that in Ellichpur the strike started as from the 14th December.

Since the beginning of the strike Com. Sudam was of the view that the strike should be unconditionally withdrawn. But in that opinion of his not one member of the T.C. lent support; and so his viewpoint was defeated. Like the other workers in the province we should also go on continuous strike that was the opinion which prevailed in the Party meeting.

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Hardly had 3-4 days elapsed, Com. Sudam asked Com. Madhu Vaidya, Joint Secy. Girni Masdoor Sangh Ellichpur, to tell the workers to withdraw the strike unconditionally and resume work from the 21st. Those who had not been arrested and also those who had saved themselves from the clutches of the police all such comrades opposed this stand. But despite their opposition, in utter disregard of it, Com. Sudam withdrew the strike and Madhu Vaidya under his signature put up posters re. this withdrawal and even announced in the mohallas through "Bhongas" in the name of the Red Flag asking the workers to resume work. Three days having passed after the start of the strike, even at that stage Com. Sudam wrote to the SDO that we are prepared to withdraw the strike and that we should be granted permission for a public meeting. But the SDO did not reply to Sudam's letter. Finally even without a public meeting, and without ascertaining the democratic verdict of the workers, even in disregard of the opinion of the remaining militant workers of the Union or of the Party members who were yet out, this decision was taken. In the so-called meeting of the

of the local workers which was held on the 19th, only Sudam and Madhu Vaidya (Jt. Secy. U.M.S.) where the two responsible leaders who were present. The rest - 8 to 10, were just ordinary workers. And before these ordinary workers, by raising a bogey of the disruptive activities of the INTUC Union, the decision for withdrawing the strike was taken. But neither did Sudam bring it to the notice of these workers, nor does he himself seem to have taken note of it while doing all this, that the owners have put up a notice re. increased work-load and retrenchment right on the 16th, and that if we at this stage withdraw the strike unconditionally what about our fight against increased workload and retrenchment? Or what about the arrested and U.G. workers? Not considering any of these things this incorrect decision of sort of smothering of the strike was taken.

As per the direction of the Union all the workers resumed on the 21st December. There the owner forced on them two looms, two sides etc., and the day shift workers even worked as per that for 1-2 days. But the workers of the night shift started resisting this attack of the owners and started a sit down strike on the night shift. Thus the day shift workers were also forced to start a stay in strike and refuse working of two looms two sides etc. Thus a spontaneous strike of both shifts started in both shifts. Despite all the efforts of the manager when the workers refused to accept increased work-load; on the contrary when they gave him a rebuff on the basis of their united strength, then the owner declared an indefinite lockout of the mills and also started dismissing the workers en masse. The notices of dismissals is still being given. The friends of the owner (Madanlal Choudhary and Bapusahib Deshmukh) and the INTUC Union, are trying to recruit fresh hands, but are not succeeding. In this "holy work" the manager is freely spending money, but this very manager on 9th January while distributing wages for December deducted wages of the workers to the extent of thousands of rupees. In the present situation the workers as well as the Union have both determined to conduct the strike till the last limit."

(Then there is an appeal for funds. (This letter has been written after consent of Madhu Vaidya, Member Prov. Ex. Fraction). (Sd/ Shanker Rao Kadu, Secretary, T.C. Ellichpur).)

But enough! This report written by 2 comrades from Ellichpur needs no further comment to show how the hardened reformist outlook of some of the Amraoti D.C. leaders had made them into strike-breakers.

In the midst of the strike, Amraoti DC met to review it (on 2nd and 3rd Jan). Here is how the Amraoti DC generalised its experience of the strike: "Experience has proved, that in the absence of organisation, despite their discontent, it is difficult to bring the workers, who are terrorised by repression and paralysed by the activities of the disruptors, on to the field of battle. And again, in the absence of organisation, one has to trail behind the spontaneous upsurge of the workers!" (Resolution of the Amraoti DC). Complete contempt for the revolutionary upsurge of the masses, underestimation of its significance- such is the essence of this outlook. It is not the discontent of the masses which in a revolutionary period draws them again and again and in ever-greater number and militancy on to the field of battle, and which the C.P. is called upon at least to participate in. No! Quite the contrary! It is "we" who drag them into the struggle, and are finding it difficult to do so today for...they are 'terrorised' and 'paralysed'! The question arises who is 'terrorised' and 'paralysed'? Is it the leaders of the Amraoti D.C. or the mass of the workers? Should not 'experience' have proved the former!

Firstly, to give up the struggle, the moment some comrades are arrested, and then dub the masses are having been demoralised, - is it anything else than reformist sabotage, hiding behind slanders of the working class?

In the Report of the Amraoti D.C. the following is said, with regard to how the strike actually started:-

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"C. of A. met at Ellichpur on 28th Novr. and called upon the workers to be ~~in~~ readiness for struggle. But by that time Ruiker had already given notice of strike and we also had to give call without adequate preparation" (emphasis theirs).

Why had Ruiker given the call for strike? Just because it was no longer possible to hold back the mounting upsurge of the working class. But it is this which the comrades refuse to see. Thus when they repeat endlessly about "lack of preparation" it only reveals their fear of this struggle. In a letter to the Amraoti D.C. dated 26/12/48, Balram commenting on the absolute negligence of agitation throughout these months - had pointed out as "one, amongst many more aspects", that,

"I think, therefore, that it won't do for us to talk of "lack of preparedness" in general and of "over estimation of our strength" in general for such things do not explain as to how these "lacks" etc. are to be and ought to have been removed...."

"It follows that where there is no perspective of real militant struggles, there is no seriousness about agitation in order to prepare the workers for the same. The two are linked.

The bankrupt banner of "lack of preparations", which Balram and Shyam held aloft to oppose the 16th March strike and which with the first live contact with the mass movement they had long since abandoned, is now being flaunted by the leaders of the Amraoti D.C. for it is no longer possible for them to use other pleas like agent-provocatourism" and so on. The PB

report "On Tactical Line" has remarked in this connection: "Firstly to make no preparations and without preparation or minimum org. measures bring the masses to the point of action and then in the name of preparation postpone action - is betrayal."

Com. M.D. explains all this action by saying that "Amraoti D.C. is faced with the primary task of reorganising the Party (emphasis his) without which nothing seemed possible".

(M.D.'s reply to the P.C.S.) This is not the first time such a bogus plea was put forward. A strike-wave bursts out in August, but the Amraoti D.C. is busy "reorganising" itself and has no time to poke its nose in it. Piece-rates etc. are being introduced but once again Amraoti D.C. is engaged in the task of 'reorganising'. And finally in Dec., it is once again 'reorganising' itself. It is clear that the endless re-organisation of the Party, is not understood as having anything to do with the task of forging the Party into an efficient vanguard of the working class in Berar, with the task of leading and organising the working class struggles. If this wrong understanding permeates the entire Party in the Province (as we shall see later), at least in the case of the Amraoti D.C. it has been raised to the level of a special theory to explain all opposition to struggles and mass actions whether in the working class or kisans.

One even hears the echoes of Joshi's Pol-Org. letter of dishonoured memory in the arguments of the leaders of the Amraoti D.C. (especially in Com. Sudan) viz. the talk about "lack of people's support" as a reason prompting the withdrawal of the strike in Bilichpur - witness, his talk with Keshav and Balram, Madhu's report to the textile fraction and the resolution of the Amraoti D.C. Who are the "people" whose support and sympathy we count upon? - The petty bourgeoisie and kisans, who are closely linked with Bilichpur workers. Their sympathy is forthcoming, to the extent the working class boldly and valorously fights the bourgeois policies. Only to that extent, the vacillations of the petty-bourgeois are overcome and they are won as our allies.

In this period, as a result of the political and practical weaknesses of the Prov. Fraction leadership - the causes of which are obvious, it has no doubt not succeeded in giving very much help and guidance. For instance, the August resolution on Textile, which otherwise outlines a correct perspective and tactics, does not help in changing the practice of Berar comrades, because it did not analyse their failure during August strike-wave. Similarly these questions with regard to the attitude towards 'partial struggles' and 'lack of preparation' were dealt with in general, in abstract, and not in relation to the practice being pursued at these centres - even in the latest documents or discussions. But when the D.C. instead of reviewing its own actions, passes off the blame on the Prov. Fraction it is only misleading the ranks and hiding its own mistakes. Such methods cannot advance work in Berar.

VII. These months saw big spontaneous agricultural workers' strike both in Chhattisgarh and Berar. At one or two places like Sawangi and Mikhed, they have been led by the local comrades there, as 'partial struggles'. But on the whole absolutely nothing has happened and there is complete deadlock, because as yet the Party has not cut the umbilical chord which tied it to the rich and middle peasants at both these places, even though formally it talks now of organising the agricultural workers. In Chhattisgarh there has been hesitation in organising struggle on the basis of the few villages where our work extends with the imaginary fear that "such struggles may get smashed in isolation". It was an attitude which ignored the extent of the widespread discontent amongst agricultural workers throughout Chhattisgarh, which would be unleashed by intensive agitation and bold leadership of struggles, if only in the villages which we can approach. In Chandur the Party cadres have only been used to legal forms of activity - viz. meetings, rallies, cultural shows and conferences, which do not seem to help in carrying forward our activity in this period. Unaware of the crisis, which is maturing amongst the kisans and the discontent which is drawing the agricultural labourers and poor peasants towards struggle, they are unable therefore to adopt themselves to newer and militant forms e.g. strikes, demonstrations despite all ban, forcible occupation and ~~fight~~ tilling of land, and so on. Thus reformist outlook has led to complete paralysation of this front.

In all this, the biggest failing naturally has been that of the leadership, which undertook no concrete analysis of the actual class relations existing and developing in the rural areas, and the way in which the economic crisis was developing. Consequently it could give no lead at all to the Kisan Party members in the province. The way forward is opened by the PB document on the Agricultural Situation, on the basis of which - both in Berar and Chhattisgarh, the concrete class relations have to be understood. Our activity has to base itself firmly on the rural proletariat and poor peasants, organising the former in its independent class organisation and so on. Round the slogans of abolition of zamindari, nationalisation of land, and land to the tillers, the developing struggles have to be boldly led.

VIII. In the Railways, under the active guidance of the A.I.R. Fraction, the Party has made some headway - both in the sense of developing its work and preparing for the strike. But there are undoubtedly lots of vacillations in many of the comrades working in the railway - an attitude of unbecoming panic and hesitation, which if not combated will

betray the railway strike. This is seen also in the case of leading comrades amongst the Postal workers at Nagpur and Jubbulpore. Even apart from these cowardly vacillations - which today can find no place in the Party, reformist understanding is also to be seen in the hesitation to break with the treacherous reformist leadership (especially in B.N.R.) on the false grounds of 'tactics', in the absolute neglect to boldly organise mass strike committees and Councils of Action in Departments, stations and workshops, in the failure to take up the task of organising sections vital to the strike, in the neglect even to utilise the strike ballot etc., as means to prepare the workers for strike (especially though not exclusively, in Jubbulpore). Clearly, many comrades in the railway and postal workers lack faith in the possibility of a strike. They do not realise the significance of this strike and therefore do not want to direct all their activity round the slogan "Everything for the strike".

IX. In the sweepers as well as on the other T.U. fronts, there is a stalemate and disintegration. The attitude of our comrades - of not exposing the reformists, of even retreating before their attacks, of not agitating amongst the workers on their fundamental demands, and of preparing them for struggle (despite for instance, a P.O.C. resolution to that effect on sweepers), is leading in many cases to our actually losing ground before the reformists. This is so for example, in the sweepers, electric and Postal workers in Jubbulpore. In Nagpur similar trend of wavering before the attacks of INTUC agents in the sweepers, which has not yet been successfully combated, threatens the very existence of the sweepers' Union. The way reformism distorts and negates every slogan of struggles can be seen from this quotation from the report of the Jubbulpore D.C. with regard to tasks ~~on~~ on the sweepers' front.

"Sweepers (a) See that the Sarwate Award is implemented to the advantage of sweepers e.g. in such a way that the sweepers get their full arrears, boy sweepers get the same on the basis of equal pay for equal work, etc." (Report dated 27th Jan.)

The POC resolution had talked of rejecting the Sarwate Award, of preparing the workers to resist this atrocious award - the worst so far in our Prov. and organise for a struggle on the basis of living wage, D.A. equal to what the textile-workers get, no retrenchment etc. But the report of the Jubbulpore D.C. talks of adapting the award to the sweepers' advantage !

The roots of the entire stalemate in the T.U. front lie in the reformist understanding that the bourgeois terror is all-powerful, that the working class is demoralised and cannot fight it back, that the struggle of any section will be crushed and so on. Experience shows that these prognostications are not justified. For instance, in BHP, the electric workers went on strike. They fearlessly broke 144, demonstrated en masse, and 100 of them - almost the total complement went to jail. The Railway-workers came forward in solidarity action. Though the leadership gave them counsels of caution and attempted to hold them back, in the name of not precipitating any repression and making preparations for the coming railway strike. Strength of reformist influence can be seen from this, that even after a practical demonstration of the workers' capacity to fight, Sarju wrote a review which actually criticised the strike since it did not conform to the anti-struggle tactics of "hit and run" propounded in the Bengal Prov. Sectt. resolution. Lack of political seriousness and an under-estimation of the fight against reformism can be seen from this, that though the members of the D.C. were not in agreement with Sarju's review, and their attention to the atrocious formulations of Sarju were drawn, the D.C. under the plea of 'no time' did not fight them out, did not call Sarju to order.

Unable to see these reformist mistakes, the Nagpur D.C. (in its report in September) and the Jubbulpore D.C. even in its latest report (27th January) - have characterised the work on the T.U. front as being "trailing behind spontaneity" and so forth. This phrase borrowed from the Joshite vocabulary has been many times used to hide our reformist anti-struggle tendency, by decrying the spontaneous initiative of the masses. It should be clear that the disease lies elsewhere and it is there it has got to be combated.

X. In the students there has been no awareness of the general upsurge, which has been gathering and expressing itself on various issues (e.g. the question of test examinations in Bihar and so on). Just because the students failed to respond to the call to observe Hyderabad Day, Anti-repression Day, and to take up a position of directly opposing the policies of the bourgeois Government comrades concluded that the students have become 'non-political' that they cannot be roused into any action and so on.

A situation developed in Nagpur for instance, where every time comrades would apply for permission to hold a meeting, and then when it was refused, they would sit back almost with relief and exclaim - "What can we do? Nothing." Thus was all action abjured, and anti-struggle tendency took refuge behind the plea - first prepare the students on students' demands. During the October Working Committee meeting of the P.S. these trends were criticised and the slogan ~~given~~ given to "orientate towards struggles, taking any issue that agitates the students". But here again the wrong organisational lead of "prepare for the conference", actually served to divert all attention from the task of building struggles. When the lathi charge on Bombay students took place, majority of the Fr. members had to be given a mandate to call for a protest-strike and the crass

expression of reformism were only subsequently combated in a Fr. meeting. The protest-strikes on Bombay lathi-charge and Calcutta firing (the second bigger than the first) even though they were limited in extent, because of our previous organisational failings, and the fact that some of the comrades have not yet broken with reformism, showed clearly how tremendously the growing upsurge in students was being under-estimated. As a result of these reformist deviations, the student movement has been in a state of stagnation, despite some show of activity at few centres.

XI. The entire reformist understanding of the Party leadership was demonstrated clearly in its attitude to the question of hunger-strike by jail-comrades. The fact that the POC, even after getting intimation from the jailed comrades since long, did not seriously take up the question or assess its political significance, and ten days before the strike was scheduled, decided on making comrades to postpone it for a week, - reveals its utter under-estimation of struggles in jail. Its main pre-occupation was to get the hunger-strike postponed by a fortnight, on the grounds of running a campaign to create public opinion. But when the H.S. actually started, absolutely nothing was done, except to some extent in Nagpur, to popularise the struggle within jail, and to rally support.

The Jubbulpore D.C. went to the extent of giving a mandate for its withdrawal to the jailed comrades and addressed the telegram to the enemy in the fight vis. the jail authorities. Its action was a direct strike-breaking action - as action of betrayal. But the fact that Jubbulpore D.C. actually resorted to strike-breaking is not just accidental. It is the direct result - the crassest expression of the reformist understanding, which pervaded the POC leadership, which right at the start was expressed in its decision of postponement, and was later on seen in its "Reply to the Jail comrades" (by Balram) and "Circular on H.S." (By Ram) - both drafted after discussions in the POC. The "Reply" does not openly take an anti-struggle attitude. It even talks of "the significance of struggle within jail" and brands the action of Jubbulpore D.C. as "strike-breaking", and of Om Prakash as "desertion in the middle of struggle". But by failing to see the reformist mistakes in the stand of the POC mentioned above, by failing to take a self-critical stand even after the sharp note of the jailed comrades (and on the contrary taking exception to its "tone"), by restoring O.P. who had sold the honour of the Party, to Party membership after a short period of suspension, it betrays its reformist character. What is left unsaid in this reply, is to be seen in the "circular" where hiding behind the Bengal Prov. Sectt.'s "Hit and Run" affair, ~~xxx~~ the struggles within jail are actually berated, and their significance under-estimated !

Characteristics of the strength of reformism in some of the comrades, is the fact that the Jubbulpore D.C. refused to recognise its action as strike-breaking - an obvious thing which requires no document to prove it.

XII. But the height of reformism - its utter rottenness, is revealed on questions of organisation, and on the attitude towards past mistakes, which the members of the POC maintained during this period.

No effort at self-criticism is undertaken by the POC. In fact, despite the atrociously reformist points by Note and D.J. with regard to 16th March in their letters, the POC in its "Note on Note and D.J." which it circulated amongst the ranks preceding their expulsion, "omitted" to answer them, as well as other wild allegations aimed especially at Keshav. Along with the POC statement their letters too were circulated, while a note by Keshav on the 16th March which took a correct stand, was simply forgotten. In this entire period, issues for political controversy are formulated for inner-Party discussion. There is Keshav's note on the 16th March. There are the letters from Jail-comrades, on the question of hunger-strike, and on action against O.P. There is subsequently the note drafted by Keshav after the Party Conference. All these documents attempt to put forward a correct perspective on the issues of Party life. But the members of the POC not only do not care to take serious note of these documents, they do not even circulate them amongst the Party ranks or organise discussions on them. On the contrary wrong and unfounded criticisms are indulged in against Keshav. Amraoti D.C. goes to the extent subsequently of even opposing the POC's decision of circulating Keshav's note to the D.C.'s.

An absolutely opportunist and bourgeois reformist stand is taken about holding District and Provincial Conferences, which were not understood as the means to unify the Party politically and to evolve a unified revolutionary leadership, but as means to get elected committees, to secure a vote of confidence from the ranks, and silence all discontent amongst them. It was importing bourgeois liberal ideas inside the Party. The fact that in their justified dissatisfaction against the Party leadership, majority of the ranks demanded elections etc., - the right to express a democratic verdict, cannot justify or explain why the members of POC should have taken recourse to such anti-Party bourgeois-liberal methods. The fiasco of this understanding is to be seen in the Provincial Conference held in November. The task of the conference was precisely to review the entire past understanding and practices, in the light of the New Thesis, to assess the role of each member of the POC in the past. Its task was to help the Party in this province to make a sharp break with the past, and to "clear the deck" for a revolutionary line in the following period. But such was not the intention or idea of the POC when it convened the Conference. From the start, they thought of only presenting an "organisational report," i.e. a report devoid of

any self-critical review of past practices, a non-political report - a report which bypasses all discussion -, and of holding the elections for a new Provincial Committee.

The report drafted by M.D. and Ram, after a general discussion inside the POC and presented to the Conference, as well as the entire conducting of the conference reveals the absence of political seriousness in the rank members, of the POC. A Conference is convened preceded by no inner-Party discussion on any self-critical report. A report is presented, which had not been even adopted by the POC. 3 members of the POC (Balraj, Azad and Keshav) - who had been released only on the eve of the Conference) repudiate this report in their notes and even ask the Conference to reject it (the former 2 being parties to the previous discussion). And then the delegates are asked to elect a new POC. About such acts, the PB has rightly said, "~~This Conference through its members has not only repudiated the report but also many of the delegates, possible to see the questions shall be forming, fall into the trap of factional prejudices against~~ "This is nothing short of making fun of Party delegates and an open announcement of one's political bankruptcy". The Provincial Conference thus gets converted into a means to put a seal on reformism, and many of the delegates, unable to see the pernicious hold of reformism, fall into the trap of factional prejudices against Keshav, who had on a number of occasions opposed the reformist outlook. With the result, that he is not elected to the new POC. A number of POC members naturally did not accept this verdict as being correct, and pressed for Keshav's co-option in the POC, though they did not yet see that by their previous attitude they had been a party to all this and that the talk of co-option then was not fighting reformism but actually bypassing the fight. But what can one say about the attitude of these ~~unworthy~~ members, like Sudam, Ram, S.K. Deshpande and others (M.D. was absent in this meeting), who losing all sense of objectivity, upheld this verdict and even regarded it as the condemnation by the ranks of Keshav's politics ?

A typically anti-working class attitude is also seen in holding to double-standards while judging working class and middle class comrades. For instance, while Abaji and White are expelled for their dishonourable acts, O.P. who was guilty of no less a crime is restored to membership after a period of suspension.

In the case of die-hard reformists, we even see the emergence of disruptive tendencies - witness, the reply of M.D. and Amraoti D.C., to Balraj's letter, in which instead of analysing their own mistakes, they turn back and attack the Fraction, and M.D. raises the question of so-called "healthy life" ? What does M.D. mean ? He obviously means an inner-Party truce. With the intensification of the class struggle outside, it was inevitable, that some comrades for all their mistakes would more and more from experience, pursue the struggle inside the Party too, But M.D. is "indignant" (his own word), if the struggle at least begins to take a sharp form. He expresses apprehension that, "may be, you intend to collect material for another document probably on reformist deviation". In other words, M.D. would like the Party to remain sunk in reformism, avoid all serious inner-Party discussions, and instead indulge in the old disruptive habit pursued hitherto of reducing everything to the plane of non-political squabbles.

Reformism in matters of org. is also seen in the criminally loose state in which the Party's Tech. is to be found all over the province. All tech. rules of functioning are disregarded. No tech. apparatus exists. All this betrays a non-political underestimation of the class enemy, who any day might arrest the functionaries and paralyse the Party of the working class. Similarly conceptions of ~~formal democracy~~ "formal democracy" are also exposing the Party and its cadres to great risks.

Thus, reformism permeates the functioning of the C.P. P.C. to date. Die-hard reformists, who oppose all struggles, in the name of "lack of preparation", "saving cadres", etc. who hide behind slanders of the working-class as being "terrorised", "demoralised" or "backward", who are blind to the revolutionary upsurge of the masses and lack of faith in the working class, constitute the majority of the POC. They completely negate the Party Thesis in daily practice, while accepting it in words. The rest display vacillations, and especially on the questions of organisation, capitulate to reformism. If the POC has failed to give any positive lead till today, as the ranks genuinely point out, it is because of this inherent character of the POC.

The struggle against reformism within the Party of the working class is an essential and inseparable part of the struggle for the hegemony of the proletariat in the People's Democratic Revolution, and must be as ruthlessly conducted. A clean break with the reformist past, an end to the vacillating and compromising attitude of those, who otherwise on many specific issues advocate a correct line, is an essential condition in pursuing this struggle.

We now conclude the report. It is by no means exhaustive nor a full review of all our work. But it attempts to put the finger on reformism. If today we have been forced to come forward, and in sharp and even angry words, arraign our past and the role played therein by each, it is because we must now draw the Party to the revolutionary line put forward in the Political Thesis, and further enriched by the PB in its latest documents. How many years have been wasted, how many struggles of the toiling masses have been betrayed just because of the hold of reformism on our Party ! We must now do away with this heritage.

For this the following are essential tasks:-

1. Remove from the POC and from all other committees, all those who are die-hard reformists. Reorganise it into a smaller body of 7, as directed by the PB, so that it can function under conditions of illegality. Those who seriously accept criticism or at least make serious efforts to understand it, can alone find a place in any leading Party Committee.

2. Issue clear directives about leading the railway strike. There must be no question of local withdrawals by the comrade there, whatever the situation, unless on an all-India plane or on all-railway plane, the Party itself withdraws the strike. Every effort must be directed towards organising and conducting strike, allowing full initiative to the masses and consciously striving to take it to higher forms of struggle immediately. Constitute small Party committees at all points of struggle of the railway workers, keeping out all vacillators, and entrusted with the task of guiding the strike constantly. Look to the Postal strike at Nagpur and Jubbulpore.

3. Start serious Party education on the 3 documents, and on the self-critical review, in order to enrich understanding of the Party line, and to cast off the ~~heavy~~ load of reformist past in our practice. PCM's directly to conduct this. Combat those who pretend that because of "practical pre-occupation" this should be postponed. Education can and must proceed, even with struggles on - including railway strike.

4. Go forward to educate and bring inside the Party and in key positions, proletarian cadre - on the basis of Communist Manifesto, Party Thesis and History of CPSU(B) .

5. Henceforward insist that there shall be no D.C. members who waver in the face of struggles, and who has not studied at least the above 3 Marxist works, together with Stalin's Leninism. No PCM who wavers before struggles and has not studied all the above, together with Lenin's Selected Works, all Cominform and New Times Journals.

6. Purge the Party of confirmed reformists, cowards and unreliable elements. Organise tech. apparatus.

7. Henceforward review all struggles, objectively and honestly estimate any mistakes and their roots and the way to eliminate them.

8. In the light of the PB report on Agr. situation analyse the class relations in this province, and boldly organise and lead all struggles of the agricultural workers and poor peasants organising them into their class organisations.

Through all this build a real proletarian Party, proletarianising its composition, and Bolshevising its leadership. Such was the call given to us by Com. BTR at the Party Congress.

10th February, 1949.

Secretary.
C.P.P.C.

I am of the view that the following points be included in this report:-

A. Regarding some facts.

1) The Report while dealing with the Hunger-strike question only mentions that a strong note was sent by jail comrades, but does not give more details. The details are as under:-

About the 8th October, 1948, comrades Keshav, P.K. Thakur and Mushtaque sent a note to the POC criticising the letter for its whole attitude and conduct of the hunger-strike (detailed summary of this note separately attached). This note characterised that the POC has been guilty of terribly underestimating this struggle; that in deciding for postponement of the date for Hunger-strike and also in not making serious efforts to convey the same inside it displayed unpardonable bureaucratic and irresponsible attitude, and that finally in sending mandatory instructions for calling off the strike, it displayed unbecoming panic and has been guilty of a gross betrayal of this struggle (almost the very points which NOW this report has noted).

In a cell meeting held in Jail on 30th Septr. 1948, O.P. was suspended for his gross betrayal in midst of battle, and it was decided to forward the decision to the POC with a request that the POC suspends him for an indefinite period and that his case to be reviewed only if i) he accepts his mistake and ii) proves his bonafides in some struggle. Despite this recommendation of the cell the POC decided to restore him to membership, without even stipulating that he should first admit his mistake. (In "On letters from Jail").

The POC in its meeting of 15th October, '48, considered this note and adopted a resolution-cum-report entitled on "Letters from Jail" (Ram and Balram) and another circular (Ram), rejecting the criticism made by the jail comrades.

These documents reached the jailed comrades about the 28th October, 1948, and on 30th October, 1948, those comrades sent their replies. On a joint note of Keshav, P.K. and Mushtaque in reply to "letters from Jail", these comrades reiterated the criticism (except in respect of telegram which was not decided by POC). Replying to the reprimand re. the tone and approach of their note these comrades sharply criticised the POC for displaying a very unhealthy attitude to criticism.

On the circular "On Fight for privileges" comrade Keshav and P.K. sent almost identical notes taking exception to it specially attacking the advice tendered i.e. "hit and run" etc. and also re. the various restrictions placed (e.g. not "till death" but endurance etc.) and concluded that the circular is a piece of advice of despair and issues such instructions and puts such restrictions as almost make all struggle impossible and foredoomed to failure.

After his release Com. Keshav sent further criticism of this circular and later submitted a note on this circular criticising it as a crass reformist document which "slows down" struggles and almost amounts to renunciation of struggle on this sector (detailed summary attached).

It is necessary to take note of these because it will show that the POC despite the correct and sharp criticism by these comrades not only does not self-critically review its own mistakes but in its resolution "on Letters from Jail" actually repudiates all this criticism and even administers a rebuff to the Jail comrades for adopting such a "tone" and "approach", a thing which further heightens the error committed.

B) Re. the Party Conference: In the August meeting of the POC a resolution is adopted which says that the Conference be called to adopt an "organisational report" and elect a new POC. Later on in the 15th Oct. to 22nd Oct. meeting the POC discusses what should be in the report and authorises Ram and Yadav to draft it and further decides that the same draft be circulated. The report very likely got ready by 25th Oct. and reached the D.C.'s by end of October. In 3-4 days the entire discussion was completed and the conference was held on 6th and 7th November. All this time table was also with the consent of the POC. Moreover the Conference was to be held openly in a H all, which meant that almost all leading comrades (being U.G.) obviously could not attend. This too was decided in the POC meeting.

Therefore while reviewing the Conference it is not enough to take note only of the report presented, but also the entire conduct of it namely how it was conceived, how organised, etc. What happened at the conference, inevitably follows from all this.

After the Conference Com. Keshav submitted a note wherein amongst other things he criticised this whole thing as importing bourgeois liberal ideas inside the Party.

In the POC meeting held on the 30th November some comrades proposed that Keshav be co-opted to the POC. Since voting was 6:6, it was decided to circulate the proposal to the D.C.'s. When comrade Keshav was informed of this decision he opposed it, and demanded of the POC his right to circulate to the D.C.'s the reasons for his opposition. His view was that this proposal of co-option amounts to an effort to bypass discussion on the points

raised in his note; and further that in case there is full discussion on these points and some conclusions are arrived at then why should it be a question of his inclusion alone, it should also be a question of some comrades exclusion from the POC.

It is necessary to take note of these facts because they clearly indicate the stand and attitude taken by various members on matters of organisation.

These are as far as facts go which need have been taken note of for they enable us to draw certain conclusions.

C) Regarding some specific mistakes.

1) The report only mentions that Keshav's note on 16th March strike, or on hunger-strike, on the latest general note etc. are not circulated.

That I think it does not fully cover the serious nature of mistakes committed in this regard, for these instances reveal how not only no self-criticism is undertaken but even when issues are raised, inner-Party discussion on them is avoided and even suppressed. I will explain how.

In the April meeting of the POC there were sharp differences on the question of 16th March strike. Therefore no resolution on it was adopted; and it was decided that this question be thrown open for inner-Party discussion. Com. Mote who led the opposition to this call was asked to draft his note and Com. Keshav too was asked to draft his note and it was decided that both these together with the opinion of other members be circulated and inner-Party discussion be organised. Accordingly Keshav submitted his note by 25th April and Mote also sent in his letter to the G.S. C.C., C.F.I. (instead of his promised note).

Despite however, the decision of this meeting, Keshav's note on 16th March is not even circulated, leave apart the question of organising discussion. Not simply that.

In June the POC circulated the letters of D.J. and Mote, together with a POC note on them (Ram and Balram). In this note again mention is made of the fact that Mote opposed the 16th March call and termed it as "economism". Then it is stated that majority of members were also opposed to the call etc. that it was decided to circulate the points of view etc. It is clear that these comrades who drafted this note were quite aware of the decision re. circulation; as a matter of fact the letter of Mote which they were circulating was the one he wrote re. the same issue. Yet they did not think it necessary to circulate KESHAV's note even at that stage. Instead what is told to the comrades is only this "majority of the POC members were opposed to this call".

Similar is the case re. Hunger Strike documents. Com. Keshav, P.K. and Mushtaque had sent a strong note to the POC criticising it regarding its conduct of the hunger strike (as referred to earlier). These comrades demanded that copies of their note be made available ~~to~~ at least to the D.C.'s and ALSO that copy of the same be forwarded to the PB. This reached the POC office by about 12th Oct. But the POC does neither. It does not even forward a copy of it to the PB despite the fact that in between there were 2-3 occasions for the same and some other material was sent. More. It does not circulate this note to the D.C.'s also. What it does instead is that a reply is prepared to this note and that reply namely "on letters from jail" is circulated to the D.C.'s.

These instances clearly show that criticism and inner-Party discussion is sought to be avoided and suppressed; and a contrary reformist understanding is given to the ranks. This really amounts to a misuse of leading Party positions and Party committees for continuing a reformist line and practice. This should definitely have been taken note of in the report.

ii) Not unconnected with the same is the specific attitude taken to Keshav. Lot of wrong and unfounded criticisms are levelled on him. Here are the instances -

- a) August resolution of POC on Keshav (Balram)
- b) POC report presented to the Conference (Ram and Yadav). The issues contained in these I have dealt with in my note of November, 1948.
- c) D.J. and Mote in their letters made wild and baseless and malicious allegations against KESHAV. The POC in its note does not even answer them, leave apart the question of taking them to task for indulging in such a practice against a responsible comrade and POC member.
- d) The Nagpur D.C. in its Party letter issued on Mohite's desertion explains his desertions by the fact that a reformist personal relation was kept with him as illustrated in D.C. granting him Rs.20/- per month as aid; or his being given the P.A. agency etc. Apart from this explanation is so non-political that it does not explain why many other comrades deflected etc. the P.C. comes to the conclusion that for his mistake also Com. KESHAV was primarily responsible and so on.
- e) How far this tendency seems to have gone is reflected by yet another instance. After O.P. had been suspended by the Jail all for having deserted in the midst of battle, O.P. wrote a letter to the POC making many wrong baseless and amlicious allegations against KESHAV. This letter be sent without showing to anyone of us. The POC in its "on letters f

jail" takes note of these complaints. Though of course it says that POC suspends judgment on these till an explanation is received etc. but also adds that if such things are done they are a serious matter etc.

O.P.'s letter comes back to us in jail on the 28th October. All the points raised by him are discussed and a reply is sent giving complete facts and which is testified by P.K. and Mushtaque and which on 95% of the points is testified by O.P. also as correct. KESHAV, P.K. and Mushtaque unanimously come to the conclusion that not only are O.P.'s charges baseless but they are also dishonest and malicious. This reply is sent back on the 30th reaches the POC by the 5th November.

It would naturally be expected that if people like O.P. to cover their betrayal indulge in such practice the POC was certainly to take him to task. More so since in its earlier note POC had already taken so serious a note of the complaints. It was further expected that the POC would circulate its decision on this question so as to remove whatever impression comrades had formed regarding me on reading the earlier note. Not to do this would mean giving a free reign to the disruptors inside the Party.

But it seems all was not well with the "seriousness" of the POC comrades as is made out in the resolution "on letters from Jail". Because after my reply is received, which reply is properly testified as entirely correct by P.K. and Mushtaque and even by O.P. on 95% of the points, the POC in its meeting of 29th November onwards does not even consider it.

All these instances could not be just accidental. They show an attitude of running down a comrade who attacks or criticises the reformism of the POC members, it is in reality an attitude tinged with factionalism.

From this follows that the reference to the delegates being moved by factional prejudices etc. and not electing KESHAV, as made in the report does not fully nail down the thing because for this action of the delegates the whole set of criticisms emanating from the POC itself are primarily responsible.

It is necessary that this too should have been taken note of in the report.

Now I come to the last part of the report.

While concluding the report a formulation has been made re. the character of the POC namely die-hard reformists who oppose every struggle etc. dominate and the rest while correctly reacting to specific issues compromise with them specially on organisational questions. I think this leaves out of account the role I have played in this period. Briefly speaking what is the position.

i) After the P. Congress there have been two major issues on which the POC has been sharply divided, when formulations and counter-formulations have been made etc. namely the 16th March strike and the hunger strike. On both these issues almost the entire POC (excepting Joshi on the question of 16th March) have taken an attitude of crass reformism namely of opposing these struggles. On both these issues I have taken a firm stand for struggle and have stood against the formulations of the rest, fighting for my stand.

ii) In some other matters too say like outlining the tasks in the coming period in April meeting of the POC. I put across a point of view of coming bourgeois offensive and perspective and need for preparing to resist the same.

iii) It is true that on the PTUC question or the question of my arrest in the earlier I too have committed mistakes, but so have many others too, and of course I am certainly responsible for them.

iv) After my release, I in my note submitted to the POC in November 1948 I have made some major points dealing with our Party life namely:-

a) On the basis of the understanding that one main Pol. task after the Congress (Calcutta) is to fight reformism in the Party I have made an analysis of the Party's practice since the May, 47 meeting of the POC and despite its obvious limitations I think I have correctly laid the finger on the main disease namely of opposing struggles, of not preparing for it and of panicky withdrawals if struggles do break out.

b) On the basis of the same understanding I have tried to politically analyse and characterise the politics of D.J. and Note and here again I feel I have been generally on right rails.

c) Lastly I have raised all these issues for inner-Party discussion and for correction of these mistakes. How far my attitude was serious and sharp can be gauged from the fact that I opposed the suggestion of my inclusion on the ground that this will amount to bypassing the issues raised and further straight raising the question of the exclusion of some other comrades.

In the general prevalent atmosphere in the Province and the lack of clarity these acts do indicate a certain consistent attitude. Moreover it has also to be noted that on no question of struggle or movement have I even been guilty of taking an oppositional attitude after the

Congress (and this has certain amount of continuity from my attitudes and stand of the pre-Congress period).

Notwithstanding the fact that I too have been guilty of certain mistakes as referred to above, as also the fact I have been unable to formulate things sharply and clearly sometimes I do feel that I could not be included - in the second category made in the formulation of the report. I therefore feel that note be taken of all these and mention be made in the report.

I had raised all these points before comrades Balram and Azad but when they did not agree I decided to send these as a separate note.

In the discussion held on this report I raised these points and informed the comrades, that I am going to raise them in a separate note, to enable them to controvert the facts of comment on them if they so desire.

Hence this note.

During discussions Com. Azad suggested that these points may even be dropped because if they are raised in this form probably it will give the Party ranks a different idea. Balram also was of the view that these points need not be incorporated in the report. His view was that all the facts in relation to the controversies and stands have been taken note of and beyond that if any special mention is to be made that would amount to sort of claiming a "certificate". He was of the view that no distinction can be ~~made~~ drawn between me and the other comrades of the second category.

Since I was not convinced by these remarks I have decided to forward this note to the PB. I have only to add that if real self-criticism has to be made that implies not only nailing down who has committed what type of mistakes, but ALSO as to who have taken a correct position, if not entirely or least on the whole and therefore a distinction such as I have claimed need be drawn.

Moreover the other two organisational mistakes namely of suppression of controversy and criticism and even of running down a comrade, are very serious things and need definitely be sharply nailed down together with those who are responsible for it.

Not to do so would amount to making the self-criticism formal and its acceptance only half-hearted.

I hope the PB in its resolution will properly assess these points I have written. All relevant documents are also being forwarded; some of the documents have been lost. I am making a summary of them by memory and after showing them to the comrades who had seen the original ones, am forwarding the same for your information.

KESRAV.

A SHORT SUMMARY OF THE POINTS RAISED BY VARIOUS COMRADES, IN THE DISCUSSION HELD ON THE SELF-CRITICAL REPORT OF THE C.P.P.C.

(Reproduced from memory, by Balram).

Group I

The first group was attended by the following comrades:- Nam, Shyam, Joshi, Hashi, Shanti, Chaitoo; Azad, Keshav, Kamal, and Balram.

In an initial meeting, Balram first of all mentioned the brief background to the preparation of the Report. After the discussions, with the PB on the 3 PB documents, and with certain suggestions from the PB, Keshav prepared a rough outline. This outline was ~~six~~ discussed by him, Balram and Azad, and the PB approved it, as a basis, for preparing the report. On return, Balram then prepared the report. This was discussed, amended and approved by the 3 comrades - Azad, Keshav and Balram, so that now it was being placed before the PC, on behalf of a drafting committee of all these 3 comrades.

Following are the comments made by the various comrades:-

Joshi:

The report does not give a complete picture of how the working-class and other sections of the people from stage to stage have reacted, what have been their problems and the situation amongst them, and in relation to this what the Party leadership, as well as the Party as a whole, have done. It only deals with some activities, attitudes, understanding, of only the P.O.C. members, from stage to stage. It does not even deal with the mistakes and deviations of the District Committees. It is not true, as mentioned in the report, that the Jubbulpore D.C. does not yet accept the criticism of its stand with regard to the hunger-strike.

Hashi:

Agree with Joshi, above. But many more points are omitted in the report, of which mention must be made.

For instance, in Jubbulpore, we have been seeing the collapse of a number of unions led by us previously - Gun Carriage Factory, 506, Electric Workers, The POC was aware of this. Why has it not been able to explain this phenomenon and point the way out? Can't understand it even now, from this present report.

The report mentions of many executives being "reformist-dominated". But why so? Because when we organise unions, we always include high-skilled and supervisory staff-wallas, on the understanding that they can influence and lead the mass of unskilled workers. The result is that whenever a struggle is imminent, these people back out and leave the workers in the lurch. That is what happened to some unions in Jubbulpore.

The report analyses textile in detail. But it does not deal adequately with the railway-front.

Many facts have not been taken note of, or are wrongly stated. For instance, Jubbulpore D.C. has from the outset regarded the call of 16th March strike as correct. It forwarded this opinion to the POC too. Why is it, that the contributions of various D.C.'s are not mentioned in the report? Besides, in Jubbulpore itself, ~~throughout, throughout, throughout, throughout, throughout~~ it is Com. P.K. Thakur who has always taken an anti-struggle line. Throughout, Thakur opposed struggles on the plea, that if we strike, our militants will be dismissed, and then the unions will go out of our hands. It is known, that even without strikes, our militants were victimised and the unions were lost, at any rate.

The report tries to give the impression, as if Keshav was always right. This is not so.

Shyam:

It seems that an attempt was made to prepare the report in the background of the PB report on "Strategy and Tactics". But this has been done, only to some extent, with regard to textile, sweepers and students. However, about such other important aspects of Party work, viz. railway, PTUC, political agitation, the report has failed to analyse our past fully. Take an instance, about the Pact with Ruikar which Keshav made, in February beginning (1948). Keshav completely failed to see the right corner in which Ruikar was, and that made him talk about a Pact and so on. Then to talk about restricting criticism within committees or confining it to a so-called "sober plane", is a way of toning down the fight against the reformists. All these mistakes, as well as the neglect of exposing the workers' united front, which has a connection with the position at present of the PTUC, must also be nailed down.

Similarly, the report should nail down the neglect of political agitation, on such vital issues like "Samyukta Maharashtra"; the tendency of escaping all responsibilities, which Nam, while being the POC, continually manifested; the resignation of Hashi from the Jubbulpore DC, which was actually an escape from work, and which he later on, explained away, by saying that it was due to his difference with the then reformist policy of the Party.

The report should also point out, how in the course of working amongst various sections the Party grew, and also mention some of the positive achievements. It should also critically analyse the mistakes of the D.C.'s. For instance, in Itarsi, we have upto now completely neglected the task of political education, of building any Party cadres. In this connection, my responsibility for the mistake should be nailed down.

Shanti:

The report does not give a picture of our province, unlike the PB document.

While pages after pages are devoted to textiles, such an important matter as the railways, is dealt with in a small section of 2 or 3 paras. That means the POC is not taking the railways seriously.

The mistakes and deviations of every district committee are not analysed. Unless this is done, we won't understand, what exact mistakes we committed or the other DCs committed, and hence how to correct them. Take an instance. Some months ago, we had a strike in the loco at Itarsi. The authorities did not even dare to take any action, or to launch prosecution. But then we left the matter at that and allowed the tempo to fall with the result that suddenly after some months, the authorities started charge-sheets and prosecution and we could not then mobilise even a handful of workers against that. Such mistakes are common. The report should in detail point out the mistakes of every D.C. In Itarsi, also, the task of political education has been forgotten, so that even though our influence is good, if 2 of us get arrested, I fear that matters may go phut. Attention should be drawn to such mistakes too.

I must also remind that before the 16th March, I had occasion to have a serious quarrel with Keshav, who advised us not to bring about a strike in railways. I differed from this instruction of keeping the railway workers out of any general strike. Note should be taken of this reformist mistake too, in his case.

Chaitoo:

This is not a real report, since it gives no continuous narration of how we worked in this entire period.

The mistakes that we committed before the Party Congress, were only a part of the general reformist policy of the entire Party. We should therefore distinguish these mistakes, from those which we committed after the Party Congress.

The report does not point out our tasks today on each front. What must we do?

It gives a picture as if Keshav was fighting reformism. This is not true. Even though many of us have on an issue - here or there, reacted against the old reformist deviation, still in general, we are all responsible for our mistakes.

Kamal:

Some serious omissions are there in the report. There is no mention for instance, of the policy pursued by us, before the Party Congress, towards the Chhatisgarh states. I was asked to work in the State Congress and so on.

Besides, Raipur DC, displayed lots of localism, in its allocation of cadres to other centres outside Raipur. Nagpur and Jabulpore DC did not properly look after their trade union work. In general, our work in the trade unions have been such that individual comrades have become leaders. When they have got arrested, the unions have collapsed, as in Gondia after Om Prakash's arrest.

All these should be incorporated.

Ram:

After the brilliant way in which the PB document has unravelled the reformist mistakes which persist in our work, we must make an objective analysis of our past. I must confess, that I am now able to see lots of mistakes, that we committed before. The self-critical report, in some measure, does this job. But certain things in it are highly misleading and unobjective. It gives an impression that there were some of us who were fighting against reformism. If this report is not to err, in the way the previous report presented to the Provincial Conference did, and as the PB has pointed out, then it must not be unobjective.

The report correctly points to M.D.'s anti-struggle stand during the sweepers' strike (March-April 1947). But the 5 POC members, who were in jail then, nearly hold similar views, as far as I can recollect, in their informal talks, though not having any reports, they committed themselves to no stand. None of us then had read PCJ's Pol-Org. letter. We had not even received it. But our reactions were similar. On the matter of release of our comrades, myself and Keshav had talks with PCJ at Bombay, and we took the line of taking a deputation and presenting a memo to the Ministry.

It is said that I was opposed to Sule's being called here. Firstly, do not bracket me with Sudam. I do not know what was his stand. But my stand was against Keshav's policy at that time of counterposing Sule to Ruiker, as a "better and bigger advocate", and a bypassing of the task of agitation amongst the mass of the workers, against Ruiker's betraying policy before the Court. I said, let Keshav himself put the case in the Court, and back it up with agitation outside. In the final analysis, it is we who have to smash Ruiker. Hence why get Sule? What is there surprising in Keshav having formulated the demands on living wage, full DA etc. - on a fundamental plane? Was any one or could any one, connected practically with the front, have done otherwise.

In our talks and reactions, many of us have reacted correctly. But even those who say that their understanding about practical tasks was correct, what has been their practice? Take, textiles. Even today, mohalla work is at a standstill. It is supposed to be going round and chatting to individuals. At least that is how I find comrades understand it. Recently I saw that we could not even rally half a dozen to a UINC meeting. Do not forget the mistakes in your practice.

I did not oppose the 16th March strike as "vanguardist" or "economist". I said, we have just had the Party Congress. We had decided to hold a Provincial Conference after this to resolve our inner-Party crisis. And so, we should not strike now. Besides, what preparations were made for this strike ?

Also, let me point out that, before the 16th March strike and after it, Keshav maintained that he should offer himself for arrest. That would intensify the strike, he said. Firstly, to neglect preparations and then talk of intensifying strike through court-
ing arrest - is this not "petty bourgeois revolutionism" ? Why omit mentioning these ?

(Ram then pointed to a number of inaccuracies in the report, with regard to facts. These being verified to be incorrect, Balram agreed to delete them from the report).
Continuing Ram said:-

It is not a question of being anti-working class, as the report says, with regard to the difference in attitude while taking disciplinary action against Om Prakash or Abaji and Mohite. I think the fact is, that in the matter of taking action, we have been always loose and neglectful. That was our reformism in relation to organisation.

About the loose state of tech., particular mention should be made of Balram, who has been the most careless in this respect.

As to rest, I think Shanti is right. We must review the work of the D.C.'s too like this. And railway should be more fully dealt with. Why not also begin the report from the post-election period, instead of from May 1947 ?

Keshav:

Comrades say that they see no "picture". As has been pointed out once, this is not a political-organisational report, but a self-critical report.

Some have said that it only deals with the activities of POCs. They do not see the main point. Here are serious and shocking mistakes being committed by the Provincial leadership itself, which is leading to a liquidation of the Party itself. Unless they are seen and eliminated, can the Party hope to fulfil its tasks ? No. So we must first understand them and break with them. Are the major mistakes, of the various D.C.'s etc. any different ? No, they too are of the same pattern. It is wrong to try to list all the mistakes committed by everyone, in the name of being objective. In seeing the trees, we will miss the wood. It is true that all have been guilty of serious reformist errors. That is a truism. But unless you see its concrete manifestation in each, and also see that there were some who faced with the problems of the masses, were basically for struggle, you won't succeed in fighting reformism. Criticism does not exclude, a proper appreciation of a correct stand taken by someone.

I maintain that as after the Party Congress, on the 2 important issues of inner-Party controversy - Hunger-strike and 16th March, I was definitely on the other side of the fence. I may not have come to the realisation as given in the PB document, but in all essentials, I was on the right side. Note has got to be taken of this fact. And in this connection, I think that there is a serious shortcoming in the report. I feel I do not come in any of the 2 categories in which the other POC members were viz. die-hard reformists, and vacillators. My position was distinct.

(Keshav then went on to refer to some points, which he said he would independently make out and forward to the PB. They are dealt with in his note, and are hence not repeated here).

Azad:

All the amendments and suggestions put forward by every comrade will only blunt the entire report. They will take away its sharpness. Why this report and what is its essential central purpose ? Here is a Provincial Party, which so far from acting as a vanguard in the struggles which are breaking out all around, is actually betraying these struggles. It is to save the masses from being further betrayed, to make the Party a real leader of their struggles, that we want to see what our mistakes were. To lose sight of this major fact, is to forget its purpose.

Those who say that "we are all reformists", and think that that is enough, actually pave the way for the worst compromises with reformism. Since if all were reformists, why fight or criticise anyone. This is not the way, we can eliminate our mistakes.

There is Chhatisgarh ~~is~~ for instance. The railway workers of Bilaspur, want to go into a solidarity action in support of the struggling ~~with~~ electric workers. But we their leaders hold them back in the name of the bigger strike to come. The kisans of Mahasamund on two occasions launch a struggle. But we withdraw it, on the plea that we will be suppressed in isolation, and so let us try legal procedure for redressing grievances. In Rajnandgaon workers face bullets and 2 are martyred. But we tell them to disperse and not fall a prey to provocation. We must see these various ways in which our reformist understanding and practice is expressed.

Only about railway, I think the report needs to be rewritten.

About the points which Keshav made out and which are not there in the report, I don't think they are necessary, or they add anything to the report. That may, on the contrary, give a wrong idea to the ranks about the central point in the report. The report does mention, how reformism in organisational matters, leads even to factional prejudices. It is not a question of any particular "viciousness" on the part of the POC comrades. He

He has a right to send them to the PB if he thinks that desirable. Let him do it.

Balram:

My frank reaction to the discussion is, that comrades do not yet realise how serious the crisis, the state of affairs in the Party really is, and which the PB document now helps us to go into and fight out. How can anyone make incidental suggestions and amendments, when the main job is to first make a total break with the entire past? In a welter of mistakes, listed and sorted out, some comrades would like everyone to forget where the actual disease is, what its roots are, what are its symptoms and how to eliminate it. Let me illustrate. If we take the report seriously, the question arises that people like M.D. and Sudam, for instance, not only should not be in any leading positions, but actually, if they have to rehabilitate their position as Party members even, they will have to try hard, show their worth through participation in concrete actions and so on. The Amraoti DC will need to be dissolved, while other D.C.'s will have to be radically reorganised. A new leadership, with different class-composition will have to be painstakingly evolved.

From the highest committee down to every Party member, we have therefore to wage a very serious struggle to "dig out reformism by its roots". And if we have to successfully and persistently conduct this fight, we must basically alter our attitude towards inner-Party struggles. Many comrades fight shy of inner-Party struggles. They think there is something wrong in this. Actually, experience shows that as the struggle intensifies, the class-enemy tries to destroy the Party, to deprive the resolution of its general staff, through alien influences, ideologies, and treacherous elements. That means continuous vigilance, and a sharp struggle against all such alien influences have to be waged. Thus, it is a matter of obligation to struggle against such trends. In the past we exactly omitted this task. The result was that we lost ourselves in "petty squabbles". I think the present report is a beginning towards serious inner-Party struggles and it must be continued in an uncompromising spirit and the entire ranks should be drawn into it. It is in this connection, we must realise the significance of the mandatory task outlined in the report, for the future viz. "review all actions". We ~~now~~ must realise at least how now that "review" for us Communists, is not just a matter of routine. It is the exact way, we carry on the fight against every manifestation of mistakes and deviations, learn from experience how to correct them, test the worth of our cadres and of our leadership and so on. If the purpose of this report is grasped, it will be easily seen, why henceforward this should be an obligatory duty of every Party functionary and unit.

Then take the case of the tasks mentioned, in order to implement the slogan of "proletarianising the Party" and so on. Is it an accident that no comrade even mentioned or discussed the tasks, or drew proper conclusions from them? Is it an accident that they are satisfying their conscience by either adding to the list of mistakes, or explaining them away? I must confess, that this betrays an improper appreciation of the roots of our major errors, and a bypassing of the ways and means to fight them.

Chaitoo even remarked that the tasks on each front are not given. He of course does not see a list of "do's and don'ts" after each front. Well, if that was our concept of political and organisational leadership, it must now change. That was a typical Joshiite way of actually avoiding giving any real lead to our cadres, of not ensuring against mistakes since their understanding remained where it was - only tips being given to them, and of appearing clever towards the end. What else does the report do, than re-orientate our understanding and practice, and consequently, to indicate what we must do in the present situation? Does it not follow for instance, that in sweepers, we must organise and develop their struggle concretely against the Sarvate Award and so on? Does it not follow that henceforward none must dare withhold any action by palming off slanders on the masses, or under other pleas?

Therefore, I cannot agree to the suggestions and amendments put forward. They are besides the point. If we are serious about eliminating reformism, we must concretely see it in its various forms, and not just refer to it in general, or confuse the issue. We should of course rewrite the railway section, not because the draft allegedly under-estimates railway, in relation to textiles. The textiles are dealt in that detail, for that is where, the depth of the crisis, the worst forms of reformism inside our Party - to the point of open betrayal, was expressed. We must elaborate the railway section, for we are confronted with that as our major responsibility and that is where the majority of our cadres will be tested. We have therefore to ensure ourselves against any outstanding deviation beforehand, to sort of forearm our cadres. But for that, we must have detailed reports too.

It is all right to say that the work of D.C.'s must be reviewed too. But where are reports. Anyway, first let us get into the railway struggle and play our role there. Let us not worry about producing "reports" and so on, one after the other. If of course any DC does so, the PC can help them, however much it can.

About Kashav. In the name of being objective, efforts are being made by some to drag in every mistake which he committed. And on the other hand, he is talking of being a "revolutionary fighter", as against the rest. I cannot agree to either of this, nor let it appear as if the purport of the report is to give a "certificate" to him. On a number of major issues, he has undoubtedly been right. But then there are others too

while they were right on 3 major occasions, capitulated to reformism, on 4 others. Keshav meanwhile was in jail. A day before the Provincial Conference, in the Nagpur DC, Keshav maintained (and I agreed with him then), that it is wrong to say there are any major trends as such - whether reformist or otherwise, in any of us. It is only "petty bourgeois instability" all round. You can see, that is not a far cry from the stand taken in the "Note on Note-DW" (June). Obviously, it is with such an understanding we could never wage a battle against reformism, and blurred over every demarcation. By the time Keshav wrote his Note, there were 2 or 3 more, who were waking to the realisation about our mistakes. And if today, we are fighting them, it is thanks to the PB document. Therein lies the historic worth of this document.

After this, all the comrades in this group, announced their basic agreement with the report. It was agreed that the report be adopted, and the same drafting committee of 3, be asked to make the factual corrections, and rewrite the railway section alone, on the basis of further reports to be supplied.

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GROUP II

The discussions in the second group were attended by the following comrades: M.D. Deshpande, Sudam Deshmukh, S.Y. Deshpande, Kathalkar, Azad and Balram.

Com. M.D. suggested that before proceeding to discuss the self-critical report, he would first of all like certain questions to be clarified, on the basis of the understanding given by the PB document. The major questions, together with their answers are given here, in very brief:-

M.D.:- How do you think that the Ellichpur struggle should have been intensified, or carried to higher forms ?

Balram:

The struggle of the Ellichpur workers (in which 1700 workers have been on strike for more than 2 months, about 200 of them going to jail, 50 facing prosecutions, massed raids by Gurkha soldiers on workers' mohallas etc.), have belied all prognostications about the alleged "limited endurance power" of these workers, of their inability to fight a battle on their own, unless the entire province fights.

We should have, from the day we gave notice of a strike, organised a real Mass Strike Committee (and not just a formal one) with mohalla ramifications. With no less than 100 advanced militants, the Mass Strike Committee, could then have taken the lead in organising resistance to police terror, utilising the forms to which workers spontaneously resorted viz. "gheraps", demonstrations in defiance of 144 etc. - on the initial days, and which we prevented from being carried on, as well as using other forms of fighting police and a handful of INTUC stooges. The point was to allow free scope to mass initiative in this respect and help ~~inorganising~~ in organising it.

Incidentally, that is not only the way, the Ellichpur workers would have shown the way to the workers all over the province and brought them out on struggle too, where they were not already so, but at the same time, that alone would have rallied "public support" (about which, much was said)-of those sections who really matter, and who seeing the bold fight of the workers against bourgeois terror, would have come forward too.

Incidentally too, we must not look mechanically at the "forms of struggle", viz. that at this or that stage, this or that form should always be used. Actually, a combination of forms have to be used, depending on the concrete class-relations and the needs of

the developing struggle. We not succeed in intensifying the strike in Nagpur ?

Balram:

The Nagpur strike is a typical example of a spontaneous long-drawn out struggle of the workers, despite their reformist leaders. However, at no stage, could our Party really effectively intervene in the struggle, and rally the workers behind it, beyond exposing the reformists' role, and exhorting workers to hold on. We are a very small force. That is one thing. True. But that by itself does not explain our failure. Take one instance. Disillusioned by the treachery of their erstwhile leaders, 150 militant workers, near about the first week of January came to attend a UTWC meeting, scheduled to take place in a library hall, in the biggest workers' locality in HGP - Dhankheda. At the 11th hour the police warned the management of the library, and threatened prosecution for holding an illegal meeting. Our comrades then abandoned the meeting. It is easy to see that had they held the meeting despite the ban, the tempo would have been raised, and had the police intervened, that would have brought not only Dhankheda, but all the textile-workers into action, with the UTWC in the van. But this only way then of defying restriction, which the workers would have understood and supported, was abandoned. The workers went back in disgust and to the next meeting only 4 or 5 turned up. Naturally, what lead could they expect by coming to our meetings. Later on, towards the end of January, our comrades suddenly came out with a call "Break 144", as if that can serve as a rallying slogan. And when the sceptic workers, who

had seen us run away before, nodded their head and yet did nothing, it was declared that they are "demoralised". To avoid the concrete steps of developing the struggle and leading it, and then come out with apparently radical slogans - such as "petty-bourgeois revolutionism". It illustrates, one of the mistaken ways, which prevented our coming forward as the leaders of the strike.

-After this, the discussion on the self-critical report started. Balram first read out the minutes of the discussions in Group I.

M.D.:

It is said the report is based on the FB document. But it is not so. Its basis is Keshav's note.

First of all, I am in agreement with the estimates about myself given by the PCS and others. Before the Conference, I had on several occasions maintained that if I have to be saved, I must not be included in the POC. But in October, I did not press for my exclusion from the POC panel, as Ram did, for I then felt that if there is such a break in the leadership, then everything may get disorganised. I accept that there have been anti-struggle tendencies in me. But this report gives a completely unobjective and disruptive picture of everything. My attitude in the sweepers' strike was not known beyond a small circle of PCM's outside. As Ram said, even PCMs in jail, held similar views, and Brahma also wanted to effect a compromise, if possible with Ruikar's help. How can you explain that after what you call an upsurge amongst sweepers, there has followed complete stagnation in that front?

Keshav wants to assert that he is always right. He at least is making an effort to claim a separate category by himself. But I must here and now warn the POC against this danger to Keshav, if it does not save him in time. Like Mote, he claims to be the only Marxist amongst us. I do not deny that he should be in the POC, but he would go the Mote way, if he is not made to see his errors self-critically. His petty-bourgeois arrogance (as seen during the Party Congress, when he even talked of preparing an alternate Draft), and his mistakes - about impatience to court arrest, about his pact with Ruikar, should be nailed down. Note must also be taken, that on 3 occasions, in the midst of decisive struggles, he kept away from his post on some pretext or the other - once by going to Bezvada, then to the Calcutta Congress just on the eve of 16th March, and now, in the midst of a decisive workers' strike.

In October, Balram himself proposed Sudam's name for the POC, even though Sudam was not elected to the Amraoti DC, on the plea that "he is improving". A month later, he changed his views. Such vacillations of Balram are typical of his students' federation days and must also be nailed down.

Re. 16th March strike, it is alright to have struggles. But what about preparations? Can we afford to neglect them?

The Amraoti DC has been criticised for its errors, regarding the textile strike. First of all, what is the explanation that all our leading mass workers - Sudam, Meshram, Diwanjee and Bhishtidhan are hardened reformists? Have you ever helped them out? Secondly, do you take into account the difficulties of the Amraoti DC, when you get out to criticise it? An unsympathetic attitude to cadres, can't help at all.

Mention is made of Balram's first letter (dated 12th Dec.) and the directives of the PCS and the textile ~~Executive~~ Fr. Secretary. What was the position then? 8 comrades were arrested in Akola, and a number at Budnera. We estimated that strike was not possible. That was the background to our decision. Do you take account of that?

On the 29th Dec. Balram addressed a second letter. What was the circumstance which prompted ~~it~~ him to do that? A few days ago I had met him. He had not even mentioned all that he subsequently wrote, and then all of a sudden, he writes to the DC like that. That is why I objected to this unhealthy method.

We should also take note of the failure of the Provincial Textile fraction, which never concretely helped the various units. In the days of the court proceedings - June-December 1947 - Keshav was representing all the 3 Berar unions. He was directly in charge of the Akola Union. Yet what was his contribution to their growth and work? Zero. Later on, when Balram was the Fr. Secretary, the POC decided to hold the Berar Textile Conference to build an "alternative leadership in the province", yet what positive help was given by the Tex. Fr. to the Berar comrades? Nothing much. (Balram intervening pointed out incidentally, that the PC never talked of an "alternative provincial leadership" evolving out of the Berar Textile Conference. That was perhaps, M.D.'s own interpretation of the PC resolution). You say there were 5 POC members there. But did you not know who they were and all that?

Finally, I must point out that merely by writing manifestoes, good reports and resolutions you cannot build the Party. That is not the way of leading the Party, as Stalin has pointed out.

S.K. Deshpande:

From the beginning we had no perspective of building struggles. That is true. I only

knew that our strategic slogan was the building of the Democratic Front. As a step towards that, in order to create an "auxiliary force" from amongst the workers, I looked at the Berar Textile Conference. But I was disappointed to see, that not one of the centres outside Berar sent a fraternal delegate. For this, why should not the POCs of those centres be criticised, just as much as the Berar POCs? For the above reason, and the wrong stand and attitude of Sudam and Meshram, that Conference was not a success, in as much as it did not yield results. For the wrong attitude of these comrades, we criticised them in the Amraoti DC. It is not therefore correct to say that none fought reformism in Amraoti.

After this Conference, we wasted about 2 months, in the Mote-L' controversy, District and Provincial Conferences. I say it was the POC and D.C. who are responsible for the stagnation in work during these months, for they gave us the above jobs.

Both in the September and November tex. fraction meetings, we were of course criticised for not leading the "partial struggles" and so on. I confess that even now, I am of opinion that we should not have "departmental strikes" and all that, unless it is the entire mill which can fight "Departmental strikes" lead only to a loss of cadres. That really is reformism.

After the arrest of many militants in Akola, there was a debacle. Even handbills sent from the Provincial headquarters could not be distributed till 13th. What then could we have done? True, my previous estimates were more optimistic, and I had given them in the Fr. meeting. But these were later on misunderstood by Keshav and Balram.

I am saying all this to give the background to what happened in Berar. This shows that there was no intentional reformism there.

As to rest of report, I think railway should be elaborated, and the other DC's work should also be reviewed.

Sudam:

An attempt is made to show that while some were reformists, there were others who were not so, who made no mistakes. Well, there can be no mistakes, where there is nothing happening.

In Ellichpur, this is the first time we have fought a long drawn out and single-handed battle. Repression was all concentrated on us. In the Amraoti DC meeting of 11th December Kathalkar had of course said that we must surpass Amalner. But I confess, I was unnerved at the prospects. I was never confident also, that in Nagpur, we will be able to lead the working class. That also made me hesitate.

On the 16th when I heard that Ruiker has withdrawn, I of course began thinking of withdrawing. Many comrades did oppose. They also said, "what will happen to those who are arrested?" I replied, "what will happen to the arrested people, where there is no strike now? Let us withdraw organisedly, so that we can later on counter-attack."

You must realise that for the debacle in Akola etc. you are responsible, since in Nagpur you are unable to overthrow the reformists. Unless you understand this, you do not understand the psychology of the textile-workers' movement in our province.

Of course reformism has to be fought and eliminated. But you cannot do it all at once. By mere criticism, you don't help. As for myself, I am willing to take the punishment that is due to reformism.

Kathalkar:

After the Tex. Fr. meeting in November, we started our agitation for the strike on bonus etc. in Ellichpur. But on 11th Dec. when the Amraoti DC, the first question posed was Must there be a continuous or a one-day strike? I was surprised. How could we discuss about this, when we had already decided that this time we fight it out - no retreat and so on. I said the Ellichpur workers can make an Amalner there. I upheld the Prov. Fr. decision. But I was alone. Back at Ellichpur, the Prov. Fr. decision was not even reported. Only the Amraoti DC's decision was communicated. Many comrades even then opposed.

On the 16th I returned to Ellichpur with Balram's letter. But already then Sudam was writing posters for withdrawal. I quarrelled with him on this. Sudam has been 8 years in the trade union movement, but he has neither faith in the workers' organisation, nor in the class struggle. He also does not think it necessary to consult the Party. He has a contempt for that. On 17th, because of police-raids etc., I left Ellichpur for reporting to E.D. and the P.C. In Nagpur I met H.D., Keshav and Balram. But when I returned, I heard that the strike was withdrawn. Increased work-load notice had been put up and none released, but still Sudam took this step. Of course, after a day or two, workers again come out. Here I must mention, that till today, we had fought no serious struggle in Ellichpur. One-day protest strike and court-work - compromises, that is all. But class struggle, never.

In the course of the strike, I had discussions with SK and Sudam. They said

workers are getting "terrorised". I replied, "Not they, but you are getting terrorised". Sudam was even worried about the existence of the Union, which he had laboured to build. He could not see that when the worker is struggling, no repression can smash his union. He was I think, also a bit concerned of his leadership.

At the same time, I must also point to the shortcomings of Nagpur.

In a Nagpur DC meeting (held in Jan. end) which I attended, Dashottar and Sharma and others talked of breaking 144. I said how? They said, let us bring out a handbill. I laughed, "Can you break 144 with handbills?" I offered to get 200 workers from Ellichpur, if they could mobilise 3000 locally. We could then march even to the Secretariat. But they would not accept my offer. We saw what was the result of this slogan. I agree that here you expose the reformists effectively. But, organisation of struggle - nothing! I can quite understand, why Sudam therefore does not listen to your advice, and disregards it completely. He is right in that, to some extent.

I think, the report should criticise the other D.C.'s also, not just the Amraoti DC.

FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE C.P. & BERAR PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA

Dear Comrades,

This is the first Conference of the Provincial Committee of the Party. We are holding this Conference under conditions of terrible repression and virtual illegality. All the same, we are holding this Conference because without it, the inner-party crisis in the leadership of the Party and also the local Party committees which has vitiated the entire development and growth of the movement of the working people of the Province and the class, cannot be resolved, the deviations nailed down and the various anti-Party tendencies rooted out.

The primary object in holding this Conference is to understand our own shortcomings and take organizational steps to eradicate them.

The Party crisis in the Province originates from the inner P.O.C. crisis.

It is common knowledge to you, comrades, how the leadership of the Provincial Party had made the crisis a family affair of their own, how the Provincial Committee did not move as a team and guide the movement of the Province, how the Central Committee had many reasons to intervene and even dissolve it though it must be said that the Central Committee also did not go to the roots of the crisis in the leadership of the C.P. and Berar Party and give a proper understanding to the ranks.

The historic C.C. document of Decr. 1947 made a turning point not merely in the life of the CPI but meant a great deal for our Party. It is this document which had nailed down the reformist mistakes of the CPI which made an objective discussion of the crisis in the Provincial leadership, possible. The January '48 resolution or Party Organizational crisis was the first conscious attempt made by the leadership of the Provincial Party to understand its own mistakes. Though the January resolution suffers from many shortcomings, in that the resolution was based on compromise, that the different comrades had different understanding of the resolution, it must be said that this resolution is of great significance in our life for while nailing down the major trends in the leadership of the Party, it decided to solve the crisis outside the "family" by taking the entire ranks into confidence.

The general offensive against the Communist Party by the Nehru Government, the 16th March strike which precipitated repression in our Province, put obstacles in the way of implementing the decisions of the January resolution, namely holding of a Provincial Conference in May. With the first wholesale attack on the Party all the weaknesses of the Party came to the fore, the crisis in the P.O.C. further deepened.

The Provincial Org. Committee in its April meeting took organizational steps in the face of the offensive of the Government and certain comrades of the P.O.C. dropped from the P.O.C. and new comrades added.

In the June meeting of the POC the POC decided to circulate to the ranks notes of Note and Ka ranjpe and a note on them by the POC.

In August meeting, on the basis of discussions of these notes by comrades and their reactions, the Provincial Committee passed a resolution expelling Note and Paranjpe from the Party. It passed a resolution on H.K. and also a resolution on Com. B.N. on their failings and their trends. In a further resolution, it was decided to hold a Provincial Conference in October to finally thrash out the organizational crisis in our Province and elect a new Provincial Committee. The POC was helped in this decision by the discussions that were held on the various notes especially in Nagpur and Jubbulpore districts.

Note here must be made of the Historical resolution of the Cominform on Yugoslav Communist Party leadership - Tito and his group. It is this resolution which has given a tremendous impetus to the various Communist Parties to re-examine itself, its past and nail down alien trends in the ranks of the revolutionary Party of the Proletariat. The

criticism and self-criticism, the chief weapon of holding high the banner of democracy and internationalism with which every Party e.g. French, Bulgaria - re-evaluation itself, has made deep impression on the POC comrades and made them take a self-critical attitude.

It is in pursuance of the decision of POC in its August meeting we are holding the Conference, to examine our past and take organizational steps to re-organise the Party life.

It is in this spirit that the report will endeavour to throw light on the special features of our Party, to help the comrades to understand the root causes of the Party crisis. The POC has been examining the past in the course of the last few months and it is the conclusions that the POC has reached being placed before you. It is not the intention of the POC to give a history of the Party. The fact is that placed as it is the POC with all its present limitations, is neither in a position to write a history of the Party in the Province, nor will it be correct thing to do it. The Central Committee alone is the most competent authority to write the history through a Commission. All the same, the special features of our Party life which are being placed before you comrades as they came out sharply during the various periods in the history of the Party will give you sufficient understanding to come to definite organizational conclusions to eradicate the various anti-Party tendencies in 1931-36 period:

It is true that the specific political and economical features of the Province have their effect on the development of its social movement. But it would be absolutely untrue to say that our Province is backward as a justification for the weak growth of the Party.

In our Province also, as in other parts of our country, the impact of world thought and Marxist Ideology found its expression in the wake of the world economic crisis of 1929 and the following years, which hit the working people in the form of wage cut, retrenchment, in low prices of the agricultural products, hitting the poor peasantry.

The working-class and specially the textile workers of the Province fought back the effects of the economic crisis through spontaneous strike battles. The G.I.P. workers' strike also came in the same period. The world Marxist thought was having its effect on petty bourgeois intellectuals who were getting disillusioned about capitalism, especially since the world crisis. In this period we see Jaywant, Kelkar and Marathe participating in the strike battles of the textile workers.

Though no Party nucleus or group was formed at that time, yet it was the beginning of Socialist thought in the Province. It was a period of struggle of the working people which afforded opportunities to organize the working-class and build the Party by drawing in of the militants thrown up in these strike battles till 1934. But lack of conscious effort in this direction by the individual comrades who owed allegiance to the C.P.I. entrusted the leadership of the working-class in the hands of reformists like Ruikar, Fulay and Kalappa.

In 1934, Mote and Kolhatkar came to Nagpur when already Jaywant, Marathe and Kelkar and Bhaiyaji Kulkarni were working at different centres of the Province in the working-class. They instead of forming a Party group, resisted the very formation of the Party. The attempts of other comrades to form a Party were thwarted by Mote in those days.

They started work in the Nagpur Textile Union. But the main characteristic of their T.U. work was one of top manoeuvring sometimes in alliance with Ruikar and sometimes in alliance with those who oppose Ruikar, like Chanekar, Jagam etc. They neglected the spade work amongst the workers and drawing the militants inside the Party, for this alone could fight Ruikar's reformism and lead the working-class forward. They persistently refused to form the Party and Mote never made a secret of this. He had his differences with the Centre. He resisted and even sabotaged the formation of the Party because, according to him, he had suspicions that the Party will be used against him by the centre.

1936-40 Period

This resistance of Mote to the formation of the Party continued right through upto 1939 and even later. It was when student intellectuals, worker militants and others were coming on their own towards Communism that the Central Committee gave a mandate to Mote and Kolhatkar for the formation of a Party Committee with the break of World War II. Yet this Party Committee which was formed after the start of the Second World War, Com.Mote wanted to make it indigenous and bypass it by the formation of another Communist Party of Provincial without allegiance to the C.P.I. section Communist International, ostensibly on the plea of drawing in of the Left nationalist elements of the Red Army and the Socialist Party.

It was precisely the period when, as in other Parts of India our Province also reverberated with anti-imperialist upsurge. It was a period when youths were getting disillusioned about the parliamentary programme of the national leadership and looking to building up a broadbased anti-imperialist front on the basis of the independent organization of the working-class and the peasantry. The peace front for peace and freedom of the world people against Fascism found its expression in the urge for building a wide National Front for freedom in our country.

It was the period when working-class fought many battles, when All-India Kisan Sabha was formed, when A.I.S.F. was organized which developed a militant anti-imperialist student movement, when States' peoples came to the forefront against autocracy, when Socialist Party was formed.

The reflection of this was seen in our Province in the peasant marches in Berar and Nagpur, the growth and development of a wide student movement, in the formation of the Socialist Party and the Red Army.

But primarily because there was no Party Committee to discuss and consciously carry out U.N.F. line of the C.P.I. in the context of the anti-imperialist upheaval in the Province, a basically wrong line was formulated by Mote which sought to create a Left platform in the Province, without consciously working inside the Congress and influencing the healthy elements and without building up mass organizations of the working people - the working-class and peasantry which alone could be the core of the United National Front.

The wrong approach to UNF tactics is further revealed in this that the Party even failed to lead the partial struggles of the workers and peasants such as Khangaon sweepers' strike and Umrer Kisan satyagraha and kisan movement which, while initiated by our comrade, was given as a gift to the Socialists.

It is the result of the same policy of not building the Party and following a wrong UNF line (build a Left platform) that we see that the circulation of Party literature was scrupulously avoided in Nagpur on the plea that they were not newspaper agents, that comrades from different centres were asked by Com.Mote to come to Nagpur and concentrate on the textiles.

It is natural for the comrades to put the question - Why is that other comrades did not fight the anti-Party attitude of Com.Mote.

The answer to this is that the other comrades suffered from inferiority complex born of their lack of proper understanding of Marxism and its organizational principles, they were Left-nationalist bourgeois intellectuals with weak or no working-class base were taken in by Mote's abstract criticism of the National bourgeoisie. ~~Intellectuals were~~ In the absence of theoretical groundings these comrades found escapes on many occasions in this period by taking up different work at different times, it is this lack of theoretical understanding that seeds of factionalism were grown as we will see in the subsequent history.

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Period 1939 - June 1941

With the outbreak of World II, there was tremendous urge in the people for a final show down with imperialism through mass action. In the face of the mass upsurge of the people, the bourgeois leadership of the Congress and other Left Parties stood unmasked in that they shuddered at the mass upheaval. Conscious efforts were made by the bourgeois leadership to sabotage the growing upsurge of the toiling people in the country. It is in this period, the CPI through its consistent attitude towards mass action against imperialism and leading the working-class in the partial economic struggles for D.A. etc. in spite of heavy repression came to be recognized as a genuine anti-imperialist force amongst the student intellectuals and working masses.

In our Province, in Nagpur in this period started the textile workers' strike for D.A. Anti-imperialist youths and masses were in sympathy with the struggle of the textile workers which, however, frightened reformist Ruikar and he tried from the beginning to sabotage the strike. Unable to fight reformism of Ruikar, through concrete exposure, through mobilization of the workers for the intensification of the struggle, we came out of Textile Workers' Union and asked about 40 of our supporters to resign from the Union G.Council.

This completely isolated us from whatever little mass contact we had in the textile workers, giving Ruikar a big handle to slander us.

This isolation from the working-class in Nagpur resulted in frustration of the Left nationalist elements (Socialists and Red Army wallas) who see that C.P.I. (C.P. & Berar) cannot lead and they take to individual satyagraha call given by the bourgeois leadership to sabotage mass movement.

It is this isolation from the working-class in the wake of the split that the pro-Party group consisting mostly of student youths and few working-class elements, now look to the formation of the Party and guidance from the centre.

The A.I.S.F. Conference in Nagpur gave us the first opportunity to establish direct links with the Centre. All earlier efforts were consciously sabotaged by Mote. In 1940, after the formation of the Party, Mote and Mukherjee were sent to Bombay during Poona AICC to establish links. Mukherjee was sent back by Mote and he came with the "news" that "the Centre has collapsed."

Even after the formation of the Party with young enthusiastic student youths who were actually at that time bearing the main brunt of imperialist repression after the brutal suppression of the working-class in the initial days after the start of the Second World War, Mote gave the adventurous call of a political conference to give lead to the C.P.I. by giving the slogan of evolving an organ of struggle for capture of power by the working-class.

There was heated discussion in the Party on the textile situation and political conference. Com. M.D. vigorously opposes the slogan, supported by B.N. But their opposition comes not from a correct understanding of the problem but as a reaction to Mote's attitude towards sabotaging building of the Party, from the reformist angle - build organization before we give any call for struggle. It is here that nationalism enters in the Party. M.D. and B.N. on one side with Mote and Vyas on the other. Mote carries the comrades with his call for political conference. The question of organ of struggle was referred to the Centre. The C.C. severely criticised Mote's contention about organ of struggle and his entire attitude towards Party, textile split etc. which unnerves Mote and strengthens M.D. and B.N. reformist attitude of build the organisation first,

After the political conference, Mote was arrested. H.K. went to work in other Province as U.G. and M.D. back to Berar.

There is again another wave of working-class upsurge in the Province, on the question of restoration of wage-cut and D.A. Such was the intensity and width of the upsurge that Ruikar was forced to form a Council of Action for the whole Province to lead the battle of the workers. It is in the background of this spontaneous upsurge that we form unions at the three textile centres of Berar and raise our effective voice in the Council of Action (Appointment of Jaya Ratnam Committee).

In June 1941 came the dastardly Nazi attack on the Soviet Union. At this time the organizational position of the Party in the Province can be summed up in this that we had student organizations in Nagpur, Amraoti and Jubbulpore with good young student militants in the Party and near the Party, with 3 textile unions in Berar and with practically no mass working-class base in Nagpur.

The Nazi attack on S.U. invigorated theoretical discussions in the Party ranks. The literature had started coming from the centre after the A.I.S.F. Conference in Nagpur. There was no unanimity about the Party line in the ranks, yet it did call forth a tremendous urge among the young student ranks for the defence of the S.U.

The Patna session of the AISF with the changed Party line of People's War showed tremendous loyalty of the Party cadres to the CPI and the Soviet Union.

Such was the enthusiasm in the student youth that in Nagpur without a working-class base, the small Party was able to rally about 30,000 people in the Anti-Fascist Conference. In Berar also in the same period we had a big kisan and Anti-Fascist rally in Amraoti. Kisan work was started on the question of control of prices, mostly amongst the agricultural labour section immediately after the conference.

August 1942:

Then came the fateful August resolution of the Indian National Congress, and the national crisis, with the wanton repression by the imperialist.

The small Party without any effective work inside the Congress, without mass base especially in Nagpur, with young student cadres, had to face this crisis. It must be said to the credit of the young Party youths that they steadfastly stood the ground against bourgeois nationalist opposition.

August '42 to the Dissolution of the Provincial Committee in Oct. '44 by the C.C.

The courageous stand taken by our comrades in the face of August struggle enabled us to consolidate our ranks and absorb all the student militants inside the Party.

BN was arrested. HK took over the Party Secretaryship in consultation with Note. Party was legalized. Party forms began functioning which was hitherto absent.

Com. Sardesai came to explain the political line of the Party. In his report he pointed out the weaknesses of the Party in the Province - such as individualism, localism, etc. and disapproved of the formation of the Berar PTUC by Com. M.D. and Paranjpe. He gave a criticism of Ruikar's reformism and impressed on work in the textile.

Sardesai's criticism of our Provincial work was not correctly understood by comrades. Com. HK went to Amraoti and criticized MD for his individualism and localism before the ranks. MD retorted and charged Note and Vyas of factionalism and resigned from the POC whereupon he was expelled from the Party.

Textile work was started in Nagpur by HK. DJ came and joined in the work afterwards. On the question of memorandum, big mobilization was being made by our comrades. Then came the 1st Party Congress with its "Production Policy and no strike". This led to our giving away of the

textile workers' agitation which was initiated by us. This wrong attitude on our part of leaving the workers to their own fate and relinquishing all struggles till the end of war, has affected a great deal in our work in the textile workers, giving a handle in the hands of the reformists to discredit us amongst the workers.

Cutting himself off from direct mass movement, Vyas began to ape the Party forms at the PH and insisted on functioning of forms which in the absence of line touch with the mass movement, became only mechanical and bureaucratic.

The Party Secretary's job became that of organization of sale of PA, quotas for funds, commune and signature campaign for Congress-League unity.

In the name of centralization of Party leadership, commune was built up. Com. Paranjpe was called back from Akola where he had developed the movement of the textile workers, to stay in the commune. Rejurwale was sent to Ballarshah and then to Badnera, PK to Akola and Bardhan was uprooted from the student movement - a movement which was most disrupted because of "August struggle" and was sent round as an organizer to Akola and Ellichpur.

The functioning of forms without direct touch with the masses and especially the working-class, became lifeless, turning the Party functionaries as bureaucrats. When BN was released in '43 end, he was sent to Amraoti as DC Secretary. The kisan movement which was developing in Berar got restricted in the few villages in Chandur taluk under the slogan of "function the forms." BN as District Secretary in Amraoti was doing the same as Com. HK in Nagpur.

To what ridiculous extent the Party functionaries cut themselves off from the mass movement can be seen from one single instance of 75 days' strike of the textile workers in April '44.

The Provincial Secretary left Nagpur for Bezwada in the face of the impending strike. This was one of the first militant actions of the working-class for the betterment of their economic condition in the later days of the war, when Fascism was already on the run. The Party should have participated and led this struggle of the textile workers, but mechanically repeating "Production and no strike" for the anti-Fascist war we not only did not join in the strike but opposed it. The Party Secretary leaves Nagpur giving the directive for opposition of the strike to the younger comrades for Bezwada to hear POC's report. It is true our wrong approach had its root in the Right-reformist deviation in the Party line adopted in the First Party Congress, yet it throws a considerable light how callous the Party leadership in the Province had become to the interests of the working-class.

This mechanical functioning of the Party forms and the bureaucratic attitude of Vyas and the other functionaries of the district led to complete stagnation in the growth of the Party and inner-Party crisis.

Note returned from Bombay in October '44. He took initiative in organising removal of Vyas from Party Secretaryship. BN and Bardhan joined Note. This attack on Vyas was initiated by Note, not as correcting things in the Province and removing Vyas from his responsibility but against the Central Committee and especially against Com. BTR. According to Note, Vyas was doing all things in Nagpur on instructions from BT. Com. BN, Bardhan and Marathe fell victims to Note's revolt against the Central Committee.

The CC intervened, censured the action of BN and Bardhan as highly disruptive and anti-Party. Note refused to accept the CC resolution and was expelled from the Party. R.K. was debarred from holding any responsible position in the Party, the POC was dissolved and co-ordination committee was formed.

The main point in the CC resolution was that with the absence of any mass work on the Party of the POC

of any mass work on the Part of the POC leadership which consisted of student and ex-terrorist and TU cadres, all this factionalism, bureaucratism etc. have come and so while dissolving the POC tasks were given to each comrade in the mass front. BH work amongst Congressmen; PK-textile Nagpur and Bardhan -students.

Election and After and Re-organization of the POC

Then came the release of Congress leaders, anti-Communist demagogy and the elections. The Co-ordination Committee did not function. PK did not return and MD was in Amraoti, both these comrades were the joint convener of the Co-ordination Committee. The need for putting up our candidates cause to maintain our base T.U. in Jubbulpore and kisan in Chandur taluk. The Nagpur comrades discussed and came to the conclusion that we must put up our candidates and the C.C. be moved for reconstitution of the POC.

C.C. sanctioned putting up the candidate. We put up our candidates in the above two constituencies. C.C. sent back DJ and Mote on our repeated demand, in spite of their not approving of the idea. (Nagpur DC resolution).

In spite of our defeat in both these constituencies, the election campaign not only did not revitalize our own ranks but gave a wide base in both these constituencies.

This was precisely the period when the post-war upsurge of the toiling people came. It was in this period that every section of the toiling people was coming up for organization and fight for their demands.

Com. B.T. came in May '46, important comrades from the distts. were also called. A new Provincial Committee of 15 was constituted with mass leaders and every comrade in the POC was linked up with direct mass movement. Importance of Railway Front was impressed and Aggarwal sent to Itarsi.

From July '46 to April 47 was the period when there were innumerable strike actions of the various sections of the workers. It was in this period that many unions were organized and the defunct unions revived.

In Jubbulpore there were organised as many as 18 unions.

In Raipur also the spontaneous upsurge resulted in the organization of many unions.

In Nagpur also the same happened.

This period is characterised by the strike action in our Province of the Press workers, M.A. clerks (Jubbulpore), Post and Lower Grade Staff (Jubbulpore), sweepers, almost in all the distts. Rang Karkhana, Glass Factory workers (Jubbulpore) Chapra workers, teachers (Jub.), Provincial Sweepers and the textile workers.

It is this period that the growth of the Party was noticed and new grounds were dug in the Railway unions at Itarsi, Wardha, Badnera, Nagpur union wrested from Talappa, work in Raipur, Gondia was started.

But the crisis in the Provincial Committee remained unsolved. When BTR came, the Party crisis was one of the agenda before him. B.N., Mote and D.J. were aligned in one bloc at this time and there was a bitter attack on the W.C. comrades by them (B.N.'s report to the district committee on commune). Com. B.T.R. had nailed down the mistakes of all comrades. Com. B.N. had proposed Com. Mote as Secretary of the Party but that was not accepted either by B.T. or the comrades.

The P.O.C. was constituted at a time when there was a veritable upsurge of the working-class and the peasantry. It was period when much headway could be made and Party developed in the Province but POC itself was a house divided with no mutual trust and with each one for himself attitude. Instead of studying the problems and assimilating the experiences of the strike battles of the working people and especially of the W.C. in the light of the C.C. resolution for "Final Bid for Power", the POC in its very first meeting became again the arena of mutual squabbles. The discussion was initiated by Mote on Unity of the Party, he attacked the working-class comrades. They resented and refused to participate in the meeting. B.N. showed his inability to take up the responsibility. Under such circumstances, the question of accounts of election also came. B.N. asked the P.O.C. to appoint a Control Commission on D.J.'s putting the question in the P.O.C.

In short, the POC ceased to have any meaning for the guidance and development of the working-class movement in the Province.

A resistance developed in Comrades B.N., H.K. and the working-class comrades in discussions of political problems as a reaction to the negative attitude of Com. Note, Paranjpe and also Huddar to the problem of Party organization in the Province.

The result of this was the development of autonomy in the jurisdiction of each POC Comrade. Each comrade became very touchy to any criticism. There was self-righteous attitude in all the comrades. Amraoti became a unit by itself. Similarly was Nagpur under H.K. (Dange's tour, cultural squad programme, D.J.'s report in the Amraoti Distt. Committee).

It was in this state of Party organizational crisis that the attack on the Party came in December '46. Leading members of the POC were clapped behind the bars and warrants were issued against others.

In spite of this attack on the Party, tremendous initiative was shown by the ranks in conducting the strike battle of the sweepers. This only speaks how healthy the Party ranks are and what great potentialities are there in the Province.

After the withdrawal of the strike and the release of the jailed comrades, the POC meeting was held. On a very issue on the agenda - review of the sweepers' strike and tasks, textile work, T.U. work and kisan front, finance, etc. there was unanimity in the comrades except M.D. who differed on the sweepers' strike estimation. It looked as if we have got over from the inner-Party (POC) crisis and that with the new understanding and unity forged through the strike battles of our ranks the leadership will also learn and carry the things forward.

But again the lessons of the strike action, healthy spirit of the ranks were lost on the leadership. In less than two months again the crisis appeared again. The Paranjpe episode is well-known to comrades, needing its mention again. M.D. refused to take up any work for some months. Resignation of Paranjpe, Note and Huddar's continued inactivity all these are too glaring episodes to recount here.

All the events in the Party life showed total inability of the Provincial Committee and especially of the Party Secretary to understand the problems as a whole to guide and develop the movement beyond a certain stage.

Historic C.C. Document of Dec. '47 and Party Congress Enlivens inner-Party discussions.

The historic C.C. document of Dec. '47 was not merely a turning point in the history of our All-India Party - in that it nailed down our reformist mistakes, but was one of great significance for our Party. But for this document, a self-critical attitude in our Provincial Committee of the Party would not have developed. The attitude of "each for himself" which had vitiated any discussion in the POC with the result that groupings of conveniences had become the recurrent feature would have remained and objective relationship, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism of Party comrades and fight for such relationship both in the leaders and the ranks would not have developed.

As a first step to fight to eradicate inner-party crisis, the January resolution was passed. This resolution as has been said before suffered from many defects. It had only superficially touched the problem. It did not nail down the mistakes of individual comrades, the origin of their shortcomings and that there was no uniform understanding about the resolution. ~~inxxxxir~~ The different comrades interpreted the resolution in their own way and found their own justification in the resolution.

Com. B.N. interpreting it as a censure against Note and Note and Paranjpe taking it as a censure against B.N. and H.K. and other comrades taking it in self-righteous spirit. Sudam and Bardhan - both the sections wanted to escape from the implications of the resolution. B.N.'s attitude c

relinquishing the responsibility of the Party Committee. Mote and DJ's attitude since March 16 only speak of this.

16th March and After

The 16th March and after brought a severe repression against the Party, the Party became virtually illegal. This created enormous difficulty in carrying forward the discussion which was initiated in the January resolution and which with the Party Congress lessons would have gone a long way to help us to understand our failings and re-group ourselves equipped with the lessons of Party Congress to face the coming struggle for the building of the Democratic Front.

The crisis that faced the Party with the wholesale attack was still further deepened because of Mote and Paranjpe who not only refused to take up any responsibility to salvage the Party from this attack but actually helped in getting the Party smash up.

The April meeting of the POC organized itself. The subsequent development revitalising of the units, digging of new grounds (mine workers, Bilaspur railwaymen), advance in the Chhattisgarh, textile workers, Nagpur, Berar textile workers rally amply justified the steps taken.

The discussions on the Note of Mote and Paranjpe and the POC document have enlivened the Party and the Party as a whole is in a better organizational position than it was on the 16th March and even before.

It is in this context that the conference is meeting. The primary task before the conference is to settle accounts with bourgeois reformism inside the Party so that it is able to carry out the task of the period - building up the Democratic Front under the hegemony of the working-class - in the Province.

Communist consciousness is not born, it has to be inculcated through understanding of Marxism-Leninism in actual practice and through criticism and self-criticism.

The fight against bourgeois reformism inside the Party is not over, it has to be continued. The Party leadership and also the ranks are not immune as yet from its influence.

Evaluation of P.O.C. and the Comrades.

The P.O.C. evaluated itself and its members self-critically. In this report we are giving the evaluation of each comrade so that it helps the comrades concerned to fight out the alien tendencies, nailed down, and the ranks to be vigilant about these tendencies.

1. B.N. - Coming from the petty bourgeois terrorist movement, drawn towards the Party in the days of U.N.F. Petty bourgeois radicalism makes him an easy prey to Mote's anti-Centre attitude. Works in the student movement and Congress ranks which strengthens his Left nationalism. From the very beginning no contact with the working-class. Active during Bengal campaign, Assembly election campaign and anti-riot campaign. Ideological weakness and failure to assimilate the experiences of the working-class struggle creates in him feeling of inability to guide the Party and involves in factional fights first with M.D. against Mote, then with Mote against Vyas and then Vyas against Mote and Paranjpe. Overwhelmed by sense of inability often reflected in him in his trying to find escape from responsibility. Intolerant to criticism.

2. H.K. Student intellectual drawn towards Marxism in the days of UNF. gets into factional fight in the early stages of the Party. After '42 placed at the helm of the Party affairs, opportunist careerist tendencies crop up. Lack of touch with the working-class movement turns him a bureaucrat and a formalist. His recent action before and after the Party Congress such as pact with Ruikar, his total indifference to the organizational tasks after having given 16th March strike. His insistence of continuous strike, his surrender to the police in spite of great Party responsibilities show him as a typical petty bourgeois radical in talk and right opportunist in action.

3. M.D. - Petty bourgeois intellectual drawn to Marxism but ideologically weak. Begins his fight against Mote's anti-centre attitude with bourgeois liberal conception about organization. Takes factional approach towards Party. Individualism and localist attitude develop in the early stages (Berar PTIC formation). Refusal to lead the struggle on the plea of organization makes his approach basically anti-struggle and panicky as was evident in the sweepers' strike. Refusal to see his mistakes and drawbacks objectively made him escape into periods of inactivity.

4. P.D. Marathe - Lack of sharp understanding and with a compromising attitude he has trailed behind economic and political upsurge but never led it. Often changed his front - textile, bidi, kisans.

5. Bardhan - Student intellectual drawn and developed towards the Party in the student movement. Refusal to take up mass campaign himself. Betrays individualist and egotist tendencies, developed a light hearted attitude towards the Party and its forms. Intolerant of criticism.

6. R.S. Agarwal, Student intellectual takes to T.U. work in the early days, but remains essentially a trade unionist. Sent to Itarsi - develops trade union but refuses to undertake political work. Intolerant/criticism.

7. Shanker-Rao Dighade - Coming from the Upper-class Maratha landlord family has in him still the vices of the class. Lack of political seriousness, individualist and subjective, lapses into periods of inactivity

8. S.K. Mukherjee and Masurkar - are new members of the POC.

The POC meeting in April removed some of its members of the POC and evaluation of these comrades is also given here.

1. Huddar - Coming as he does from the RSS, he continues to have the feudal ideology even today. His approach to problems is subjective with the stamp of bourgeois mysticism, garbed in Marxian phrasemongering. In the name of family limitations, he remains inactive.

Enters into factional grouping with Mote and Paranjpe and attacks bourgeois reformism of the CC as a smokescreen to hide his own inactivity.

2. Sudam Deshmukh - Tailism, economism, intolerant to criticism, no faith in the working-class and vanity.

3. Mashram - The same traits as of Sudam.

4. Dr. Dewanjee - A Gandhian individualist, trailing behind spontaneity, absence of serious political understanding, touchy to criticism.

5. S.D. Mukherjee - Ideologically weak, not able to get over his family attachment, absence of political seriousness and sense of responsibility - seen at various periods. Glaring instances are - 1) absence for a whole month on the eve of the Provincial sweepers' struggle, Trailing behind spontaneity.