

CRITIQUE OF P.B. DOCUMENT NO.16 ON "MAIN FEATURES OF THE INDIAN
PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLES AND THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY"
- Prasad.

The editorial article of the Organ of the Information Bureau, dated 27th January 1950, was a great and inestimable service rendered to the cause of the Indian revolution and world revolution by the leadership of the international communist movement.

For over two years now, objectively speaking, Trotskyism flourishes in the leadership of the Indian Communist Party, its most ardent champion and supported in practice and in deeds. On the international plane, whatever might have been the verbal protestations of proletarian internationalism in the various resolutions and documents, the leadership carried on in practice an ideological battle against Marxism-Leninism. Its attack against Mao was nothing else.

The leadership openly slandered the Great leader of the heroic Chinese people. It is not without its significance that the leadership of the party did not even call upon the Indian working class and the Indian people to celebrate the heroic victories of the Chinese people - victories that were sending a thrill in the hearts of every Indian toiler and evoking great hopes of their own liberation drawing near.

Under the inspiration of the leadership, some of the responsible CCMs, Arun Bose for example, slandered the Burmese and Viet-Namese parties for their "crimes" of not having gone along the path of the P.B. and for having drawn their inspiration from the Chinese revolution and going along that path. He slandered international leaders like Dimitroff as "reformists". The leadership and some of the CCMs carried on a campaign of slander against such great internationally accepted Marxist authority as R. Palme Dutt as a thorough-going reformist.

All this was nothing but a consistent fight against Marxism-Leninism under cover of fighting "Right Reformism". And it adopted the most unscrupulous method of slander in this fight.

Inside India, it had taken the party completely on to the path of Trotskyite left-Adventurism. It fought every one that dared to oppose or even to express disagreement with this policy by wielding the big stick. None who dared to disagree with its line and policy could escape the lashes of its whip and the slander campaign of "reformism" - not even an internationally respected comrade like Com. Dange, nor a P.B.M. like Ajai Ghosh.

It is not fortuitous that while the Indian working class had the honour of its leader being specially named by the WFTU, which in its main resolution of the Milan session of the World Trade Union Congress, specially sent its "cordial and affectionate greetings to Comrade Dange, courageous fighter for the trade union cause", the same com. Dange was dubbed by our P.B. as a "coward".

At a time when the liberation movements in the colonies were making the most spectacular and mighty advances in the countries of Asia, and greatly undermining the whole colonial system, these Trotskyite policies and left Adventurist practice of the Indian Party have decimated the party in most of the provinces and brought disaster to the trade union movement.

In Tamil Nadu with a strong working class movement under the leadership of the party, the party organisation is in a state of collapse. As the Tamil Nadu Trade Union Fraction says in its report dated 29-4-1950, "the party has been seriously disorganised and party committees severely decimated.... the trade unions have virtually been liquidated". Links with almost all the districts have been broken. Party finances have utterly collapsed.

The Adventurist March 9th call of 1949, smashed whatever unity existed among the All India Railway workers and the possibility of our approaching the mass of Railway workers through that organisation. All our Railway unions have practically collapsed. The Rivd

rival All India Union of Railway workers that started in October 1949, is a still a paper organisation, with no functioning union or effective membership. The red flag is unable to move the mass of Railway workers in any centre for any big action on any issue. Links with the Railway workers wherever we were strong have been smashed.

In Maharashtra all the strong TU centres of Khandesh and other areas have been virtually smashed. The position is so serious that for the past one year the provincial committee of the party has not been able to find a stable for itself in the province.

The AITUC has been unable to run a single All India campaign effectively on any issue. All its circulars ~~xxx~~ to the provinces remain unanswered or unimplemented by most of the provinces, because there is no means of implementing them. The AITUC to-day functions more as an organisation issuing statements, than co-ordinating the trade union movement and leading it. Its financial position is on the verge of collapse. During the last one year since the last 23rd session of the AITUC, receipts by way of affiliation fees and subscriptions to the TU record have been just about a thousand Rupees. This means that the ~~xxx~~ organised membership is about one lakh. To-day it will be even less. The T.U. Record and the Marathi T.U. Bulletin have had to stop publication because of lack of sales.

The serious state of disorganisation of our working class movement will be seen in the fact that at a time when the workers all over the country were facing the most ferocious attacks, when objectively the conditions were ripening for forging working class unity when unable to bear the attacks workers in many places were spontaneously coming out on strikes, the party has been generally unable to intervene in these struggles in most of the places. In the result, most of these strikes and struggles suffered defeat in the absence of organisation.

These adventurist policies and practices have led to serious disruption inside the party. The defection from the party ~~of the~~ inside the Central Jail of the entire working class cadre of the SIR, of the majority of the working class cadres from the Coimbatore, Madra and other districts of the province, were fundamentally due to the repeated adventurist struggles. No Right Reformist, No disruptor could have succeeded in getting so many of these comrades, some of whom have fought heroic struggles in the past and withstood police torture, to take to the path of defection from the party but for ~~the~~ our sectarian policy and left adventurist practices.

Similar disruption must have taken place elsewhere, wherever this adventurist ~~policy~~ line was faithfully and fully implemented.

The state of organisation in Bombay and Maharashtra can be gauged from one single fact. Because of the existence of the Central Press in Bombay, almost all important publications are immediately brought out in Marathi. But yet the provincial parties have not been able to take advantage of this. The stocks of Marathi publications have accumulated with the PPE. Not a single copy of the pamphlet on the Railway Enquiry Committee Report in Marathi has been sold.

It is true that the party had to face the most severe and brutal repression of the imperialist Agents, who are naturally bent upon crushing the working class ~~movement~~ and democratic movements. This state of decimation of the party organisation and virtual liquidation of the trade union movement cannot be explained away by repression alone. The great heroism exhibited by the mass of workers and toiling people only shows that had we followed a correct policy, this situation need not have been brought about.

Instead of building up the movement in a way that would strike powerful blows at the enemy despite his repression, our policy and practice have helped the enemy in his objective. It is only in Telengana, where the party has been following on the whole a correct policy, in direct conflict with the line of the P.B., that the party has been able to defy the armed military might of the Government, and put the party on the map of international revolutionary movement.

Thus two years of sectarian policy and adventurist ~~policy~~ practices have objectively helped the enemies of the revolution. Further ~~policy~~ persistence in these would have meant the liquidation of the Indian people's revolutionary struggles for the time being.

It was at this time that the leadership of the international communist movement was compelled to ~~inter~~ openly intervene and sound the note of ~~stark~~ warning by means of the editorial article of the Organ of the Information Bureau.

Unless all this is fully realised, we will not be able to realise the great and inestimable service rendered by the editorial article.

This open intervention became necessary, because the leadership of the party, blinded by conceit and arrogance, refused to heed the warnings given before by the international leaders and authorities before. In July 1948 itself, an article appeared in the "Bolshevik" (or "Pravda") which had specifically stated that only the Big Bourgeoisie had gone over to imperialism and this specific point was noted by a CC^m and raised with the P.B. We also know that the Andhra P.C. had raised this specific question, with what results, every one knows.

Com. R.P. Dutt had sent friendly warnings that the party ~~was~~ is following a left-sectarian policy. He was, of course, slandered as a reformist.

Towards the middle of 1949, Zukhev's Review of Dyakov's book, "The national question and British Imperialism in India" was published in "Bolshevik", organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), and this was available to the Party leadership.

In the very beginning of the review, Zukhev underlined the fact of the predominance of feudal relations in agriculture, and of Big Bourgeoisie alone having gone over to imperialism. He had stated:

"All this proves that India, just as before, is chained to ~~that~~ colonial backwardness, resulting from centuries of British yoke, from the predominance of feudal relations in the countryside, from the reactionary and treacherous nature of the national Big Bourgeoisie, which lends a helping hand to British imperialism" (Communist No. 4, June-July, 1949, P. 124)

And he leaves no doubt as to the meaning of the term "Big Bourgeoisie" - he approves the analysis of Dyakov on the question and says:

"Analysing the composition of the top leadership of the Indian National Congress, A.M. Dyakov comes to the conclusion that the agreement between British imperialism and the Indian Big Bourgeoisie was in essence a compromise of the imperialists with that section of the bourgeoisie that was economically the most powerful, the Gujarati-Marwari Section. In other words, the Big Bourgeoisie of Bombay, representing in the main only two developed nationalities of Western India, the Marwari and Gujarati, has emerged in the role of the principal ally of the British" (Communist No. 4, June-July 1949, P. 129)

No doubt is left here about the meaning of the Mountbatten Award. The P.B. published this review in the Communist No. 4, June-July, 1949, with an editorial note in which it stated "This review, appearing in the organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) is very important....." And yet it failed to see the direct contradiction between its own thesis that the whole of the Indian Bourgeoisie had gone over to imperialism and Zukhev's clearest formulation that only a section of the national bourgeoisie, the wealthiest and economically most powerful section, had gone over and become the ally of the British.

And by a strange irony, this article of Zukhev appears in the same issue of the Communist in which the P.B. document on Strategy and Tactics appears, in which the P.B. had thundered against the Andhra P.C. for its formulation that only the Big Bourgeoisie had gone over to imperialism and also for its formulation ~~that~~ regarding the anti-feudal fight being the main struggle in the countryside.

Just about this time came Mao's article on "Dictatorship of People's Democracy" in the organ of the Information Bureau, dated 15th July, 1949, recounting the experiences of the Chinese revolution and says in that article:

"To date the Chinese people have mastered two fundamental points:

"1. The awakening of the mass of the Chinese people in the country; this means the unification of the working class, peasantry, petty-bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie. (Mao uses the term 'national bourgeoisie' to denote small and middle bourgeoisie as opposed to the bureaucratic comprador bourgeoisie of China) in a tight united front under the leadership of the working class and the establishment of the dictatorship of the 'people's Democracy, headed by the working class and based on the alliance of ~~the~~ workers and peasants".

In the article Mao repeats the formulations about the importance and the role of the small and ~~middle~~ middle bourgeoisie and many of the points that have been vehemently attacked by the P.B. in the Report on Strategy and Tactics and on the basis of which Mao was compared to Tito and Browder.

That the very month in which the P.B. published this attack in the central Organ of the CPI, the Organ of the Information Bureau ~~published~~ published this article of Mao meant nothing to the P.B. It did not make the P.B. enter into a serious re-examination of its position. This is the respect it gave to the leadership of the international communist movement as embodied in the Information Bureau.

It is remarkable that to this day this important article of Mao has not been published by the Party leadership in the Party journals. It did not think that this authoritative article of Mao would be valuable to the tanks in discussing the fundamental issues raised, when it published so many articles in Communist No.2, February-March, 1950, nor did it think it necessary to bring it out as a ~~separate~~ separate pamphlet ~~at least~~ at least at this time.

Within a few months of this came Mao's reply to the Greetings of the General Secretary, in which he had indicated ~~clearly~~ in the clearest possible terms the path that the Indian people will have to take. He said:

"The Indian people is one of the great Asian people with a long history and vast ~~territory~~ population; her fate in the past and her path to the future are similar to those of China in many points. I firmly believe that relying on the brave Communist Party of India and the struggle and unity of all Indian patriots, India will certainly not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators. Like free China, free India will one day emerge in the socialist and People's Democratic camp. That day will end the imperialist era in the history of mankind" (Underlining mine)

Thus the great leader whom our leadership had openly slandered as a Tito and Browder, underlined the great significance to all mankind of the success of the Indian people's revolution and clearly indicated the path it should take.

To our leadership, this clear message meant, of course, nothing.

And then in the ~~first~~ first week of January itself came the Manifesto of the Peking Conference as also the speeches of Liao Shao Chi and Li Li San at the conference ~~together~~ together with all the other documents of the conference. The importance of the Manifesto and the other documents can be realised from the fact that the representatives of the Soviet trade unions, of the Chinese trade unions, and of the working class of the South East Asian countries who were leading the armed struggle of their peoples for their national liberation attended the conference and drew up the main documents.

Two members of the Central Trade Union Fraction had immediately stated that the Manifesto, being of great importance to the working class movement and the liberation struggle should be immediately published. One of them had drawn the attention of the Secretary of the fraction to the fact that the line of the Peking Manifesto contradicted the line of the Indian Party. The secretary of the Fraction a CCM, however, thought that for this very reason it should not be published and the whole question was referred to the General Secretary about the 10th January. The ~~Secretary~~ Secretary of the Central

Central Fraction maintained in later talks with the members of the Fraction that it was quite justified and proper for the party to withhold publication of such documents when they contradicted our party line. According to him, it would confuse the ranks and undermine their loyalty to the party leadership!

After cogitating over the Peking Manifesto and other documents for three weeks, the General Secretary directed publication not of this historical document, but the speech of Stalin delivered 25 years ago to the university of the Toilers of the East, with his own preface in which he wrote:

"Sounding a sharp ~~and~~ warning against the compromising and reactionary role of the national bourgeoisie which enters into a bloc with imperialism as the revolutionary movement ~~in~~ of the toiling masses progresses, ~~com~~ Stalin has outlined etc."

This was in direct contradiction to what Stalin had stated in that very article viz.,:

"The fundamental and new feature in the conditions of existence of such colonies as India is not only that the national bourgeoisie has split into a revolutionary party and a reactionary party, but primarily that the compromising section of this bourgeoisie has already managed in the main to come to an agreement with imperialism. Dreading revolution more than imperialism, concerned more about its moneybags than about the interests of its own country, this section of the bourgeoisie, the wealthiest and most influential section, is completely going over to imperialism the camp/ of the irreconcilable enemies of the revolution, having entered into a bloc with imperialism against the workers and peasants of its own country" (Underlining mine)

This distortion was not an ordinary matter. It was indulged in by the General Secretary who had preached homilies to the ranks about the respect that should be shown to the classics and thundered against their distortion of their writings. Why was Stalin distorted in this manner ~~just~~ at the time when the question of publication of the Peking Manifesto was raised? This criminal distortion was obviously intended to justify the Trotskyite analysis of the P.B. and its policies, which were in direct contradiction to the clear line laid down in the Manifesto and other documents of the Peking Conference.

As for the publication of the Peking Manifesto itself, it was stated that the general Secretary would write about it after a few days! Full three weeks had not been enough for the General Secretary to come to a decision on it!

Judging from all this and also from the way in which Mao's writings have been handled by the P.B. and from the fact that all the documents of all those that differed from the P.B. have been suppressed, while the P.B. had no compunction or scruples to misquote them for the purpose of attacking them, it is very probable that a tirade against the Peking Manifesto and against the "utter reformism" of all those that had gathered there would have come in the Party organ in the ~~xxx~~ ~~xx~~ normal course of events. Why else was the document withheld even after the document was referred to the General Secretary specifically?

Fortunately for the Party, however, the editorial article of the Information Bureau came just at that time and prevented any further havoc. Meanwhile many more documents of the Institute of Economic and Pacific Institute of the Academy of ~~the~~ Sciences, USSR, on the colonial and Pacific questions had come.

Thus, by the time the editorial article of the Information Bureau came, the P.B. was already in possession all these valuable documents for more than a month.

The editorial article of the Information Bureau, while it warmly spoke of the armed struggles of the Peoples of Viet-Nam, Burma, Indonesia, Philippines and ~~Korea~~ South Korea, which were all following the path chalked out by the Chinese revolution, at the same time sharply stated that this is the path that the colonial peoples should take.

In these circumstances, one would have expected that a leadership which had denounced in the strongest language the Chinese path and categorically rejected it in its main resolution on Strategy and Tactics, would have woken up to the serious crimes it had committed and seen that its entire strategy and tactics, its entire policy and practice were in conflict with those laid down by in the international documents.

Strange, but nonetheless true, it is that in the first statement on the Editorial of the Organ of the Information Bureau, issued a fortnight after it had been in the hands of the P.B., it totally failed to see this. It refused to acknowledge that its rejection of the Chinese path was wrong. It refused to even acknowledge that these documents have raised questions of fundamental strategy and tactics of the Indian revolution and called for a discussion of the same by the ranks.

Instead it beat its own drum of having carried on a relentless struggle against Right Reformism and just talked of certain left-sectarian, dogmatist "mistakes". Need there be any wonder that the statement, while recounting the achievements of the Party, does not so much as mention Telengana, which stands, despite all the pre-Congress right reformism and the post-Congress left-sectarian deviation, as the brightest spot of the Indian people's democratic struggles?

The statement was nothing but an attempt at self-justification of the policy pursued for the last two years. The fact that the Organ of the Information Bureau has not cared to publish the said statement so far is not without justification, its significance.

Such is the extent of the sectarian Trotskyite ideology that had gripped the party leadership. Need there be any wonder, then, that the P.B. does not see in the Editorial of the Organ of the Information Bureau direct and open intervention in the calamitous affairs of the Indian party? It just patronisingly refers characterised the editorial as a "brilliant contribution to the Indian People's struggle for national independence and people's democracy"! Not denunciation of the Trotskyite line, but a "brilliant contribution", which can only mean further enrichment of it!

It was only after the ranks in Bengal had criticised the P.B. document No 14 (and the Bengal P.C. must be applauded for allowing this criticism, unlike the PHQ committee which stifled all criticism and discussion of the document) that the P.B. admits that the previous document No.14 "did not correctly draw lessons from this Editorial article and so sought to minimise the seriousness of the left deviation the Polit-Bureau had committed".

One and a half months have elapsed since the first statement on the Editorial article was released, in which it was promised that the P.B. would re-examine all its resolutions, including the report on Strategy and Tactics. All the important and relevant international documents have been in the hands of the P.B. for nearly three months, when the new document No. 16, on "Main Features of the Indian People's democratic struggles and the Main Tasks of the Communist Party" was released to the ranks on 7-4-1950.

It is obvious that the Political Thesis of the 2nd Party Congress despite the correct slogan of the People's Democratic Revolution that it advanced, despite the correct programme of the People's Democratic Front that it gave, despite the correct call for boldly unleashing the struggles of the masses that it gave, nevertheless, has very serious defects. Its analysis of the crisis in India and the class relations is basically wrong. It cannot, therefore, serve as a safe and reliable guide to the Party.

Under these conditions this document on "Main Features of the Indian People's Democratic Struggles and the Main Tasks of the Communist Party" should serve as a basic document for an entire period. It should positively analyse the class relations and positively lay down the strategy and tactics. Naturally, it should sharply expose the dominant left-deviation and lay bare its anti-Marxist character. It should lay bare the results of the policy so far pursued. Only then on the basis of this living experience can a real and conscious revolutionary line and practice emerge. Only then the tasks can be concretely laid down.

Does the new document No. 16 fulfil this purpose? Nothing of the kind. It is true that this new document is an advance on the previous one, in that it admits that it was a case of serious left opportunist deviation.

Nevertheless, it does not give a clear analysis of any of the problems of the Indian People's Democratic Revolution. Nor are the tasks facing the Party clearly laid down. There is no review - not even a general one - of the resolutions of the P.B., which had been promised in the earlier document?

It just takes some of the points made in the criticism of the Bengal comrades (See Party Discussion Forum, P.B. document No.17) and has not gone beyond them. It takes some of the passages from the international documents and contrasts them with passages from the Report on Strategy and Tactics and the document on the Agrarian Question. Thus only the most obvious ~~max~~ things are admitted.

As for the future tasks, the document does no more than quoting the general directives contained in the editorial article of the organ of the information Bureau and the speech of Lio Shao Chi. The only advance is ~~to apply these directives to the concrete situation in India~~ that it has revived the slogan, "Telengana Way is our Way". No attempt has been made to apply these directives to the concrete situation in India and concretise our tasks. The four tasks laid down are vague. There is no cogency in the document.

The impression one gets from reading the document is not that the P.B. is ~~seriously~~ fully and genuinely convinced of its mistakes, but it is admitting them, because the international documents say so. So also the new line is admitted to be correct not because of full conviction, but because the international documents say so.

All these will be clear if one analyses the document in detail.

The main features of the Indian People's democratic struggles are given in patches, in Section I and Section III. In the main they are dealt with in the first four paragraphs of Section I.

These are just bare statements, some of them being passages taken out from international documents, given without the quotation marks. No attempt is made to elaborate these formulations and explain them.

The document says in Section I:

"The leading role of the proletariat in the anti-imperialist struggle has lent the national liberation movement the character of a struggle not for bourgeois democracy but for People's Democracy".

Is it correct to say that the leading role ~~in the~~ of the proletariat in the anti-imperialist alone lends it the character of a struggle for people's democracy?

As early as 1905, Lenin in his Two Tactics, had stated that the hegemony of the proletariat alone will ensure the success of the complete victory of the bourgeois democratic revolution, which was "incapable of directly overstepping the bounds of a mere bourgeois democratic revolution". Was the revolution contemplated by Lenin then, in 1905, the same as the ~~revolution contemplated by Lenin in 1905~~ People's Democratic Revolution that is now on the agenda? Obviously not. Why should we call it a people's democratic revolution, as distinct from a bourgeois democratic revolution, but for the fact that these are two fundamentally different in character? The leading role of the proletariat alone cannot ~~lend~~ lend the anti-imperialist struggle the character of a ~~people's~~ struggle for People's Democracy.

Compare this formulation of the P.B. document with the following by Zukhov:

"The leading role of the proletariat in the anti-imperialist struggle, as also the earlier experience and the new post-war ~~historical~~ historical experience contributing to further exposure of bourgeois

bourgeois democracy, which is incapable of guaranteeing the attainment of genuine independence and not even directed towards the carrying out of genuine effective democratic transformations, have lent the national liberation movement the character of a struggle not for bourgeois democracy but for people's democracy.

"People's democracy is a special form of power which corresponds to the transitional period from Capitalism to socialism, which has been possible thanks to the victory of socialism in the USSR and the consolidation of democratic forces all over the world, not only fully corresponds to the interests of the broad masses of the toilers in the colonies and semi-colonies, but also is easily understood by them and realisable in practice" (Report to the Institute of Economics and Pacific Institute of the Academy of Sciences, USSR - published in "Colonial People's Struggle for Liberation" - PPE - P.8)

It will be seen that the P.B. had taken the first sentence of Zukhov quoted above, omitting the important portions underlined by ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ in the quotation, and placed it in the document. There by the P.B. fails to see that the struggle for People's Democracy is today rendered inevitable by the entire course of ~~xxxxx~~ history and that no struggle for liberation will succeed unless it is fought simultaneously as a struggle for People's Democracy. It fails to see that this becomes possible not only because the proletariat leads the ~~xx~~ liberation struggle, but also because of the victory of ~~the~~ socialism in the USSR, the consolidation and the growing might of the democratic camp in the post-war period, the going over of the big-bourgeoisie of every colonial country to the camp of imperialism, their betrayal of the national struggle and role as servitors of imperialism, and the growth of political consciousness of the mass of the people, who see in the USSR and the Democratic camp their stoutest champion.

It is this development of history that has placed in every colonial and semi-colonial country the struggle for People's Democracy, which is a new form of power corresponding to the entire period of transition from ~~xxxxxxxx~~ capitalism to socialism, on the agenda.

In the bourgeois democratic revolution, the task of the proletariat was to isolate the bourgeoisie as a whole and win the hegemony of the revolution and "to paralyse the instability of the bourgeoisie" (Stalin)

Today, in the People's Democratic Revolution, the task of the proletariat is not to paralyse the instability of the bourgeoisie. Already the wealthiest and the most influential section of the bourgeoisie - the Big Bourgeoisie - has gone over to imperialism and become its chief ally. The task of the proletariat is to fight this section of the bourgeoisie along with imperialism and feudal lords.

In the bourgeois democratic revolution Stalin pointed out, "it was necessary that the class which was fighting the proletariat for the ~~xxxx~~ leadership of the revolution and striving to become its sole leader, should be forced out the arena of leadership, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ and isolated. This too was dictated by the very idea of leadership, which precluded the possibility of there being two leaders. Lenin considered that the liberal bourgeoisie was such a class" (History of the CPSU(B) P.69)

Today, as far as the big bourgeoisie is concerned, it is not ~~xxxx~~ contending for the leadership of the revolution. It has already betrayed the revolution, become openly counter-revolutionary and allied itself with feudalism and imperialism in order to fight the revolution, and is actually fighting the revolution. The task of the proletariat is ~~xxxx~~ therefore not to isolate the big bourgeoisie, but to fight it along with imperialism and feudalism.

This is the task laid down by the Editorial of the Organ of the Information Bureau:

"In these conditions, the task of the Indian Communists, drawing on the experience of the national liberation movement in China and other countries, is, naturally to strengthen the alliance of the working class with all the peasantry, to fight for the ~~xxxxxxxx~~ urgently needed agrarian reform and - on the basis of common struggle against for freedom

and national independence of their country, against the Anglo-American imperialists oppressing it and against the reactionary big bourgeoisie ~~XXXXXX~~ and feudal princes collaborating with them, unite all classes parties, groups and organisations willing to defend national independence and freedom of India" (Underlining mine)

It is this fact that determines the character of the new revolutionary people's power - People's Democracy - which carries out not only the bourgeois democratic task of abolishing feudalism, but also confiscates the capital of foreign imperialists and of the native big bourgeoisie who collaborate with it.

Com Maslennikov says:

"The main economic task of the People's Democratic Revolution is the liquidation of the economic foundations of the landlords and big capital who constitute the prop and allies of imperialism. The confiscation of ~~x~~ all the property ~~of~~ belonging to the Kuomintang top strata and big capital in general represents an important revolutionary measure which lays the basis of socialist construction" (The Historic Victory of the Chinese People, by Maslennikov, published in "Problems of Economics" - P.12 of the typed copy)

And again:

"The foundation of social economy, according to the common programme is the sector of state-owned economy, which bears a socialist character. The development of this sector is the most important task of the People's Republic in the work of development of production and of the creation of a prosperous economy and is leading force in the social economy" (Ibid, P.13)

Hence the formulation of Zukhov that "People's Democracy is in a position to guarantee both emancipation from the imperialist oppression and the carrying out of genuinely democratic transformations, creating the necessary pre-requisites for a transition to socialist construction" (Colonial People's Struggle for Liberation - PFH, P.9., Reproduced in para 4 of Section I of the P.S. document No.16)

Hence it is that People's democracy is a special form of power "which corresponds to the transitional period from capitalism to socialism" (Zukhov), alike in the countries of Eastern Europe and in the colonies and semi-colonies.

The P.S. document by stating that "the leading role of the proletariat in the anti-imperialist struggle lends the national liberation movement ~~its~~ the character of a struggle not for bourgeois democracy but for people's democracy", ignores all these basic factors of the alignment of class forces both nationally and internationally, ignores the immense role of the Soviet Union, of the tremendous growth ~~xxxxx~~ and consolidation of the democratic camp led by the USSR, of the unprecedented crisis of the whole system of imperialism, all of which have created the conditions for the struggle for national liberation being fought as a struggle ~~is~~ for People's Democracy.

Compare this statement with the following of Zukhov:

"The entire post-war ~~development~~ events in the colonial world developing as an exposure and weakening of reaction and the growth of revolutionary forces in the shape of the consolidation ~~of~~ and further strengthening of the camp of democracy and socialism, has resulted in the national liberation struggle of the peoples of many countries going over naturally ~~to~~ into the struggle for people's Democracy" (Ibid P.9)

Unless all these are properly seen, the alignment of the class forces opposing the reactionary forces will not be ~~xxx~~ properly seen. It is this alignment of the class forces of reaction and counter-evolution both nationally and internationally, the fact that the Big Bourgeoisie of the colonial and semi-colonial countries have entered into an alliance with imperialism, the fact that in today's conditions of deeping crisis imperialism everywhere oppresses also the middle and small bourgeoisie and often ruins them, all these make it possible for the proletariat to unite not only the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie but even the middle and small bourgeois

proletariat to unite not only the peasantry and the urban petty-bourgeoisie, but even the middle and small bourgeoisie who have no ties with imperialism and who are oppressed by it in the struggle against imperialism and its allies.

Today only the proletariat, uniting with all patriotic forces, can ensure genuine national independence. That is why Zuhov says that "People's Democratic revolution can easily become the form of national liberation struggle, a form of colonial liberation struggle" (P.9., Ibid)

All these are completely ignored in the P.B. document on "Main Features of the Indian People's Democratic Struggles and the Tasks of the Communist Party". It is true that another document is promised separately on "People's Democracy". But, when it is remembered that there has been tremendous confusion on this very question, that the very stage of the Indian revolution was not properly understood because of this confusion, it is necessary to state the basic facts governing People's Democracy, its character, the factors making it possible today. Unless these basic features are properly understood, we are once again likely to commit errors regarding strategy and tactics - maybe in a direction different direction, in the direction of Right "reformism".

That this danger is real will be seen in the next Section of the P.B. document No.18. Immediately after these few bare statements in the first section, the document goes into the experience of the Chinese revolution. But in this the P.B. does not go beyond what wrote in 1927.

Wanting to draw a parallel between the character of the Chinese revolution and the developing Indian revolution, the document says:

"The character of this revolution (the victorious Chinese People's Democratic Revolution) was described with brilliant clarity by comrade Stalin in May 1927, in the following generalisation regarding the question of the nature of the Chinese revolution:

"The present-day Chinese revolution is a confluence of two currents of revolutionary movements - the movement against feudal survivals and that against imperialism. The Chinese bourgeois democratic revolution is the confluence of the struggle against the feudal survivals and the struggle against imperialism" (Underlining mine.)

Twenty three years have passed since this was written by Comrade Stalin. These twenty three years have brought about tremendous political and economic changes both in China and in the world. The second world war had ended in the political and military defeat of fascism and in the victory of the Soviet Union.

The stage of the Chinese bourgeois democratic revolution had long passed and a People's Democratic Revolution had been successfully accomplished, with the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic.

It is well-known that this victorious Chinese People's Democratic Revolution was a confluence of not only the struggle against feudal survivals and the struggle against imperialism, but also the struggle against the bureaucratic compradore capital of China, represented by the Kuomintang clique. This is what G. Asofyev says:

"When in 1926-27 comrade Stalin spoke of the bourgeois democratic character of the Chinese revolution, he proceeded from the concrete situation in China and the tasks with which the situation confronted the people's national liberation movement, namely the abolition of feudal and imperialist oppression. As a result of the political and economic changes that have taken place in recent years, there arose the further task of abolishing the power of the big bureaucratic capital headed by the 'four families' monopoly group". (New Times No.18, 1950, P.13)

All this is made clear in the numerous writings of Mao including in the article "Dictatorship of People's Democracy" published in the organ of the Information Bureau, dated July 15, 1949.

And yet the P.B. ignores all this and clings to what comrade Stalin wrote about the character of the Chinese revolution twenty three years ago under different concrete situation, and characterises the victorious Chinese People's Democratic Revolution as a bourgeois democratic revolution.

What else is it but dogmatism, mechanical quotations of the writings of the great teachers without regard to the concrete situation when they written, refusal to apply them to the existing concrete conditions and environment?

Incidentally, it is a remarkable fact that the P.B. while wanting to assimilate the experience of the Chinese revolution and draw lessons from it, quotes what Stalin wrote ~~23 years ago~~ nearly a quarter of a century ago, quotes Lio Shao Chi and Li Li San, but has found nothing in the writings of the great leader of the Victorious Chinese people, ~~wh~~ who charted the revolution to victory, to be of any use to us in evolving correct strategy and tactics. Remarkable indeed, but nonetheless true!

The Third Section deals with the class relations in India, here ~~again~~ again the same method is followed, - of just making bare statements and formulations without attempting to explain or elaborate them.

The first two paragraphs just state the colonial character of ~~India~~ India's economy - low level of industrial development, absence of heavy industry, particularly metallurgical and machine-building industry, and 87 per cent of the population being dependent on agriculture. These have been taken out from Balabushovich's article and just placed at the head of the Section.

As for domination of imperialism, there is just one sentence: "It is exclusively dependant on British capital and majority of Indian capital is British".

Certain minimum facts about the stranglehold of British finance capital on India's economy, in the Banking and credit institutions of the country, in the Railways, industries, in the plantations and import and export trade etc., should be ~~given~~ stated to make the point of imperialist domination real. Only then it will be seen what imperialist domination means to the mass of the people - no industrial development no development of productive forces, all-round decline of economy and poverty, misery and unemployment.

Just after these two paragraphs stating the colonial character of India's economy, the document has just one paragraph for the position after the Mountbatten award. Once again just bare statement.

"Even after the Mountbatten Award, Indian Union as well as Pakistan remain economically, politically and militarily under the domination of British imperialism" says the document and there it ends.

Such a formulation does not bring out the meaning of Mountbatten award, that it was the political expression of the economic developments that were taking place from about the end of the war. The appointment of Sir Ardeshir Dalal as the planning member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, the mission of the industrialists sponsored by him to ~~Brit~~ Britain and America, the deals that were negotiated by Birla ~~and~~ Tata and others during that visit, which were continued ~~after~~ since then, all of ~~which~~ these clearly indicated that Big Business was moving over to open collaboration and alliance with imperialism. The Mountbatten Award was only the political expression of this relationship, directed against the rising mass revolts. It is a specific form that imperialism was compelled to seek in order to continue its domination of India and thwart her industrial development.

That this is so can be confirmed by the last three years of the experience of the ~~sham~~ independence. There are enough facts to confirm this analysis - sterling balances, refusal to give any capital goods, the ECARR Conference where American Ambassador bluntly told that the colonial countries should ~~not~~ give up all aspirations for industrial development etc. This domination is further seen in the devaluation of the currency decided upon by the Anglo-American imperialists at Washington and in the talks now reported to be going on far behind the backs of the India Government for the transfer of a part of the Sterling balances to America. Despite all the begging of Nehru, USA refuses to give any capital goods, but on the other hand ties India to American imperialism by means of loans to purchase American tractors some goods for building river dams

and goods for building river dams, to purchase American Railway engines and other Railway equipment, and for making strategic roads and airports!

The new Constitution perpetuates the imperialist domination by the guarantee of the already existing stranglehold of British finance capital and by guaranteeing immunity to all future investments and profits.

All this is the living concrete experience of the last three years., of "freedom", which clearly demonstrate the truth of the formulation of the editorial article of the organ of the Information Bureau. Unless these are sharply brought out - not necessarily elaborately and in great detail - there can be no real understanding of ~~what~~ imperialist domination and what it means. Only then on the basis of the concrete developments of the last three years, the meaning of the Mountbatten Award will be clear and the formulation of the Organ of the Information Bureau will become our living consciousness.

If we ~~have~~ a clear understanding of this basic reality, then it will be easy enough to see how the basic line running through the Report on Strategy and Tactics is wrong.

In the remaining portions of the section are given passages from the Report on Strategy and Tactics and the document on the Agrarian Question which are in contradiction with the line of the Organ of the ~~the~~ Information Bureau and commented upon.

The portions dealing with the colonial character of Indian economy very well bring out how the formulations in these passages quoted from the Report on Strategy and Tactics, deny the colonial character of our economy, how imperialist domination is negated.

However, the nailing down of our mistakes does not go deep enough. The passages quoted are so obviously in contradiction with the basic formulation of the Organ of the Information Bureau and they cannot be missed by any body.

What the P.B. document fails to bring out is the fact that flowing from this negation of imperialist domination, the entire analysis of the economic crisis in the Report on Strategy and Tactics is fundamentally wrong and defective. The analysis of the crisis presented therein is of the capitalist crisis as it would affect any capitalist country and not as it affects a colonial country.

It is not enough to see that according to Marxist-Leninist analysis "Imperialism strives to keep India a colonial backward agricultural country" (P.B. document No. 16). This imperialism always sought to do. What is the new thing in the period of the crisis?

Because of the crisis, imperialism not only seeks to keep India a backward agricultural country, but intensifies exploitation of the people, strives by every means to ~~take~~ export the crisis from the home country to the colonies. This is how the Working Manifesto formulated the question:

"In order to maintain and to consolidate their domination over the peoples of the Asian countries, to increase their enslavement, to squeeze still more profits out of them, and to find a way out of the crisis which is already developing, the rapacious imperialists are increasing their economic, political and military pressure on the oppressed peoples of the Asian countries" (Underlining mine)

Events of the last three years confirm this - devaluation, increasing American imports of consumer goods and foodgrains, the present talks on the transfer of the sterling balances etc.

It is necessary to see not only imperialist domination but also what it means in conditions of crisis - complete ruination of the mass of the people including small and medium capitalists - because then only we will be able to see what a wide and mighty front of the people against imperialism ~~can be formed~~. It is ~~this intensified exploitation~~ ~~that~~ ~~and~~ its allies can be forged. It is this intensified exploitation that gives rise to the most heroic struggle of the people against the armed might of imperialism. As the Working Manifesto says,

says, "this looting, this barbarous cruelty of imperialism, cannot but give rise to a determined resistance on the part of the peoples of the persecuted oppressed countries of Asia in defence of their national independence".

Finally, the Report on Strategy and Tactics, which started to analyse the capitalist crisis, ended its analysis with a complete negation of the crisis itself! This is what the "Report on Strategy and Tactics says in the concluding portion of its analysis of the crisis in section I:

"Secondly, the Indian capitalists are dependent on imperialism in yet another way. For industrial development, there are two paths - the path of socialist development, the path of national freedom and democracy. Following this path India could get help for economic advance from the USSR and democratic countries... But the capitalists want the other path - the path of building Indian economy not in co-operation with the USSR, but with the imperialists. This means that capitalist development is determined by the war needs of imperialist powers and not by the interests of the people. It means begging for capital goods from the imperialists who are not prepared to send them unless you sell your foreign policy and defence to them and also agree to accept them as economic partners, and guarantee them that there will be low taxation, no nationalisation, suppression of labour, cheap labour and drive against communist and other democratic forces"

(COMMUNIST KAL No.4, June-July, 1949, P.32)

Thus we are told that there two paths of industrial development - the socialist path and the capitalist path! Is it not an amazing formulation to make at a time when production is rapidly falling all-round in all capitalist countries, when capitalism is proving itself before the whole masses of the people that it is incapable of even working the existing productive forces, let alone the question of developing them?

This is not a case of just negating the role of imperialism alone. The accepted Marxist-Leninist understanding of capitalism itself, of capitalism in the declining moribund stage, of the general crisis of capitalism, of the deepening post-war crisis of capitalism, which develops in the midst of the general crisis of capitalism and which signifies the accentuation and the extreme acuteness of all the contradictions of capitalism - all these have been completely liquidated in this passage of the Report on strategy and Tactics.

On the Agrarian Question ~~also~~ also the same method of making spare statements is followed. The document states that the dominant form of exploitation in agriculture is imperialist-feudal and growth of capitalist relations ~~is~~ is yet insignificant.

Once this formulation is accepted, it is easy enough to pick out any number of passages from the document on the Agrarian Question to show that the formulations made therein are in direct contradiction with this correct understanding. After all the document itself was written with a view to fight the formulation that there can be any unity of all peasants.

What is necessary, therefore, is an explanation of the basic formulation regarding the class relations in the countryside. It is no doubt true that a document is promised on the Agrarian question. Nonetheless, while a detailed analysis of the agrarian question can be left over for a future document, it is nevertheless necessary that a clear idea of the agrarian relations should be given in this document itself, if the party ranks are to discuss and understand the important questions of strategy and tactics that have been raised.

Further, it is not enough to see that the growth of capitalist relations ~~is~~ insignificant in agriculture are as yet insignificant. It is necessary also to see that the growth of capitalism in agriculture is actually hindered by imperialism and its agents. No doubt this fact is stated in passing in another place in the document. But this must be seen as part of the basic analysis of the class relations obtaining in agriculture. Only then it can be seen that it is possible to unite the entire peasantry against imperialism and feudalism.

The document points out that "the essence of the capitalist mode of production is the production of surplus value, exploitation of wage labour and it occupies an insignificant part in agricultural life". This is the crux of the problem. Only an understanding of this ~~xxxx~~ fact will help in seeing that feudal relations and not capitalist relations dominate Indian agriculture. This must be explained with facts.

But instead of explaining this, the document contends itself with the formulation that "Indian agricultural commodities, besides being food crops, are mostly raw materials for foreign imperialists, a fact which lends to Indian agriculture the dominant character of semi-feudal economy under colonial subjection and not of capitalist agriculture".

It is correct to point out that imperialism hinders the growth of capitalist relations in agriculture, as part of its attempts to thwart industrial development. Once it is bent upon and dies everything to retain the feudal system of exploitation in agriculture.

But it is not clear from this how it can be stated that the fact of Indian agricultural commodities, besides being mainly food-crops, are mainly raw materials for foreign imperialists, lend to Indian agriculture the character of semi-feudal economy.

The major portion of India's agricultural production is food-grain. Does it mean that the production of food-grains precludes the possibility of capitalist relations in agriculture? Did not capitalism in agriculture grow in Europe and America primarily in the production of food-crops?

Or take the non-food crops. A big proportion of them is cotton, consumed by Indian mills. That apart, what lends ~~kk~~ agriculture the character of feudal or capitalist economy? The actual relations of production under which they are produced or the person who consumes the goods, to whom the produce is sold? Take for example, an agriculturist who owns 10 acres of land in ~~kkxxxx~~ the Guntur District of Andhra, on which he produces tobacco. He employs wage labour, and does not rent his land or enter into share-cropping ~~xxxxmanagementxx~~ agreement. He himself supervises the cultivation and looks after the operations. He produces the tobacco and sells it to the Imperial ~~xxxx~~ Leaf Tobacco Development Company, a British firm. Does he cease to be a capitalist agriculturist?

What should be shown is that imperialism has hampered the growth capitalism in agriculture and the relations of production in agriculture are actually feudal. This should be shown by ~~actualrelationsxx~~ reference to actual relations existing in the countryside and not by means of deductive logic.

native

The fact is that in the entire area of the former/~~xxx~~ states, the jagirdari and zamindari systems are in vogue. In the territory of the former British India, 49 per cent is under the Zamindari system, which every one knows is the feudal system. But even inside the ryotwari areas, share-cropping is the dominant system in vogue. In recent years money rent is being introduced. But even this is only form of the feudal system of share-cropping.

If all these are clearly shown as also how imperialism actually perpetuates these relations, then it is easy enough to see that feudal exploitation is the dominant system in agriculture.

The document should also clarify ~~whax~~ who is a landlord and who is a rich peasant.

On the Question of the role of the Indian Bourgeoisie, also there has not been any analysis to show that Big Bourgeoisie ~~xxxxxxx~~ alone has gone over to imperialism and that the congress leadership represents this Big Bourgeoisie alone. There is just one paragraph which makes the statement that a few large families - the Tatas, Birlas etc., - control enormous resources and control the congress organisation and guide its policy through Nehru and Patel.

Considering the fact that the entire policy of the Party has hinged round this question as to who has gone over to imperialism - the whole of the Indian bourgeoisie or only the Big Bourgeoisie - it is necessary to give some facts to show the correctness of the formulation that only the big bourgeoisie has gone over. It should further be shown with facts that the Congress leadership represents this section of the bourgeoisie

bourgeoisie only. The major policies of the India Government during the last three years amply illustrate this. The policy of no nationalisation is obviously designed in the interests of Big Business, because the Congress programme has all along been one of nationalisation of key and major industries only and not all industries. The key and major industries are in the hands of the monopolies - both foreign and Indian. The taxation reliefs granted in the successive budgets have always been in the interest of big business - for incomes of over 1½ lakhs a year etc. Thus the formulation should be reinforced by the actual experience of the last three years.

The document says that the P.B. failed to make a distinction between the big bourgeoisie and the small and the middle bourgeoisie "because it failed to see imperialist domination over Indian economy, the colonial character of Indian industries and the monopoly hold of a few families". This is an understatement of the gross un-Marxist understanding of the P.B.

One has only to remember that when the Report on Strategy and Tactics attacked the Andhra Secretariat document for its formulation that sections of the bourgeoisie other than the big bourgeoisie can be neutralised, it did so primarily on its understanding of the international situation. Seven printed pages have been devoted to this aspect of the question in the Report (pag 62 to 68 of "Communist" No.4, June-July 1949) because, according to the P.B. "this understanding of the international situation is the key to the reformist ~~understanding~~ outlook of the Andhra Secretariat".

The P.B. justified its thesis on the basis of its understanding of the world situation and its interpretation of Zhdanov's speech before the Nine Communist Parties' Conference. Consider, for example, the following:

"The Political Thesis bases itself on the intensified contradictions - the major contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, on the immensely increased strength of the forces of socialism. While it takes account of the increased conflict of capitalism and imperialism, it at the same time lays down that the new basic elements are two camps - the camp of the bourgeoisie, of imperialism against the camp of socialism, of democracy, the people. The Andhra Secretariat, because it ~~denies~~ denies the existence of two camps, bases itself primarily on the increased conflict among the bourgeoisie and thus makes out a case for collaboration, with one section of the bourgeoisie, when all sections are united in organising a world front of capital against labour."
(Communist No.4, 1949, P.57) (Underlining mine)

This is made further clear, when the P.B. enumerated the reasons for rejecting the thesis of the Andhra Secretariat. Take the following from the report which makes it clear:

"Thirdly, they (the bourgeoisie) are not thinking in terms of competition and conflict only, but more in terms of collaboration against world communism and the Soviet Union.

* * * * *

"Fifthly, the Andhra Secretariat always forgets the basic class contradictions and bases itself only on the increased conflict of the bourgeoisie. It is obvious that even if some sections do not get enough benefit, or let us say not much out of the present state etc., can they think in terms of an alternative, of altogether new type? Can they really take a challenging stand to the present collaborationist state? They dare not. For, the alternative to it is a People's democratic State and not another form of capitalist state. That is why even the disgruntled elements cannot go beyond constitutional opposition and an attempt to take possession of the Government through constitutional means, while always ready to protect the state against the communists"
(Ibid, P.70)

And finally, we get the following:

"The Andhra Secretariat forgets the dominant contradictions between the exploited people and the capitalists, the challenge of world

"The Andhra Secretariat forgets the dominant contradictions between the exploited people and the capitalists, the challenge of world communism, and the consequent position taken up by world capitalism - the INTERNATIONAL FRONT OF CAPITAL; and hopes to base its strategy on the differences among the capitalists, WHEN ALL OF THEM ARE UNITED, EXERCISE IN SPITE OF THE DIFFERENCES, AGAINST THEIR ENEMY, THE WORKING CLASS. The working class no doubt takes advantage of whatever differences that might exist among different sections of the bourgeoisie, not to rely on any section, but to discredit and expose both. IN THE PRESENT PERIOD, IT CANNOT BASE ITS STRATEGY ON THESE DIFFERENCES, AND FORGET, AS THE ANDHRA SECRETARIAT DOES, THE MAIN BASIC CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE WORKING CLASS AND THE BOURGEOISIE. The Andhra Secretariat sees the effect of the economic crisis, collaboration etc., only on certain sections of the bourgeoisie and forget the masses; they forget that these same crises and collaboration intensify the contradiction between the people and the bourgeoisie a hundredfold, leading to an open war between the two". (Ibid, P.70)

Commenting on the Andhra documents, the P.B. says: "Obviously the international outlook revealed in the Andhra Secretariat document is an open repudiation of both the Thesis and Zhdanov's statement before the Nine Communist Parties' Conference."

Quite apart from the fact that the P.B., in its criticism of the Andhra document had twisted the document in many places, it is obvious that the P.B.'s understanding of the meaning of two camps itself has been basically wrong. If that understanding is correct, then there is no scope for uniting any section of the national bourgeoisie in the anti-Imperialist peoples' Democratic Front, because, according to it, despite their conflict, they are united with imperialism in the world front of imperialism and capitalism against communism and the working class.

The P.B. had quoted Zhdanov in support of its understanding of the two camps. How wrong that understanding had been can be seen from this one fact alone. In the same speech before the Nine Parties' Conference, Zhdanov enumerates the tasks of the communist parties; and says:

"In view of the fact that the majority of the leaders of the socialist parties (especially the British Labourites and the French Socialists) are acting as the agents of United States imperialist circles, there has devolved upon the communists the special historical task of leading the resistance to the American plan for the enthrallment of Europe (Obviously, this refers to the Marshall Plan) and of boldly denouncing all co-adjutors of American imperialism in their own countries. At the same time, COMMUNISTS MUST SUPPORT ALL REALLY PATRIOTIC ELEMENTS WHO DO NOT WANT THEIR COUNTRIES TO BE IMPOSED UPON, WHO WANT TO RESIST ENTHRALLMENT OF THEIR COUNTRIES TO FOREIGN CAPITAL AND TO UPHOLD THEIR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. The communists must be the leaders in enlisting all anti-fascist and freedom-loving elements in the struggle against the new American expansionist plans for enslavement of Europe".

It is clear that these tasks were addressed to the communist parties of Europe, taking into consideration the concrete situation existing there. But even in those countries Zhdanov enjoins upon the communists to support all patriotic elements.

We know how the European parties are implementing the line. In the fight against the war-mongers and in defence of peace, the communists are uniting all sections of the people, including sections of the bourgeoisie, who do not want war, and whose enterprises and industries are being ruined by aggressive American imperialism and its Marshall "aid".

How does this understanding of the P.B. arise? It arises from the failure to understand the depth of the crisis facing the capitalist system and the imperialists' system. It arises from a failure to see the colossal nature of American imperialism which is unable to solve its crisis, except by enslaving every country. It reduces all other imperialists to the position of its satellites.

But at the same time, the crisis is so deep that the bloc of monopoly capital, headed by the American monopolists, direct their attacks not only on the freedom and independence of all peoples, not only intensify their exploitation of the people, but also squeeze out all other small and medium capitalists. We know the number of small

small and medium enterprises that were ruined during the last crisis of 1929-34. Utilising their difficulties, the monopolists bought these enterprises for a song and ruined these small and medium capitalists. In today's conditions of the crisis, which, when it breaks out, will be infinitely more ferocious than the last one and with the further growth in the power of the monopolists, these small and medium capitalists will face ruin.

Thus although today they have illusions about the Government - who did not have them? even the Communist Party of India had them - as the crisis develops and they face the full blast of the monopolists and see the real face of the Government, they can be drawn into the anti-imperialist camp.

The P.B.'s un-Marxist formulations ~~arose~~ thus arose not only from a failure to see imperialist domination and the monopoly hold of a few families, but also fundamentally from its basic Un-Marxist understanding of the world situation, of the monopoly stage of capitalism and of the depth of the capitalist crisis.

Secondly, The Second Party Congress was a great landmark in the history of the CPI. The P.B. Document No.16 very correctly quotes the articles by Maslennikov and Balabushovich for a realisation of the positive achievements of the Congress. In general it can be said that the Congress gave a crushing blow to Right Reformism.

To the positive achievements of the Congress given by Balabushovich, it should be added that for the first time, the Congress spurred the mass of party members to study and endeavour to understand the classics of Marxism. For the first time, after the Congress, comrades throughout the country, conscious of the fact that their ignorance of Marxism was a great factor contributing to the Reformism of the past period began ~~to~~ seriously to study Marxism and try to understand it.

Secondly the unleashing of the mass struggles - both on the working class front and on the Kisan front - in 1948, which were developing as a result of the deepening economic crisis and the intensified exploitation of imperialism and its collaborators, was a direct outcome of the 2nd Party Congress.

But for a correct evaluation of the Congress, one must also realise its shortcomings and weaknesses.

After quoting Maslennikov's precise statement that the reformist line of the pre-Congress period "was strongly ~~condemned~~ criticised and condemned" at the Congress, the P.B. document adds:

"The Second party Congress corrected the right opportunist understanding about the new situation" (P.12) (Underlining mine)

Such a statement could be made only if the 2nd party congress gave the party a correct strategy and tactics, only if it gave the party a correct understanding of the major questions facing it. For, obviously, you cannot correct a wrong understanding by means of another wrong understanding. Turning from Right Reformism to Left opportunism is no "correction". Social democratic conceptions, which were the dominant features of the party in the pre-Congress ~~xxx~~ period, cannot be fought and corrected by means of Trotskyite conceptions.

Can it be said that the Political Thesis of the 2nd Congress ~~correctly~~ correctly fought the Right Reformist deviation and corrected that understanding? Can it be claimed, as the P.B. document No.16 does, that the "main decisions of the Congress were an effective weapon both ~~against~~ against Right opportunism and against left sectarianism?

Such a claim cannot be made merely on the basis of the fact that that the Political Thesis advanced the correct slogan of People's Democratic "evolution, the correct programme of the people's Democratic Front, and that it correctly emphasised the alliance of the working class, the peasantry and the urban petty-bourgeoisie. What understanding of these slogans, what understanding of the meaning of the class alliance and what strategy and tactics for the ~~realisation~~ realisation of these slogans did it give. That is the crucial ~~question~~ question

the crucial test. In other words, such a claim can be sustained only if the Thesis analysed the class relations correctly, had a clear perspective of the nature and objectives of the revolution, and indicated the correct strategy and tactics.

Left deviation and right deviation signify conduct of the bourgeoisie and are related to concrete circumstances and situation. They are deviations from a correct attitude and conduct towards non-proletarian classes, which are determined by the concrete situation, by the concrete positions that these classes occupy in relation to the revolution. If the analysis of the Political Thesis on this crucial question with its formulations of the various classes towards the revolution is wrong, then, obviously, it cannot be asserted that it will serve as a weapon to fight left deviation.

On these crucial questions the Political Thesis had taken up a completely left sectarian position. The P.B. document itself admits some of these left-opportunist formulations of the Political Thesis. What it fails to see is the fact that these are not some isolated minor "mistakes", but are basic formulations, on which depend the entire conduct, strategy and tactics of the party.

This is not the place for a detailed analysis of the Political Thesis. But certain broad features can and should be indicated to show how on every crucial question the Political Thesis had the roots of left sectarian deviation deeply and firmly imbedded in it.

Firstly, it is not correct to state, as the P.B. document No.16 does, that the Thesis "asserted that the Big Bourgeoisie had betrayed the masses and gone over to imperialism" (P.13). This statement is contradicted by the following later statement of the P.B. document itself: "The Political Thesis did not distinguish between the big bourgeoisie and other sections of the bourgeoisie and did not differentiate between their roles. It placed the whole bourgeoisie in the category of 'collaborationist'" (P.13)

However, it is not a case of failure to distinguish between their roles and of lumping them together in one category alone. The Thesis positively stated that it is ANTI-MARKIST to make any distinction between sections of the bourgeoisie thus:

"In fact all shades of differences within the bourgeois camp (such as those between Nehru and Patel) are entirely subordinated to the new basic re-alignment of the class as a whole, namely its role of collaboration with imperialism. Both Nehru and Patel represent this collaborationist class, and all differences between them are being and will be so solved within the fundamental framework of the collaborationist policy of the class as a whole. The working class cannot go forward without fighting the policy of this class. That is why today, IT IS ANTI-MARKIST FOR THE WORKING CLASS TO BASE ITS STRATEGY ON THE 'DIFFERENCES' WITHIN THE BOURGEOIS CAMP, such as the 'Patel-Nehru' differences" (Political Thesis, First print, P.55) (Emphasis mine)

Although in the above passage the alleged differences between Nehru and Patel are specifically referred to, they are just by way of illustrations. The basic point sharply underlined therein is that the bourgeoisie as a whole, the whole of the class has gone over to imperialism.

We have already seen how the P.B. in its Report on Strategy and Tactics, in supporting its analysis of the role of the Indian bourgeoisie and in rejecting the Andhra secretariat's analysis, based itself on its understanding of the international situation, on its understanding of the two camps. That was not a fortuitous development. We will find the same understanding in the Political Thesis also. This what the Political Thesis says regarding the new class alignment at the end of the 2nd world war:

"The close of the anti-fascist war has thus led to a new constellation of forces. The old combination, in which certain sections of the bourgeoisie and their reformist hangers-on were found in the people's camp in the common battle against fascism, is replaced by one in which THE ENTIRE WORLD BOURGEOISIE, ranged together with its reformist hangers-on

hangers-on and reactionary supporters, is attempting to blend itself together to stem the tide of revolution and to oppose the working class the people, the socialist Soviet Union, the Eastern Democracies and the colonial peoples"

"The impact of the economic crisis ~~is~~ and the imminent menace of revolution are the basic reasons why the new-set-up comes into existence" (Ibid, P.5)

And again:

"The basic line of the BOURGEOIS PARTIES IN EACH COUNTRY, and of their reformist hangers-on, IS TO FIGHT THE REVOLUTION AT HOME AND ABROAD. That is the why the old set-up completely changes. This is what creates two camps - the imperialist, anti-democratic camp and the anti-imperialist democratic camp, composed of the Soviet Union, and the Eastern European Democracies and the fighting peoples all over the world" (Ibid, P.6)

Secondly, as the P.B. document itself admits, the whole analysis of the economic crisis proceeds on the understanding of an independent capitalist country. Although the passages under the heading "Real face of the Mountbatten Award" state that Britain's domination has not ended only the form has changed, the fact remains that the dominant running thread throughout the Thesis is this analysis of an independent capitalist country.

The problem is posed as one trade pacts, as customs concessions etc, between two independent countries. Nowhere has the stranglehold of British finance capital, imperialism's exploitation through that stranglehold, the impossibility of any industrial development under this stranglehold, have been ~~brought~~ so much as mentioned.

The questions of foreign policy and home policies of the India Government have throughout been posed as those of an independent Government. The complaint is made that the Government is dragging the India through these policies into the Anglo-American camp, just as the British Labour Government, by its policies, is subordinating Britain to USA imperialism.

Thirdly, regarding the character of the Government the Thesis ~~nowhere~~ points out that it is an agent of imperialism. On the other hand it is presented as a 'satellite' Government which has got control over vast manpower and resources. Take the following:

"Imperialism makes big concessions to the bourgeoisie and hands it over Governmental power to rule the Indian people in its own narrow selfish interests (not in the interest of imperialism?)

"At the same time, the state it has won is dependant on imperialism and is a satellite state.

"In the new state, therefore, the national bourgeoisie shares power with imperialism, with the latter still dominant indirectly.

"This is the secret behind the reactionary policy of the National Government. The bourgeoisie has ceased to play an oppositional role; it has renounced ~~and~~ struggle to get concessions from imperialism; IT IS NOW DEPENDENT ON THE NEW STATE AND THE CONTROL OVER THE INDIAN PEOPLE TO USE THEM AS Pawns IN ITS BARGAINING WITH IMPERIALISM, WHENEVER DIFFERENCES AND CONFLICTS ARISE; THESE CONFLICTS WILL BE SOLVED AT GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL BY OFFERING NEW CONCESSIONS TO IMPERIALISM, THROUGH CUSTOMS, LOWERING OF TARIFFS, SECURING OF JOINT CONCERNS ETC.,"

(Ibid, P.42)

Herein you will find the replica of the Trotskyite formulation of the position in China of 1927.

And again:

"But today, the people in their disillusionment are learning something more, and that is, that a Government manned by leaders in whom they had utmost faith cannot discharge a single responsibility and ~~cannot~~ cannot give them land, peace or bread. More and more the people are coming to the conclusion that the national Government is guided by the vested interests; MORE AND MORE THEY ARE SEEING THE LINK BETWEEN THE

BETWEEN THE INDIAN CAPITALISTS AND THE NATIONAL LEADERS (NOT THE LINK BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND IMPERIALISM?). Out of this disillusionment will come the demand for a new Government" (Ibid, P.73)

Thus, although there are phrases here and there about imperialism and the fight against it, the whole Thesis proceeds on the basis that the fight is in reality against the bourgeoisie and its Government. The later formulations in the Report on Strategy and Tactics were only further elaboration of this basic thread running throughout the Political Thesis.

Fourthly, nowhere has it been realized that the agrarian revolution is the driving force of the Indian revolution. That is why we find that in the Chapter on the Tasks of the Communist Party, tasks on different fronts are given in isolation from one another, and it has nowhere been emphasised or even mentioned that the main task of the Communist Party in the present phase of the revolution is the leading of the agrarian revolution.

That this understanding of the agrarian revolution being the driving force of the Indian revolution ~~was~~ was completely absent can be seen from another fact also. It can be seen from the way in which the Telengana fight has been posed in the Political Thesis and the place given to it in the Thesis.

In the original draft, there was no mention of the Telengana at all. At the Party Congress, the slogan "Telengana Way Our Way" dominated the congress. Nonetheless, the drafting Committee, which finalised the Thesis has given just a para to Telengana. And that too in the section dealing with the tasks on the States Peoples' Front. This is what the Thesis says:

"This is borne out by the struggle in Hyderabad, where, under the leadership of the Communists and the Andhra Mahasabha, the struggle of the Telengana people has reached an unprecedentedly high level. Braving the terror unleashed by the Nizam's army and police and the fascist Majlis-Ittihad-ul-Muslimeen, the people of Telengana have liberated over 2,000 villages and are conducting a bitter struggle for land, for freedom and democracy. Thereby they have demonstrated how the struggle can grow and develop when the issue of land for the tiller is made an integral part of the democratic struggle, when the issue of abolition of autocracy and power for people is placed in the forefront, when the masses are led by the fighting organisations and are free from the paralysing influence of the bourgeoisie". (Ibid, P.107)

- Telengana struggle had no lessons to teach to the peasants' struggles throughout the country against feudalism and imperialism, but it has only lessons only for the states' peoples in their struggle against autocracy.

Fifthly, although the Thesis, while formulating the tasks on the agrarian peasant front, mainly concentrates on the abolition of feudalism; it nonetheless formulates the task of fighting the rich peasants also. This is what it says: "Landlordism of all forms must be liquidated without compensation to the landlords; the land of the landlords and the rich peasants must be distributed among the toiling peasants and all forms of feudal and semi-feudal exactions must go". (Ibid, P.97) The report on Strategy and Tactics and the document on the Agrarian Question only elaborated this fundamental postulate of the Political Thesis. Any other strategy, of neutralising the rich peasants, in the countryside to be advocated in the face of this, would mean doing violence to the Political Thesis.

Sixthly, the P.B. document itself admits that the Thesis made wrong formulations on the question of the stage of the revolution.

Thus, on every crucial question, both national and international, on the question of two camps, on the questions of the stage of the revolution, role of the bourgeoisie, the attitude and conduct of the proletariat towards sections of the national bourgeoisie, of the character of the Government, of the attitude to the rich peasants, on the analysis of the crisis etc., the Political Thesis had given fundamentally wrong analysis and basically wrong formulations. Moreover, it d!

Moreover it did not realise that the agrarian revolution was the driving force of the Indian revolution. In fighting the Andhra documents, the P.B. was only faithfully defending the line it had worked out in its Political Thesis.

To claim, therefore that the decisions of the Party Congress as embodied in the Thesis afforded a weapon to fight left opportunist deviation does not correspond to truth. On the other hand, the Thesis contained all the left opportunist formulations, which, as we have seen, were later elaborated in the subsequent P.B. documents.

Here it is not a question of minimising the crisis crimes of the P.B. To look upon the question that way is wrong. It will completely beg our attempts at proper understanding of the roots of left opportunist deviation.

In fact, it will be surprising if these left-opportunist formulations and trotskyite analysis were not present in the Political Thesis. It must be remembered that the main author of the Political Thesis was the General Secretary, who was also the author of most of the later documents of the P.B. in the post-Congress period. The drafting Committee, which finalised the Thesis consisted of the members of the P.B., who have practically led the P.B. and the party since the 2nd Congress. It will not be wrong to say that in practice they have been functioning for the P.B.

Are we to believe that all the left opportunist was not there in them before at the time of the party congress, that they had very correct Marxist understanding and outlook at that time, and that these tendencies suddenly, as if out of thin air, took possession of them and took the shape it did only about nine months after the Congress, in December 1948, when the first major documents of the P.B. were prepared? In the face of what has been stated about the Political Thesis, the absurdity of such a claim is evident.

It is well-known that until the Party Congress, the overwhelming majority of the party comrades had never read any Marxism. They could not therefore see through these un-Marxist formulations and analysis.

Nonetheless, they were realising, through their practical experience of the repression let loose by the Congress Government and by the events in the country since the Congress assumed office, that the Congress Government was one of collaboration, and anti-working class, anti-people.

Comrade Stalin pointed out in reference to China in 1926:

"In China there is not yet any group or Government capable of carrying out reforms similar to Stolypin's which will serve as a lightning conductor for the ruling group.

"It is not easy to bridle and suppress the millions of peasants who have taken possession of the land of the landlords.

"The prestige of the proletariat among the working masses is rising from day to day and its strength is far from being destroyed." (quoted by Chen Po Ta, Communist No. 2, February-March 1950, p. 129)

Chen Po Ta points out that on this basis Comrade Stalin pointed out that there was no possibility for reformism to exist in China.

This applies to India of 1948 also. The Congress Government, being an agent of imperialism, caught up in the throes of the biggest capitalist crisis, was not capable of any kind of reform. Millions of workers and peasants had taken to heroic struggle in 1946 and 1947. The ground under the foot of reformism was being rapidly undermined by the objective conditions. Comrades were realising that the Government had to be fought, although vaguely.

That is why, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of the P.M.s had never studied Marxism, Right reformism could be so easily vanquished at the Party Congress.

To state this is certainly not to minimise in any way the fact that the present leadership led the fight against the old reformist

old Right Reformist understanding of the situation after the Mountbatten Award.

It was only the ignorance of Marxism of the ranks in the party that enabled the left opportunism to parade itself as "Revolutionary Marxism". The fact that it came out against the Right reformism at a time when the mass of party members were not able to see it gave left opportunism the halo of being the "Marxist Core" of the old C.C. This halo has been since built up in the period following the Congress.

Whenever any rank and file comrade or middle leaders levelled any criticism against any particular policy, they were told that it was improper for them to criticise the leadership. They know nothing of Marxism. The leadership had proved its Marxism by the fight against Right Reformism. ~~This is the leadership~~ "You did nothing to fight Right reformism. This is the leadership that fought Reformism. How dare you criticise such a leadership?" Such arguments were used to silence criticism and to demoralise the lower ranks.

It is very necessary to realize that it was not revolutionary Marxism, but left sectarianism that triumphed over Right reformism at the 2nd Party Congress, because only then, it will be possible to understand ~~the meaning of~~ and realize the meaning of all that had happened subsequent to the party congress. That within two years after the party Congress, at a time when ~~in~~ in every country the people have made tremendous advance, when the colonial struggle for national independence and people's democracy have made the most mighty advance in the countries of Asia, we should find ourselves in a position where the P.B. itself admits that disaster has come to the Party organization and to the working class movement itself, is not an ordinary thing.

Only a full realisation of the left opportunism that is deeply embedded, that cannot be and certainly is not a sudden growth, will enable us to make a sharp break with it and ~~consciously~~ consciously fight it and root it out of the party.

The document does not indicate that such a full realisation has been there in the P.B. If there is a realisation, then there is a lot of hesitancy. The document reveals a mood of extreme self-justification.

In regard to the attitude of the P.B. to the documents of the Andhra Secretariat, the document No.18 says:

"The Andhra document, despite the fact that it contained some weaknesses of formulations, in the main proposed a very correct approach to the concretisation and precise formulation of the general line of the party.

"The Polit-Bureau, on the other hand, THINKING IN TERMS OF REMOVING THESE WEAKNESSES, took an opposite direction and rejected the Andhra documents as "Right Reformist". (P.14)

Can any one reading the Report on Strategy and Tactics say that the P.B. thought in terms of removing the weaknesses of the formulations in the Andhra document? When you think in terms of removing the weaknesses of certain formulations in a document, ~~it~~ it means that you accept the fundamentals of the formulations. But this is how the Report prefaces the attack on the Andhra Secretariat documents:

"Here we undertake a detailed criticism of the document submitted by the Andhra Secretariat, ~~which reveals~~ WHICH REVEALS REFORMIST THE MOST NAKED AND GROSS FORM, This document is an open attempt to take the party back to the "Mountbatten Resolution" position and repudiate the line adopted by the 2nd Party Congress."

After this, who can believe that the P.B., when it attacked the Andhra Secretariat document, all it thought was ~~the~~ only removal of certain weaknesses in formulation" and not of attacking its fundamentals but somehow, by some mysterious process, it landed itself into rejection of the document?

Once again this is an attempt to conceal the depth of left opportunism of the P.B., an attempt to smuggle in the idea that the P.B. had a completely correct Marxist understanding not only till the December meeting

meeting of the P.B. but even at the time when it undertook the criticism of the Andhra document, but somehow it "swung over" to left opportunism at the meeting.

This hesitancy is further revealed when the document refers to the struggles of the period. We certainly did not expect a review of all the struggle in this document. But we certainly we never expected just such a passing sentence: "Some of the jail clashes were examples of extreme adventurism". Just this one sentence is put in in the document without any thought of what it would mean to the brave comrades inside the jails who carried out implicitly the directives of the P.B. "Some of the clashes were examples of extreme adventurism", could be taken to mean that the comrades who led them or who participated in them were primarily responsible for those adventurist actions.

Was it difficult for the P.B. to state whether the general line laid down by the P.B. with regard to jail struggles in this period was correct? Jail struggles, there will be in the future also and probably some struggles are taking place. The question is not whether a particular clash or struggle has been adventurist, but whether basically the line laid down by the P.B. was correct. Once this is made clear, then certainly comrades inside the jails will be able to review their struggles correctly and draw the lessons therefrom for future guidance.

The P.B. had put forward the theory that the jail is a front of revolutionary struggle in this period, just like the working class or peasant front. We have not heard or read in any of the books available to us that such a theory was or is in vogue in any other party. There is no mention of this front or the role that the jail struggles had in the February or the October revolution in either the History of the CPSU(B) or in the History of the Civil War in Russia. There can be no doubt that if this theory of jails being a front of revolutionary struggle was also the conception of the Soviet leaders, it would certainly have been not ignored in these authoritative books.

Similarly with regard to the working class struggles in this period. The document says:

"We had given, on many occasions, infantile calls for general strikes, without making serious efforts to bring about unity of the workers and without considering whether it was possible for the workers to come out in face of police terror. On most such occasions, workers did not respond. These were undoubtedly adventurous calls, not from the angle reformists call them adventurous, but from the revolutionary angle" (P.17)

What is this talk of reformists calling these struggles adventurous, except a surreptitious way of attacking those who criticized the P.B. with regard to the 9th March Railway strike call as reformists? It is the same old stale myth that was served out in the General Secretary's letter on "Reactions to 9th March".

The major criticism of the P.B. from many rank and file comrades and provincial and district committees comrades in regard to the adventurous strike calls came in connection with the 9th March Railway strike call. One would like to know which of these comrades had stated that there should be no strikes at all.

It should be remembered that almost immediately after December 1947 C.C. resolution came, comrades were leading strikes in most of the provinces. Some of the biggest strikes and general strikes such as the Coimbatore Textile Workers' General Strike, the province-wide Municipal workers' strike, the tannery workers' strike, the SIR Running staff strike and many other strikes in Tamil Nad, the textile workers' strike of C.P., the province-wide municipal workers' strike of C.P., the militant bangle workers' strike of Erozabad and others, had taken place in the period following the January 1948. No one is reported to have characterized these strikes that were fought out in the post-Congress period, without any guidance ~~from~~ regarding strategy and tactics, from the P.B., as adventurist.

The question arose only in connection with the 9th March Railway strike call. This arose not only in Tamil Nad but in many other provinces. Why fog the issue instead of a straight and direct answer to the question which has been agitating and is uppermost in the minds of most of the comrades?

Any one would have naturally expected in this document a clear answer not to the question whether some of the strike calls were adventurist or not, but on the question whether the basic strategy and principles worked out in connection with the 9th March strike and elaborated in the 22nd February circular and the General Secretary's letter on "Reactions to March 9th" were correct. After all they formed the basic line for the entire period since then. The AITUC Fraction document following the last session was a but a logical elaboration of those documents and naturally, therefore, the document has been approvingly referred to in the P.B.'s (or General Secretary's) letter to the U.P. P.C. It was on the basis of these documents that the entire "re-education" of the party ranks on "Revolutionary trade unionism" had proceeded in Tamil Nad, and elsewhere.

Was this line correct? Obviously not. Otherwise there would be no ground for the series of adventurist and infantile calls that had followed since then.

The document states:

"We went wrong because our guiding line had been to rely on developing political general strikes as the only means to fight white terror, because we failed to visualise that the working class can win basic improvement in its ~~own~~ conditions of life and labour by leading the agrarian revolution, and by organising armed struggles in the rural areas, because we proceeded on the understanding that working class offensive can continuously advance without any zig-zag. We committed this deviation because we overlooked the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal aspect of the revolution. Because we analysed events and formulated our tasks in the dogmatic way by drawing parallels with the Russian Revolution" (P.18)

This is analysis of our is nothing but escaping the location of all roots of our practice and a slander on the Russian Revolution and the great Soviet leaders who led and made the Russian Revolution. Did the Bolshevik leaders give such adventurist and infantile calls without making serious preparations for the strikes, without caring for the state of organisation, at any stage of the revolution?

The 22nd February document of the P.B. "On Railway Strike and Our Tasks" gave the strategy of bringing out the textile workers and other workers on strike either on the 8th March, before the railway strike or in any case on the 9th March in order to infuse confidence in the Railway workers. No one has heard of sympathetic strikes being called before the strike of the workers in whose sympathy the sympathetic strike is called, have come out on strike. Did the Soviet leaders work out such peurile tactics at any stage of the revolution?

Did they advance the theory of jails being a front of the revolutionary struggle at any stage of the revolution?

Let it be clearly recognised that not only was our analysis of the class relations etc., left opportunist, but the very conceptions of revolution were peurile and naive. Many were these peurile and naive conceptions. Basically, the running thread of them was contempt for organisation, reliance upon the spontaneous developments and the P.B.'s own ideas of what these spontaneous developments will be, extreme contempt for the ranks and for the safety of the lives of the cadre.

"The situation is explosive; Give the call; Throw the vanguard" - this was the running thread. "Do not bother about the fact that workers in a particular place or places are weak. Think of the All India explosive situation; think of the wored situation; Think of the attacks on the workers; Give the call; everything will follow" This was in practice the line followed in the Trade union front.

Never was a serious appraisal made of the position in all or even a majority of the centres before giving a call. It was stated in connection with the 9th March strike call that had we only brought out about five hundred textile workers on the streets in Bombay on the 9th March and developed a clash with the police, the "situation would have been galvanised and transformed".

If any one raised the question of organisation, he was dubbed as a "reformist", as one who wants to escape struggle and smuggle in the "Joshian" compets! If any one had stated that in the face of the overwhelming and superior enemy armed police forces, it is unwise and not correct to have an open clash with about forty or fifty of our workers and that in such conditions we must adopt "hit and run" tactics of inflicting the maximum injury to the enemy, while preserving our strength, then he was dubbed a "reformist". Where is the authority for the use of this phrase "hit and run tactics"? Has Marx, Engels, Lenin, or Stalin ever used such a phrase?

To say, as the P.B. document does that the P.B. did not consider whether the workers could come out in face of police terror is certainly not true. The P.B., sitting in the U.G. den, completely isolated from the mass of workers, and in supreme conceit and arrogance, refused to listen to any reports to the effect that in the face of police terror workers would not come out at any particular time. They, in their contempt of the cadres, and so very convinced of their own appraisal of the situation, in fact, denied the extent of police terror. "No more are the workers afraid of terror" - this was what was rammed home to the comrades. If any one, out of his daily experience and contact with the workers, denied this and said that the workers would not come out in the face of this repression, then he would be dubbed a "coward". He should accept being a "coward" and enter into "self-criticism" or face expulsion.

To say this is certainly not a reflection on the working class which had shown marvels of heroism in the face of unprecedented terror during the last three years.

It is now two years since the Party Congress and we are in a period of revolutionary advances. Did the P.B. take any step during this period to check up the state of organisation? Did it take any steps to help the provinces with advice as to how to build up the organisation under conditions of extreme terror and illegality?

Revolution is not playing cricket. It is not brought about by just clashes. Clashes are just preliminary to more serious, organised and sustained battles. Particularly, in our country, where the mass of the people have been unarmed for centuries, it means that we must train up people in the use of arms. Otherwise no armed struggle is possible. In the 1946 battle of Coimbatore, the workers seized the rifles from the police. But not knowing how to use them, they broke them and threw them into wells. Did the P.B. seriously think of training some comrades in every province in the use of arms and call upon the provinces to do so?

In "Two Tactics", in the Preface to it, on the approach of the 1905 Revolution, Lenin emphasised that the primary task of the party was to do wide propaganda for armed struggle. If this was so in Russia, it was much more necessary in India, where Gandhism for years had poisoned the minds of the people. Obviously propaganda for armed struggle cannot be carried on openly. Did the P.B. think of the necessity for this propaganda? Did it check up the arrangements for the production of illegal literature, pool the resources of the provinces and look to the organisation of propaganda?

Such conceptions are certainly not a sudden growth. In the very first ~~letter~~ Circular issued by the general Secretary ~~xxxxxx~~ in 1948, after the party congress, he had proposed some "spectacular" action within six months to fight the repression! Not a cool ~~xxxx~~ assessment of our class forces, of the enemy's forces, choosing of place and time on the basis of these, serious preparations for the assault, but some "spectacular" action!

To repeat, let us not run away with the idea that we committed only some mistakes regarding the stage of the revolution and analysis of class relations, and now that we have corrected by the leadership of the international movement, everything will be all-right. The very conceptions of various categories, of struggle, of revolutionary situation etc., have been wrong. Marxian concepts have had a completely wrong meaning for us.

Any-one who reads the tirade of the P.B. ~~saxkx~~ against the Andhra secretariat documents in the "Report on Strategy and Tactics" will see what a wrong conception of even the term "working class hegemony" the P.B. had. If that conception stood, then obviously all that is now proposed as the correct way of forging working class hegemony, should be anti-Marxist. According to the P.B. working class hegemony could only be forged by means of a general strike, which alone would correspond to its concept of "working class in action".

~~Thax~~ These concepts have donned the garb of revolutionary Marxism and have been given to the comrades during the last ~~xxax~~ two years in many of the documents and otherwise. All these concepts will have to be fought out and liquidated. The contempt for organisation must be ruthlessly fought out as a disease of the petty-bourgeois. While it is not possible to go into the details in the document that is to become the basic document of the Party for the next period, it is necessary to indicate the broad features and call upon the entire party to enter into battle against them.

The battle against left sectarianism is not an easy one. Unlike Right reformism, it dons the garb of being revolutionary. Any one who minimises it today, is doing great disservice to the party and to the revolution.

But this battle can be successful only if all the crimes, all the manifestations of it in our practice, are openly and frankly recognised without any hesitancy or reservation. Only then will it be possible to lay down correct strategy and tactics, will it be possible to chalk out our immediate tasks. Only then will we think of seriously building up the organisation for implementing them.

How the hesitancy bogs our attempts at correct understanding can be seen from one instance. The P.B. document says ~~thax~~ : "We went wrong, because our guiding line had been to rely on developing political general strikes only as the only means to fight white terror, because we failed to visualise that the working class can win basic improvement in its conditions of work and life, by fighting imperialism and by leading the agrarian revolution, ~~saxx~~ by organising the armed struggle in the countryside."

This is a very loose formulation How can the workers of Hyderabad, for example,, win a basic improvement in their conditions of life and work by organising the armed struggle of peasants in Nalgonda? Compare this formulation with the following formulation in the eking Manifesto:

"Workers of the oppressed countries of Asia! You know that your own liberation is inseparable from ~~kxk~~ national liberation. To achieve a basic in your social status and conditions of work, it is indispensable that first and foremost you win genuine national independence, democracy and freedom for all the popular masses. You should be the most devoted, the most determined and the most thorough going fighters for the cause of national liberation. You must show initiative in uniting around you the broad masses of the peasantry etc. etc..."

It is our task to explain and educate the working class that there can be no basic improvement in their conditions of life and work unless they win genuine independence, freedom and democracy for all. We must show them that their leading the agrarian revolution alone will ensure the winning of ~~kxk~~ genuine independence.

We are not going into the various tasks that have been laid down in the document, except saying that they are vague and not concrete

and not concrete. We shall deal with them in another document.

It is necessary and correct to warn against Right Reformism. But one must be able to foresee what form it is likely to take in the immediate future. While giving this warning, let us also not forget that in the last two years, correct revolutionary Marxist ideas were fought as "Right Reformism".

The P.B. document says that one particular form of Right Reformism today is to say that today no armed struggle is possible and we must resort to parliamentarism.

Is this reformism or some thing else? Right reformism is an expression of a conciliatory attitude and conduct towards exploiting classes. To say that at a particular time a particular form of struggle is not suited to objective conditions is certainly not an expression of this conciliatory attitude to the exploiting classes.

Today, to say in the face of Telengana and in the face of the seething agrarian discontent, in the face of the vast countryside that we have in our country, that armed struggle is not possible is ~~surely~~ certainly wrong. But one must see wherefrom such ideas arise. They arise from a feeling of helplessness, because of the present disorganisation of the party, from the decimation of our forces. Such comrades feel that today it will not be possible to cope with the immense task of organising armed struggle because of this state of affairs.

This feeling of helplessness should be fought by explaining to the comrades and showing them how, despite this decimation, we can with correct strategy and tactics, organise the armed struggle, what organisation can be built up if we take the job seriously, where the objective conditions are ripe for extending the armed struggle that is already on in Telengana, what preliminary preparations are necessary in other areas, etc. To dub everything as reformism will only lead to suppression of frank discussion inside the party, and demoralisation of the comrades.

We should also remember that some times such ideas arise out of cowardice also. But in such cases, it should be seriously investigated and cowards should be dubbed as such. Right "reformism and cowardice should not be mixed up.

Right Reformism is likely to arise in the form of advocating no struggles ~~ixtix~~ against the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nationalities like the Tamil, Andhra etc, under// the plea of winning them over for the United front. It is likely to arise on questions of linguistic provinces. It is also likely to arise on the question of struggles against the landlords, wrongly classifying them as rich peasants. It is not likely to arise in such gross form as no struggles whatsoever. This is so because at a time when the whole party and the historical course of events are moving towards armed struggles, it is not likely to adorn such gross forms. It is therefore very necessary to think out clearly the forms that it is likely to take and warn against it.

At the same time, we must remember that the main danger today is from left opportunism, adventurism. The article by Chen Pota in Communist No.2, February-March 1950, will show what objective conditions gave rise to what deviations in the Chinese revolution.

Mao had to fight Right "reformism, for the hegemony of the proletariat, between 1925-27, when the party was adopting the tactic strategy of united front with Kuomintang. Again it had to be fought during the Anti-Japanese war, when there was the nation-wide United Front. At that time, the right reformists advocated that there should be no agrarian reforms, because, according to them that would alienate the landlords who were also in the nation-wide anti-Japanese war.

We had to fight left opportunism and adventurism, in the period of the ten year civil war, when left opportunism forgot imperialism, went in for adventurist actions. Again left opportunism had to be fought after 1946, while implementing the new agrarian law, when it left opportunism took the gross form of lumping middle and rich peasant in the category of landlords and confiscating their lands.

Thus while talking of Right and Left opportunism one must take into account the objective conditions and determine what deviations are likely to be dominant.

The same point is made clear in the speech of Li Li San in the Working Conference:

"In the experience of China, Right Opportunism was also opposed and this occurred during the two periods of united front with the KMT. The tendencies of liquidationism and legalism were also opposed and they occurred during the early days after the failure of the first great revolution. But this mistake of Right deviation did not exist as long, as an ideological trend and was soon overcome. But right after this Right deviation was overcome, there occurred a left adventurist deviation which endangered the party for a long time, causing greater loss to the party. It is only after this left adventurist deviation was completely overcome that the movement took the correct track and advanced smoothly to attain final victory"

(Documents of Working Conference, All China Federation of China Publication, P.25)

Hence while talking of right and left opportunism, one must take into account the objective conditions and understand what situation is likely to give rise which dominant deviation. For example, when Comrade Stalin talks of the Right danger in the CPSU(B), he begins with an analysis of the question "Are there objective factors favourable to the development of such a danger?".

In the present period, when the party is going over to armed struggle against imperialism and its feudal and big bourgeois allies it should be realized that the main danger arises from left opportunism, which has gripped the party for the last two years. Right opportunism is likely to arise from the fact that certain sections of the ~~exploiting~~ exploiting classes, like the small and the medium bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nationalities are also to be won over in the united front although as vacillating allies.

Hence the need for a correct understanding of all the roots of left deviation, of all its manifestations in the party, and particularly in the immediate past is not only urgent but must also ~~be~~ be ruthlessly fought out if the party and the revolution are to make any advance.

There is no need to argue as to whether Right Reformism is less dangerous ~~is~~ or left opportunism. There is no need to quote any one for this. The past two years of our experience is enough to vividly bring out the danger of this left sectarianism. Any who argues as to which danger is less harmful is denying the entire experience of the Indian party, the experience of the 46-47 period as well as the experience of the last two years, and is blind to the realities of today.

In this connection the following passage from the "Report of Dimitroff to the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Party is of immense help to us :

"Misusing the authority of the Comintern, posing inside the country as the real interpreter of ~~the~~ its decisions, taking advantage of the difficult conditions of illegality, the left sectarians of that time, succeeded ; through organised factions, in holding a plenum of the C.C. in the summer of 1929 and in taking over in fact the party leadership. Under the guise of Bolshevisation of the party, the left sectarians actually pursued an anti-Bolshevik course. They raised the slogan "Extirpation of narrow socialism", waged an insidious struggle against old loyal party members, against its revolutionary past and pushed the party along the disastrous road of leading to isolation from the masses. This was facilitated by the inactivity of some old and renowned party activists inside the country, who had then withdrawn from Party work.

"The left sectarian faction became the main obstacle to the Bolshevisation of the party. At the very moment when the fascist dictatorship persecuted our

...of the party. At the very moment when the fascist dictatorship persecuted our party and strive to break from within and to smash its leadership, it found its best allies in the leaders of the left sectarian faction....

"...Big strikes broke out, major electoral victories were scored and legal possibilities began to be used widely. The party was growing and moving forward boldly. Its successes would undoubtedly have been greater however, had it not been for the harmful influence of the left sectarian faction. Thus for instance, their Second plenum instead of concentrating on the party's assuming command of the new militant upsurge of the masses went in for scholastic sectarian discussions about the Party's past and composed mileages of resolutions which no worker could read through. And again, through the fault of this leadership, our party could not carry to a successful conclusion the breakthrough in the front of the fascist dictatorship in the summer of 1933 as well as during the Coup-d'etat of May 1934.

"The left sectarian course, which in reality, was a Trotskyite course had nothing in common with the comintern line and was directed against it.

"1. Instead of a sober appraisal of the situation on the basis of a concrete Marxist analysis of the forces in action, the general formulas of Leninist-Stalinist strategy and tactics were being reiterated and the conditions of other communist parties were mechanically applied without taking into consideration our concrete set up. The left sectarians took credit for the successes booked by the party in spite of their leadership, and proclaimed as its immediate task the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship in Bulgaria.

"2. Perseverent and steadfast agitation among the workers and peasants for the popularisation of the party slogans, for the preparation of the struggle and for the mobilisation of the masses were superseded by "Revolutionary" phraseology and bombastic appeals for "revolutionary" actions. Such typically left sectarian slogans were "A general and open offensive", "Dominate the streets", "Occupy the land", etc. The slogan of a political strike was so discredited by the left sectarians that the Profintern was compelled to specifically its use in Bulgaria.

"3. Real leadership based on conscious adoption by the members of the party and of the mass organisations of the party decisions directives gave way to mechanical and rude commandeering.....

"4. Under the guise of false "Bolshevisation", the entire narrow socialist period of the party was proclaimed as "Menshevik" and "anti-Bolshevik". Under the pretext of defending the September apprising, a Trotskyite "criticism" of that apprising was popularized and the September activists of the party were ostracised."

(Political report delivered to the 5th Congress of C.P. of Bulgaria, PPh., p.23-25)

Many of these features of left sectarianism were common in India also during the last two years. Only one thing must be added. There was not merely rude commandeering, but a regime of terror, with the big stick. Internal democracy was suppressed. Comrades began to be afraid of speaking a word against any policy of the leadership for fear of losing the party card. The P.B.'s vies were imposed on the ranks and even those holding the highest positions in the party under threat of disciplinary action. All comradeship between party members disappeared. Every one was afraid of the other being a spy who might report anything that might come from his lips, which savours of "Reformism" or "lack of respect for the leadership".

All these have to be ruthlessly fought and rooted out. Let us hope that in the self critical report that is promised, these features of complete suppression of inner-party democracy will be brought out in order to help the entire party its repetition.

Dimitrov adds in his report, while dealing with the left sectarianism in the party: "The support received from the party in its struggle to overcome left sectarianism from the Comintern and the Bolshevik Party, especially as regards the Second plenum of the C.C., whose harmful decisions were rejected by the Comintern's E.C., should be gratefully acknowledged".

Let us also have the humility to acknowledge the great help that the Information Bureau had rendered to us in fighting this left sectarianism and not just talk patronisingly of "the contribution" made by the editorial article, to the Indian revolution.

The document No. 18 is therefore very defective and needs to be completely overhauled.

31/5/50

Dear Com. Sanjeev,

Sanjeev,
Herewith a note from Com.
Winesham about Deshile Red
Meeting. Please send it to
Marshall cell and ask them
to let me know what
they have to say by
way of explanation etc.

The suppression of Babbar's
name is a serious matter
apart from other things. This
if true, is not merely ~~unfairness~~ ^{unfairness} on
P+T issue but actually branding
disruptors who are expelled from
Party and suppressing hard Party
examples who suffered & fought
to save the Party. I let me know what you
have to say regarding Utharam

(P.S.) - I would like to know finally
whether it is possible for Fort committee
to arrange my meeting with Narkat cell. — USK
9 June 1950

Com. Hanis,

Here are the extracts
from letters received by me. I
am sorry I could not send them
earlier because I had some other urgent
work.

(1) Letter of Chintu (area ^{Committee} ~~Organiser~~ Sec. Shewari -)
His letter is in Marathi - here I am attaching
it herewith it is about Nagapuri, this
is his second complaint re. him. 1st was
his letter with details - copy of which
was sent to you.

(2) From Ramrao's letter dated 25/5/50
(P.S.U) ^{com.}
I was informed by Kanti Zaveri
that his cell secretary has told them
that P.S.C. has with drawn charges
against P & T. Another comrade from
P.H.A. Com. K.D. then said that in

charges made by B.C. that they are police-
spies have been with Dravida. A. V. Srinivas

(3) Letter of Cooper (BSB) to Rajin dated
24-5-50.

"I had some talk with PHQ
Comrades. The picture is tragic
and astounding. They have lost
faith in leadership and ideals
even in our past traditions and
future. They won't be back but
to ask; how could we know
the entire party was not factious
against the renegades who suffered
very badly. Mehta asked me
"It seems B.C. asked Patkar for
self-critical report covering days (?)
Is it the method to help a
comrade out?" + "God forbid help
Patkar out!! Dravida way

from mass movement, refusing
to study from those in contact
with masses, their comrades are
living in a world of their own
own fantasies. They only ask
for dropping the fight against
P.T. because the case is pending
before CC, as if it were
a case of "Sub-judice",

- (4) from letter of Divish dated 28/5/50
" report of my talk with Paama-
nand Parikh - He was very
precise in formulating his opinion
of Marshal Cell. He told me
that they have decided (?)
that in view of their changed
policy etc. Party is going to
change its attitude towards Patilkar

gang. He also said that he holds different views, but cannot do anything.

(5) from Rajan's report letter dated 28th May - conveying reports he has received from ^{Kaifas} ~~Rajendra~~ ~~Convent~~.

* Kaifas's reports are based upon daily meeting of Staff of Fort Convent like Vikas - Mehta - Jaiswal ^{et al} with Indi - PSD Convent.

- Heena whose brother is in Marhal reports that PHQ Convent, Govt say that P & T are victims of Left. Secularism - hence don't do anything against them he stopped - She reported the gossip that is going round that P & T were locked - they were not given food etc. that Dr. Sec. himself wrote out the self-critical report of Patkar & forced him to sign it.

- "The Bai' report is extracted & the was harassed, water was thrown on her etc"

// - "B.C. is suppressing P.B. ~~and~~ documents - It could have got the help of For O.G. Committee for Investigation & Prod & by now they would have done it"

These are some of the exhibits from reports I have received. I will put out some more in a couple of days.

The ^{Sund} Desain of A.I.S.F. Told Rajin Pradi that particularly the last charge of suppression of P.B. documents by B.C. is openly & repeatedly made by For

Comrades -

As regards this charge you know the facts. Here I will repeat them.

(1) I called Sanjeev to meet me immediately after receipt of P.B. dot No. 16 ~~and~~ to his place of translation.

In meeting place, as work could not be done properly because Sanjeev was altogether "off his rails" for most of the time. While leaving he agreed to ^{bring} ~~do~~ No 16 + ~~check~~ me that he would inquire from Mangrui

+ Rege ^{Shankar} whether any work had been done. S.V. was then given articles by Soviet articles.

Sanjeev was to give dot No. 16 in the

file - Actually his last instalment

==

reached me on the 13th. After ^{cut in} this ^{part} was installed by your apparatus. This took another 10 days. I was told on the 25th to find a P.O. This took 2 more days. The dot reached B.C. tel on 28th. They were distributed in next day.

- Till now Saajee has not informed me whether Maghani or Rege are going to help.

- I have been asking you repeatedly since the 1st of May about transmission of P.B. dot. in Udon & Hindi by Fed comrades.

No definite reply has been given for 20 days despite repeated enquiries from my end. Only yesterday Rahim

writes to me that "Very likely
Front commands will not be able
to give us any kind of info."

As against this → After a very happy experience
of Sangreco I asked P.C. comrades
to distribute No. 17 + 18 - No.
No 17 was translated, typed &
distributed to P.C. comrades on 24th
May i.e. 4 days before
No. 18 could reach them.

No. 18 reached their hands by
28th along with No 16.

(all this details in his argument state of P.C. Tok + prod)

Now these are the facts re.

P.B. documents - Now decide
for yourself who suppressed P.B. doc.
And in fairness to P.C. & at least
let the P.H.A. comrades know these facts

This is a serious charge & the most amazing
thing is that even S.V.D. has repeated this charge
in his note to me - (It is there in P.H. pamphlet too!!) when
he should know the facts at least about Sangreco!! quite - Vikram

P.S.

I do not want to complain in the least about the time required to cut & copy the doc^{ts} ^{through} your apparatus. I know the difficulties - but when this delay is used to accuse P.C. of suppression of P.B. facts, then facts must be stated. In view of the fact that such a charge has been made by at least some Fort comrades, I would like

2nd June 1960

to formally request the Fort committee to place the facts before them. This is all I want to say
Coun. Rahim, Vikram Gulip.

I am sorry,

my note of yesterday has created a wrong impression. I never accused Fort committee of suppression of P.B. document. All I wanted to show that this charge levelled against P.C. is untrue.

I referred to Urdu + Hindi translation of documents because P.C. was accused of not taking the cooperation of O.G. Fort comrades in translation & production of documents. I know & fully appreciate this difficulties & if they are not able to help P.C., I will not blame them. But where is it proper for them to accuse P.C. of not taking their cooperation?

Is it in accordance with facts?

Does the Fort committee ^{really} feel
that B.C. is guilty of ~~justly~~
of not only suppression of P.B. Doolis
but also of refusing to exhibit
the cooperation of O. G. Fort comrades?
This is all I wanted to know
and I ~~would~~ ^{also} wanted to know whether
Fort committee will place the
facts before the O. G. comrades
so that they know the real picture?
Secretly about the question
of P.O. Also I want to point
out one fact. you know
that till now during last 3 months
B.C. got a number of documents
cut & cycled through your apparatus.
Ah yes And while distributing these
documents to B.C. comrades

so far on no occasion the question
of p.d. had come up. ~~The~~ At
the time of distribution of doct-
NO. 14. also the same number
of copies were to be cycled.
But at that time the difficulty
to sending so many copies
to Ford had not come up. I
did not know ~~absolutely~~ where
the doct. was cycled then & where
the ^{next} doct. ^{NO 16} was cycled now - now
and I supposed to know it.

So when you asked me to
to give instructions to ~~myself~~ Philip re. distribution
of doct. NO. 16, I did not have
any idea that we would have
to provide for a P.D. to
transfer so many ^{copies} doct. com.

Phillip also did not raise
the question when I gave
written instructions as regards
his timeline. I gave him
instructions before going out
to meet O.G. Committee i.e. on
19th May. And it was only
after I returned i.e. on 23rd
24th that I was informed
by Phillip that a p.o. would
be necessary. Now if I had known
~~that a p.o.~~ ^{this before}, I could have easily
arranged for p.o. when I was out.
But since I did not know it, I
had to write again ^{to Rajan} after my return
and this naturally led to ^{his delay} loss of another

3 days. This is all I wanted to say.

Now even after stating these facts, you feel that I
should have thought of & arranged for p.o. earlier, then
I will accept the charge. Please tell me which facts I have ignored &
I have truth has been obscured? gully's Vikram

27/6/50

Com. Sanjeev,

I am herewith

enclosing Neela's letter re. her
little with Rakha. Rakha's letter also
I am sending along with this.

Let me know what you have
to say re. the same. I have
also written ARP ~~work~~ ^{female} your
amendes re. this report of
Coitine of Bai. Further I have
written to Bai as well to
let me know whether she
has given this statement
under duress. I will let
you know as soon as I learn
from them. P.

Re: Neela's
letter
7/6

Sincerely,

Vikram

P.S. Please return
Neela's with
after parents -

5/6/58

Com. Hamid,

Sending herewith
reply to Editorial Committee note
which please forward to concerned
concerned.

You will have to decide
about two meetings or one
meeting as the case may be.

My present programme of meetings
with O.G. contributors is fixed
till Saturday. Rajam is fixing
further programme from Saturday
onwards. Hence if you let
me know immediately by
forwarding whether it would
be possible to meet Fort-
Comrades on Saturday + Sunday.
I will ask Rajam to keep

These two days full. I will
be at Parlier place ^(Rahim knows it.) on
Friday. If you fix up
the meeting places ^{for Saturday + Sunday}, you will have
to arrange for transport
from there.

Let me know your decision
as early as possible.

I had raised the question
of giving day to day guidance of
FSU, GPAA + PWA by Fort-committee
in the new situation. You have
not written to me ^{so far} on this point.
Shall I state what the
arrangement fixed between us
no longer holds good and inform
the committees of their points accordingly?

Please clarify this point.

Yours truly,
M. S. Sanyal

Yours truly,
Vikram

Vikram

Please pass on
this to Sanyal
accompanied

576150

Com. Harrod,

I have just received
because George's note.

Yesterday Rajan has written to
me saying it would be difficult
for him to arrange a meeting
of Harold or Fort committees
because both of us are
going out of the few places
we have will be used to
often for meetings number 3
O.G. committees. It will be
better therefore, if you can
arrange meeting with Edith
committees on Saturday or Sunday
at one of your places. This
also for another reason ~~before~~ ^{because}

at none of our places
it is possible for me
to meet more than
two accounts at a time.
Hence please recall that
my reply is arranged
through your machinery
and let me know whether
this is possible. I
will discuss this matter
again with Dezgin when
I meet him, but
I can't guarantee
if, before that.

William

rec'd 4/6

27 / 6 / 50

Com. Rabin,

I have not yet received any supply from you to the note I wrote ^{to you} ^{day} ^{before} the other day.

Both of us - myself + Shangi are going out tomorrow night.

I shall return after a week or so and Com. Shangi is ~~going~~ may stay over for a longer period. I am making a more O.G. comment from other fronts such as Phys. Middle-class employees, doctors etc.

I have informed Com Philip about this and he is making Keshav tonight to fix up final arrangements.

21/P I am not meeting S.V. just now.
I have asked Rajain to
find out place for P.C. meeting
and if we get in the place
(which is likely) we will call
him for the meeting. Hence
there is no need for this
meeting just now. I will meet
him only if P.C. meeting
is impossible.

Com. Kabit of Madal cell
has written to meet in this
day that Madal comrades
are ^{willing} ~~desirous~~ to meet me.
Com. Gayev ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~not~~ ^{not} ~~likely~~ ^{likely} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~meet~~ ^{meet}
this. Re. It may be possible
for me to meet 2-3 Madal
comrades at one of our
places. I am trying to get.

But if it is possible meet them
through our apparatus, is there
any objection? Does Sanjeeva
want to attend this meeting. If
so how are we to contact
him & bring him to meeting
place. I shall let you
know about this as soon
as Rajim is able to fix
a place, but in the meantime
let me know whether
we can ^{contact} them independently
or we will have to do
this through Rajim. Please
let me consult Sanjeeva
and let me know your
views so that I can
inform Rajim accordingly.

I need 700 Rs (seven hundred)
immediately to pay wages of
whole business of this
let expenses. Please
arrange to send this
amount as early as
possible latest by
tomorrow afternoon.

I was informed by
Ninan that your son Hanu
is not well. I hope
the ailment is alright by
now. ^{light} Thank you for this
matter.

Please send a letter to
Com. Yashwant to send one copy
of Kalinin's book "Communist
Education".

Yours
sincerely

Vikram

BRIEF ACCOUNT OF LAST ONE YEAR'S UNIT FUNCTIONING AND MY ROLE IN IT.

--- Yeshwant.

During the last two years left sectarianism policy of the party led us to a very disastrous path both politically and organisationally. Politically we ~~repudiated~~ repudiated proletarian internationalism, discarded Marxism-Leninism and accepted Trotskyism and Titoism as our guide. During the whole period of last two years we ~~remained~~ remained so blind that we thought that we were going towards final victory though we were ~~knowing~~ moving so rapidly towards a very disastrous end. We were so conceited, ~~and~~ arrogant ~~and~~ blind that the advices and warnings of the International Communist movement could not make us see how we were betraying the cause of revolution. Even the Peking Manifesto or the great ~~manifesto~~ editorial of Lasting Peace... could not give us a jolt, at least to me.

The first time when I started realising that something ~~wrong~~ wrong is going on inside the party was when document No.16 came in my hand. Immediately after that I felt that (1) bourgeois nationalism has taken deep roots inside the party (2) a terror regime has ~~been~~ been established inside the party. Servility has very consciously been developed amongst the ranks. Leadership has become bureaucratic and arrogant; it has developed a contempt for the ranks. (3) we reduced self-criticism to morbidity and an instrument of crushing the comrades. I immediately wrote down these things and sent it the next day to the PHQ Committee Secretary. Along with this I demanded that the PHQ Committee circular which throttled our discussion on No.14 should immediately be withdrawn. After this I was continuously struggling to unmask in myself all the vices which have crept in during these last two years and trying to learn from ~~the~~ our great masters of Marxism-Leninism and along with other comrades trying to take part in hammering out a correct party line. During this struggle I tried to look back to the past and here I am trying to see and understand the deep-rooted sectarian, trotskyite tendencies inside the party, my unit and in my own functioning.

I am limiting this report only to last one year since I was a member of the OG unit as it is difficult for me to recollect even the major incidents of the last two years. Immediately after the Party Congress, Party leadership was forced to go UG and the PB nominated a PHQ Committee to guide the work of the PHQ. In the last week of Feb. 1949 the PHQ Committee also went UG and nominated an OG unit to carry out the day to day work of the PHQ Committee. I remained its member from the very beginning and continued till recently when the unit was dissolved and an elected unit took its place. Immediately after the unit was formed all our papers were attacked and the press was sealed. In ~~the~~ spite of our best efforts we could not bring out new papers from outside for more than one or two weeks. Then came the 9th. March Railway strike. Just before that the PB's circular had come and everybody was very much enthused, at least was trying to show that he was enthused, otherwise he would have been called a reformist. Then the strike failed. It disappointed everybody. Comrades started expressing doubts if the call was correct. When this thing was discussed in my cell almost all the cell members raised this doubt. Though there was a lot of confusion yet everybody was feeling that something was wrong. I myself had many doubts but I tried to defend the position of the leadership and tried to convince that the strike had failed not because the call was wrong but because there was heavy repression, Socialists had betrayed, and we could not change our organisational pattern. Then I tried to show that inspite of the strike we had taken a step forward i.e. we had unmasked and isolated the Socialists. I myself was not convinced about these arguments because when the unit met the PHQ Committee Secretary after the strike I raised the same question with him. He replied that call was correct. The strike failed because the ranks and the lower leadership failed to fulfill their tasks. This shows how servility towards leadership and contempt for the ranks was taking roots. This example shows what attitude was there in all of us towards the party policy. Always try to justify the stand of the leadership even if you are not convinced. If you do not do this then you be damned by the leadership as unworthy of any responsibility, reformist, renegade etc. This attitude which we developed in the reformist period, we maintained in this period and took forward at the later stage.

After the failure of the Railway strike and the closing of the press and the papers a general frustration and ~~unemployment~~ feelings of unemployment set in in the PHQ. It affected the unit also. ~~and~~ On the other hand PHQ Committee all the powers in its hands reduced the unit to a post-box or its agent in the PHQ whose duty was only to see that the instructions of the PHQ Committee were reaching the comrades, and that they were being implemented. Unit members finding themselves in this position felt humiliated and took it up with the PHQ Committee in joint meetings. PHQ Committee ~~Secretary~~ Secretary always tried to explain away in this manner that because the unit was not functioning politically that is why this feeling of 'no power' and 'post box' was coming. Unit ~~members~~ members were never convinced of this argument but because it was a fact that there were many defects in ~~the~~ their functioning they could not stand against that argument.

This thing continued upto middle of April. When BC decided to observe Peace Week, PHQ was given the task of preparing posters and organising Peace Week. A Fraction Committee was formed by BC. Two comrades from PHQ were also included. And in some of the meetings

/ In

I and unit secretary Com. Praganta also attended. By this time we had travelled quite a long way on our sectarian path. This whole campaign was run on a very sectarian line. In our Fraction Committee meeting Com. Praganta went to this extent that in this Peace Front even people like N.H. Joshi cannot come. I and some of us took this stand in the beginning that whoever signs our manifesto (which was very sectarian and nobody would have signed that except people very close to us) can come. After discussion I also agreed to that. In the unit, ~~throughout~~ this Fraction, and in PWA ~~throughout~~ ~~throughout~~ we used to discuss the question of Peace Front. We felt that our manifesto approved by the centre was completely different from the Wrocław Conference manifesto. The latter was very broad-based and ours was very narrow, but we tried to justify that the situation in India was completely different. We referred this to the PHQ Committee and on one PHQ but never got any guidance. After Peace Week we observed Labour Week and then ran the campaign in support of the hunger-strikers. A new life came in PHQ. All the comrades participated in the campaign with great enthusiasm and ultimately we lost about ten comrades from the PHQ who were arrested in the 8th May demonstration. In the campaign we forgot the responsibility of running the Central Office of the party and started feeling that in Bombay we can take the place of CG. All the campaigns were run on a sectarian basis so much so that some of the unit members (probably Bannath) took this stand that for withdrawing the hungerstrike we should not take any co-operation from people like K. Karanjia and N.H. Joshi etc.

During all these campaigns and activities PHQ Committee never bothered to guide or help on any issue. After these campaigns were over unit reviewed the whole thing in detailed and sent detailed report but not a comment came from the Committee. At this period I was incharge of running the campaign in support of the hunger strike. Every day bulletins etc. were issued. Press conferences were organised, regular contacts with jails were kept, but in all these things the Committee did not bother to say anything but when the comrades were arrested and PB pulled the Committee sharply they sent a sharp note to the unit forgetting that the comrades were sent in the demonstration with their approval. Of course, they had instructed that the comrades should attend the demonstration but should see that they are not arrested. It is obvious how ridiculous. The Committee completely to see its failure to guide PHQ in such an important campaign. Due to their political bankruptcy and incapability in leading, the PHQ Unit members ~~they~~ in their petty-bourgeois enthusiasm forget their responsibilities and tries to arrogate to themselves the responsibilities of the CG. Not only this, but I on behalf of the PHQ unit started guiding PWA Fraction and giving advice to the All India Fraction and criticising them for not being enough sectarian, in spite of the fact they were quite sectarian themselves.

Things continued like this upto August when in the name of emergency all the members of the Unit and quite a good number of other PHQ comrades were made to go UC, which disrupted the whole work in the PHQ. Work in most of the cells, ~~was~~ particularly Marathi Hindi etc was stopped. Only the Urdu cell and to some extent PPH continued their work. All the unit members who had gone UC cut themselves off completely from the PHQ except me. I regularly maintained contact with my cell and kept on participating in day to day work. At the later stage Hair also started working. Comrades were withdrawn on the basis of a report that the Party was going to be banned and a general round-up will take place. The whole thing was done in a very unplanned, unorganized and a panicky manner. PHQ Committee decided about this and the Unit did not react politically. Did not even discuss why it was necessary to withdraw so many comrades. No planning was done as to how to continue the work during this period. Besides the work being disrupted all the comrades withdrawn lost almost all contact with the PHQ and with each other. Unit members never met each other in this period even to review the whole thing. We forgot to see that when some office functions CG then it is necessary to take risks and to be prepared for sacrificing the cadre. Our primary responsibility is to run the CG machinery effectively. If a danger of round-up is imminent then the withdrawal of key cadres should take place in such a manner that dislocation does not take place or it is minimized to a great extent. All these things we could realise only when all of us came back and the whole thing was reviewed in the unit. During Upto this period the unit did so many things, so many campaigns were run, almost all the comrades in PHQ participated in this but nobody was taken into confidence. Not a single CG meeting was held. Unit never tried to find out what the comrades feel about all the campaigns and activities. It was never in the consciousness of the unit or of the Committee that they can learn anything from the ranks. General understanding was this that these Committees should decide everything and the ranks' responsibility is only to carry out the instructions— nothing more nothing less. The result was that it was the general pattern of functioning that the Committee used to issue instructions which the unit used to convey to the cells and get ~~them~~ implemented. For the Cell Secretaries meetings no agenda was announced no discussion used to take place. Cell Secretaries were expected to hear what the Unit Secretary had to say and to convey those instructions to the cells.

... were very badly handled both by comrades made incharge and the committee members. The result was that a lot of discontent had accumulated in the ~~members~~ minds of all the comrades and in the unit members. After the emergency period when a resolution of PHQ Committee came on Laxman about his instructions to hoist the Congress flag on PHQ on the 15th August discontent against PHQ Committee burst out.

In my cell itself comrades criticised very sharply the functioning of the unit and particularly that of the PHQ Committee. I took a leading part in this discussion and the cell demanded self-critical reports from the unit and the Committee.

Unit in its discussion on this resolution came to the following conclusion:-

- "1. The resolution nails down not only a serious political blunder but it puts its finger on the re-assertion of reformism in all its planes-- political and organisational.
- "2. The instructions for August 15 and the way they were blindly accepted show that the PHQ Committee has become a task-setter and we a set of job-doers. The functioning has been non-political, reformist and bureaucratic.
- "3. The unit should review its work for the last six months. The PHQ Committee should also give a review of its functioning in so far as how it failed to lead the PHQ politically and organisationally.
- "4. Unit realises ~~it~~ that it has to politicalise itself and comrades should again take up the study of the classics as that is the only guarantee for the comrades cut off from the mass movement."

(--minutes of discussion of the unit)

During the discussion Comrades stressed on the non-political functioning of the unit and the Committee and the developing servility; e.g. in that meeting Com. Joy pointed out "Basis of discipline in fort today is to a large extent fear and not Bolshevik consciousness...X why did comrades not protest? Because they have been told that in this period nothing should be questioned. We have carried this to an extent of no discussion at all."

Unit's sharp criticism of the PHQ Committee completely upset the PHQ Committee. First they remarked that unit while discussing the resolution on Laxman should have taken up the concrete points raised by different cells instead of going for general discussion. Unit did not agree with this. Afterwards Committee Secretary wrote to one of the unit members (probably Murty. I do not remember exactly) that it seems very dangerous tendencies are developing in the ~~unit~~ unit members and PHQ comrades are organising a revolt against the committee i.e. against the Party Centre.

Immediately after that two very serious incidents took place which brought to the open the bankruptcy and the non-political functioning of the OG unit and its secretary.

First incident was about a raid on RPH. In this connection the unit secretary took a very wrong stand, called a GB meeting and gave a very adventurist line without even consulting the unit members. Before the unit ~~meeting~~ meeting I asked the unit secretary to first discuss the whole thing in the unit and then call a GB meeting but he just brushed aside my argument by saying that he had called the meeting just to collect opinion. After the GB meeting when the report reached the PHQ Committee it sent immediately a circular sharply criticising the stand taken by the unit secretary.

Unit in its meeting correctly maintained that the right of holding GB meetings can not be denied to the unit; it criticised quite correctly how the unit secretary by-passed the unit before calling the GB meeting but it supported the unit secretary's stand about the raid which meant nothing but this that if police adopts a provocative attitude we should fall a prey to that and if necessary ~~be~~ be prepared for a clash. Obviously this stand was very adventurist, but the unit ~~did~~ failed here to understand completely.

Unit showed its bankruptcy again at the Left Consolidation Committee (LCC) meeting. The ~~unit~~ unit secretary without consulting anybody advised comrades to co-operate with Trotskyite gangs who had organised the meeting. No unit member reacted to ~~kick~~ that when the notice of the meeting was put up on the notice-board. They realised only when comrades came back from the meeting and expressed their anger.

These two incidents (details are known to all the comrades in the PHQ) throw enough light on the functioning of the OG unit. From the beginning the unit was functioning not as a political unit, taking decisions collectively but it was composed of a few ~~individuals~~ individuals who were functioning on individual basis. The state of affairs took an acute turn after the emergency period. Because the unit secretary was on the spot he used to give opinion on many important issues often without consulting or discussing with other unit members. Rest of the unit members remained non-political and

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indifferent, did not react to political events and did not bother how the unit was functioning. This was a general pattern and continued to remain upto the period when the unit was re-organised.

When the PHQ Committee saw that the unit was taking a very defiant attitude, demanding self-critical report from the Committee members, they planned out an offensive against the unit. They planned a unit meeting on the 14th. September and made full preparation for that. Before the meeting the Committee Secretary met Coms. Nair and Murti and convinced them that the unit and particularly the Unit Secretary were committing very serious mistakes and above all they were organising a revolt against the PHQ Committee, that i.e. against the party. This fact was never told to the other unit members. The result of this was that when the unit met on the 13th. to discuss the agenda of the meeting of the 14th. Coms. Murti and Nair took a completely different attitude than the others. Myself and Ajoy insisted that the PHQ Committee should review its own work of the last six months and then only we can nail down our own mistakes which were said we never denied. I stuck to this position till the meeting. In the meeting the PHQ Committee Secretary gave a long list of unit's mistakes particularly Prasanta's in connection with LCC meeting and RPH raids etc. He did not say a single word about PHQ Committee's role and then in the name of centralism, party discipline, loyalty to the party &c. succeeded in bamboozling the rest of the unit members. After him nobody spoke; some Coms. raised only some points. I said only this much that the PHQ Committee got this impression from our demand of self-critical report etc. that we are organising a revolt &c. that was wrong. After Hamid's criticism all of us collapsed. People like Ajoy got demoralised and others started feeling repentant. In the informal talk after the meeting Com. Hamid said how party looks towards centralism. Then he showed what attitude party is taking towards Bengal and Assam comrades (these documents had not come so far) &c. In this way he tried to impress upon the unit members that any breach of discipline means very heavy punishment, even expulsion.

After the meeting, the unit met and tried to see its own attitude "self-critically" towards the PHQ Committee and the events of the last few weeks and passed resolutions on unit's and unit secretary's role in LCC meeting, RPH raid etc. One resolution was passed on unit Secretary denouncing everything possible. Through one resolution it ~~announced~~ it decided to prepare a self-critical report covering the last six months. As regards PHQ Committee, it changed its attitude this much that it said in the resolution:

"Unit hopes that the self-critical review of the PHQ Committee would be ready soon so that the PHQ, as a whole can learn from it and equip itself for the tasks confronting it today."

In this meeting Ajoy proposed that he should be relieved from the responsibility of Unit Secretaryship and Murti should be elected as the cell secretary as he was more close to the PHQ Committee Secretary. This proposal was rejected but it shows his state of mind. After the unit meeting with the Committee Secretary all the unit members became more self-critical and more servile to the PHQ Committee. Ajoy could not change that much and so got very demoralised. All these things shattered the Unit life. Unit stopped taking initiative in the PHQ life even to that extent to which it used to take formerly. Even in the unit meetings discussions started becoming abstract. On many issues Unit was not able to come to any unified understanding and feeling of frustration started developing. Discontent against PHQ Committee started developing again and it came out when a resolution on jails came and I raised this point with the Unit Secretary that it is correct that I made certain mistakes but what about Nissar who also made the same mistakes. This point I never raised with the PHQ Committee. In fact after some time I convinced myself that I should see only my mistakes and it is not my business to find out the higher committee member's mistakes. This period ended with Com. Prasanta's suspension and nomination of the new unit along with merging of Mashal Office with PHQ.

In this review of six and half months I am not able to unmask my crimes, relationship between unit and PHQ Committee particularly their effort to crush the comrades, organise Gestapo methods, develop servility through terror, concretely, because

1. In this period I never came in contact with any of the Committee members except Laman and our relationship was limited to our cell work.
2. Relation between the PHQ and the Committee was maintained only through Unit Secretary and some other comrades like Murti and I never tried to find out what was happening.
3. Except in the earlier period when I was incharge of campaigns etc. I remained a unit member only in this much that I used to attend unit meetings once or twice a week. I never handled any individual or cell problem and so I had little contact with the comrades. I participated in the functioning of the unit very actively after I was elected unit secretary.

All these things I will be able to take up in the II part. Some important facts of this period which I know I can put here.

PHQ Committee Secretary had never any confidence in Prasanta, the unit secretary. He never trusted him so from the very beginning he started getting reports directly from other comrades. For this purpose he used Com. Murti specially. This comrade used to go to his den even before he was taken in the unit. Gradually Murti became the most trusted person in the PHQ. ~~and he was used to~~ was used not only to give reports of the PHQ and the unit also to put PHQ Committee Secretary's view before the unit.

After the emergency period when Hamid found that discontent is spreading not only in the ranks but also in the unit itself, he decided to crush the most potential elements and to terrorise the others. For this he adopted very unscrupulous and factional methods. Before the 14th Sept. meeting he met two of the unit members (Nair and Murti) and manoeuvred in such a way that he was able to smash Ajoy. On the other side he was busy in "disciplining" Ramnath. ~~and he was used to~~ As soon as he succeeded in breaking down Ramnath he came out with an offensive against Ajoy and took full advantage of his mistakes in connection with the LOC meeting and the RPH incident. Before releasing the resolution about Ajoy he consulted Murti and Nair and informed them about the whole thing ~~weeks before~~ weeks ~~before~~ earlier. He met me also the same day when he released the resolution so that he may be sure that no opposition comes from the unit. Not only this just before that he disciplined Saral and Kalyani also about whom he felt that they were discontented.

Resolution on Prasanta played the role which the Committee wanted it to play. It smashed completely whatever resistance was there in the unit members particularly in me against the PHQ Committee. I, like other unit members, collapsed completely.

All of us wrote long self-critical reports, which were not only morbid but they denounced whatever good we had done before. In one of the unit meetings where we discussed the resolution on Prasanta we actually tortured him, hurled all sorts of ~~abuses~~ abuses at him and called his names. He wrote a most morbid self-critical report about activities denouncing every good thing which he had done so far but it did not satisfy us and we asked him to prepare another report. The other one also was not accepted by the unit and was discarded on the ground that it was formal. Only in Nazi concentration camps could people be tortured mentally in a worse manner. Whenever I remember the meeting I shudder and realise how this method was being perfected not only in the PHQ but all over India and how it succeeded in smashing the party.

After reading ~~the~~ our self-critical reports and minutes of the meeting the PHQ Committee Secretary paid a tribute and it was well deserved.

With Prasanta's suspension a new phase started in the PHQ and particularly for me. The left sectarian line was implemented with a greater gusto in this period and as the citadel was tottering still more discipline and and more gestapo methods were adopted.

PART II

The new unit was formed after merging Masahal in PHQ and with the starting of the weeklies; so the PHQ which had formerly very few functions now took upon itself the running of the papers. Formerly the papers were being run by the Centre and now that the responsibility was given to the PHQ Committee so the Committee also became very active and limited the powers of the unit to the minimum.

After crushing Ajoy the PHQ Committee did not want to take any chances. After his suspension it appointed both me and Murti as incharge of the tech apparatus and after the new unit was formed Hamid instructed Murti to see that he was elected as the Unit Secretary. When he was not elected he was pulled up sharply. When Hamid did not succeed in this manoeuvre he continued this arrangement that I and Murti both remained incharge of the tech. ~~apparatus~~ Murti's dak used to come always in a closed cover addressed to him only and my dak always open and addressed to both. Murti used to send his report always in a closed cover.

This is how the beginning was made and this was the basis of the unit and PHQ Committee's relationship that the PHQ Committee secretary had no faith in the Unit Secretary. In this period of the last six months Hamid was mainly responsible for organisational matters and Sanjeev was the boss of the editorial side. Unit had no powers but had to bear responsibility of each and every thing. For even allowing a comrade to take food in PHQ it was necessary to at least inform PHQ secretary and he could change unit's decision.

PHQ Committee besides giving instructions through chits used to meet unit once or twice a month. General pattern was this that first unit had to report and give its self-criticism and then committee members (generally Hamid and Sanjeev) used to give a long harangue in a general way saying that unit was not functioning politically. They were not doing this and that. The whole tone used to be very provocative.

they were not doing this and that. The whole tone used to be very provocative, arrogant and self-conceited, that members used to accept everything without murmur in a most disgraceful, and contemptible manner, swallowing every ~~thing~~. All the harangues in all the meetings were the same, very general. No issue was taken up concretely and thrashed out. Obviously there was no question of self-criticism.

What respect PHQ Committee has for the Unit members and to what servility Unit members had reduced themselves can be seen from these examples:

1. When the Jail document was released, Hamid issued instructions that it should be discussed first in the unit and if any member shows any vacillation that should be reported immediately. One Unit Member should attend the Cell discussions but it should be seen that nobody who shows any vacillation should be allowed to attend any cell. If in any cell anybody shows slightest vacillation it should be reported immediately.
2. When the LASTING PEACE editorial had come, it was immediately typed and some copies were sent to PHQ Committee comrades. They did not know who typed and sent. The next day a very long note came from Hamid in almost filthy language, charging Comrade responsible for typing that he was in fact organising a revolt, he was thinking himself a great Marxist. Everything was in superlative. When I saw the letter I felt very bad and wrote the reply in a very sharp tone. The next day Murti said that as he was responsible for typing that out, ~~he~~ so he would reply. When I saw his reply (which was very mild, only statement of fact) I destroyed my chit and wrote only this much that Murti was replying.
3. Before Document No. 16 came, Hamid met me when he was going out. In that meeting he tried to impress upon me that how I should be vigilant and see that the disruptors do not raise their head. When I said what did he mean by disruptors, he said only Patkar-Tambitkarites, etc. In fact his whole talk was such which showed that he had no confidence in anybody.
4. Hamid and Sanjeev had developed almost a Gestapo service in PHQ. They used to meet PHQ comrades without informing even the cell and used to get reports about each other. In this period before Document No. 16 had come, I met Hamid only twice and Sanjeev twice or thrice (Meetings along with Unit or other Cell members are different) only. They always encouraged individual cell members to write about other comrades directly in sealed covers. Many decisions were conveyed to Murti even before Unit or Unit Secretary used to know (For ~~example~~ instance about Resolution on Sanjeev and about Circular on discussion on Document No. 14.

In this period the whole Unit including myself became completely servile. Never raised any voice on any important issue. Whatever understanding was given about Jail Document or No. 14 etc. we very religiously conveyed to the Cells.

PHQ Committee dealt the cells also with the same iron hand with which they had dealt with the Unit. Writing very sharp, strong, rather unbalanced notes to cell members was a common practice. Immediately the papers were started and Sanjeev became in charge of editorial Committee, he started writing very sharp letters to Chinan on every small issue and asked the Cells to take up. The result was that hammering started on one side from Sanjeev and on the other from the Cell and Chinan collapsed completely. Things became so obviously precarious that I wrote a note to Sanjeev to stop this. Then when I met him I told him to stop this method which instead of helping comrades leads to smashing them. In the same manner Hamid started writing to Chinan when he said something when document No. 14 came. This terror regime made all of us so servile that we lost independent political thinking. If sometimes some doubts arose we were afraid to express. For instance after Mao's People's Democratic Dictatorship had come I discussed with some comrades and said that in India also middle Bourgeoisie will have to be taken into consideration, but after expressing this I suddenly realised that I had committed a crime; for two days I tried to explain away to remove this impression. It was the result of this servility that it reduced me to such a non-political level that I said to comrades that in Peking Conference Manifesto it is mentioned that Rich peasantry etc. can come in the democratic front because our point of view had not reached there. My servility and blind faith in our leadership took me to this level that I was prepared even to denounce the International leadership. Units relationship with comrades in PHQ also was not much different.

As PHQ Committee had taken over the task of guiding PHQ politically and organisationally so the Unit has very little to do in this respect but it had to attend some day to day problems and problems of the individuals and cells. The classic example is Unit's handling of Gujerati cell. When the new unit was formed first, Proful and then Nana were made in charge of that cell,

— but Rana did not do anything except attending one or two meetings and when his own cell showed no confidence in him then Permanand was made in charge and when the things instead of coming on proper rails went on deteriorating then I was asked to take charge. How the Unit members handled the cell? Two members, i.e. Proful and Permanand, who had old prejudices against the Cell Secretary continuously derided the Cell members particularly, two against the Cell Secretary. Through their talks, their behaviour etc. they created a rift in the cell. Cell lost confidence in the Cell Secretary, got demoralised and mentally smashed over and above this Committee members and Unit members went on attacking the Cell Secretary in a very harsh manner even for very small mistakes. The result was this that when a very sharp note came from Hamid about Ghiman's remarks in connection with the LASTING PEACE editorial, Ghiman collapsed completely. At this stage Unit reviewed its attitude towards that cell and nailed down Proful and Permanand's attitude. They were sharply criticised particularly by me for prejudicing Gujarati cell members against the Cell Secretary. Their factional behaviour was pointed out and nailed down. After this Unit asked me to tackle the Cell. I had long talks with Ghiman and I tried to show him that he was subjective and he should not take the criticism of Hamid in a ~~xxx~~ subjective manner. Instead of helping him to see and fight Hamid's criminal attitude, I covered, rather justified it and put the whole blame on him. Tried to explain him that Hamid criticises the Unit members in still harsher manner. In my talk with the Gujarati Cell members, I did try to see that some understanding is developed between the cell members. I wrote a note to Hamid asking him to write the Cell to adopt proper attitude towards the Cell Secretary, but my understanding remained that Gujarati Cell Secretary is rotten, he cannot change and we have to carry on anyhow. While discussing with ~~and~~ other cell members I gave this same understanding. Told them that they have to carry on any way as there is no other alternative. I failed to see how the callous, rather criminal attitude of the Unit members and Hamid and Sanjeev had crushed that comrade completely. The result of this understanding was that in one of the Gujarati Cell meeting, I burst out against the Cell Secretary when he did not submit reports. This very fact reflects my bureaucratic, arrogant and contemptuous attitude towards comrades, which I had developed in this period, which I had learnt from by 'bosses', who were treating us in the same manner. Unit members' this attitude was not confined only to the rank and file comrades, but they were adopting the same attitude towards their own colleagues in the Unit. There are many examples of this relationship. One example I will give here which will fully illustrate the whole thing.

Unit received a lot in complaints from Marathi cell about their cell's functioning and particularly about Cell Secretary's functioning. Unit discussed the matter and decided that Unit Secretary should attend the Cell meeting and after collecting facts should report to the Unit. I attended the Cell meeting and found that almost the whole Cell was up in arms against the Cell Secretary. I came back and reported the whole thing to the Unit. The Unit instead of taking up Rana's failures concretely and helping him in finding a way out jumped at his throat, long harrangues were given, and after thorough beating he was ~~xxxx~~ asked to accept his mistakes. His acceptance was called formal and he was made to write a self-critical report. This process of general criticism, and hammering continued for months x together and the Unit succeeded in smashing him completely. It is no doubt that in this ~~xxxxxxxx~~ connection his mistakes were very serious and his attitude towards the Cell and Unit was not correct, but unit also completely failed to help him. It is a different thing how far that effort would have been successful. Same method was adopted ~~xxxx~~ in case of other Unit members when ever they committed any mistake.

As far as factional methods and espionage system of PRA Committee is concerned, it is very difficult for me to throw much light on this as I was never in their confidence. I can say this much.

I was expected to send general reports about PRA and sometimes I had to send reactions of comrades about different comrades' reactions. I always sent these reports in a general way. Individual names were mentioned when I used to send reports about certain cell after discussing certain things. About individuals I used to send reports when I wanted that Hamid and Sanjeev should meet and discuss with them. For instance in this period many problems arose about Rana and I wrote about this to Sanjeev and Hamid and either I sought their advice or asked them to meet and discuss with them.

I never had this idea that PRA Committee members were in a factional and degenerate manner and so I never reacted when Hamid differentiated so much ~~lx~~ between me and Murti or I could never see before now in what factional

they planned against Ajoy.

I knew that Murti regularly, and other Unit members sometimes were sending reports directly and Murti used to send his report always without showing me and others, used to send often open and sometimes sealed, but I never reacted to that and never suspected anything. Not only this, even some individual comrades also used to report about other comrades, but due to my political bankruptcy, I never reacted that this was in fact a gestapo method. I did never react that no comrade should report to the Higher Committee (of course except about Tech.) behind the back of the Cell and no comrade should meet any Higher Committee member without the knowledge of the Cell. I could never realise that how this method was reducing comrades to textmate servility and destroying confidence in each other. Not only did I not realise the seriousness of this crime of PHQ Committee. Particularly Hamid, but I became a conscious tool in this whole affair.

All these things I could start realising only after seeing document No. 16. After that I started struggling against this both inside the Unit and with PHQ Committee members and wrote many notes pointing out these things. I very sharply criticised them for sending all the circulars which they sent ~~after~~ after the documents had been circulated. When I met Hamid I put before him how in a factual manner they were functioning. I raised these things both in the Unit and in the Joint Meeting with Committee members. In spite of the fact that immediately after No. 16 and other documents came I was able to see many things and some times even before other Unit members, but this is a fact that I like other Unit members could not keep pace with PHQ comrades. After these documents had come discussions started in PHQ in full speed. I instead of mixing and struggling along with other comrades isolated myself, got panicky and along with other Unit members raised the bogey of discussions being derailed. Things did not stop here, but we the Unit Members tried to get resolutions passed in different cells on this issue. The whole thing shows that the weight of last one year's functioning in Unit was so heavy that we failed to come out immediately. We failed to see the healthy reactions of the majority of the comrades and saw a small thing as the only reality.

The Unit realised this and not only put before the joint meeting, but also before PHQ Committee. This thing made us realise that it is necessary that our Unit should be dissolved and all of us should integrate ourselves in our cells and with the help of other comrades make effort to rehabilitate ourselves. After the joint meeting, I after consulting the Unit members, wrote a letter to the PHQ Committee asking them to dissolve the Unit immediately. After the dissolution of the old Union, I have started working in my cell and struggling to see my own crimes of the left sectarian past and hope that with the help of my own cell members and other comrades I will be able to ~~my~~ unmask my past more thoroughly and take a real turn with the rest of the Party.

To: The CCM-in-charge

June 23, 1950

Dear Comrade,

We have just received the circular that you had sent yesterday intimating us about some of the organisational changes brought about by the last CC meeting. This news came as a relief in so far as the old PB has been dissolved and the CC has been reconstituted and the GS has been removed from the CC.

We will of course express ourselves on the circular though we know that before we know fuller details regarding these it is not possible for us to express ourselves fully on them - for instance not before we know why the particular nine comrades have been chosen for the new interim CC is it possible for us to express ourselves on the merit of this particular decision or the decisions as a whole.

However, there are certain matters which must be clarified immediately as they are intimately, inescapably and vitally connected with our day-to-day work here.

Although we had not had even a single acknowledgement of receipt or an assurance either from the old CC or the new CC that materials sent from here are being studied, carefully, we hope that the CC has gone through carefully the various resolutions, minutes of the cell meetings, etc. that we have sent from here for the perusal of the CC.

We do hope you have studied them with due care and also the memorandum that we have sent to the CC.

You must have noticed the deep anxiety which we all feel at the grave crisis of the Party. You must have noticed that we consider the failure of the old CC as the fundamental factor of the crisis.

~~It is a fact that the failure of the old CC was fully reflected by the CCMs who were in charge of running the PHQ. This is revealed by the gross and impermissible failure of the CCMs to lead the PHQ politically or organisationally during the past period, the reaction of the CCMs to the Cominform Editorial of 27.1.1950 and the anti-Party arrogance that these CCMs are guilty of. We repeatedly demanded to know the names of these CCMs so that we could make sure that they are not again given the charge of guiding the PHQ for you will agree that ~~no~~ sane person could ask the comrades in the PHQ to repose their faith in anyone of these two comrades.~~

It is unfortunate, however, that we have not yet been told who these CCMs were. We request you to convey the names of these two CCMs immediately to us, particularly because some comrades here feel that one of the two CCMs involved is yourself.

Quite apart and besides alone from this clarification which of course is very important, we would also like to make it clear that it is not possible for us to repose political confidence in any member of the old CC until we know his full record for the last two years and are able to study his self-critical report.

This becomes particularly important in your case in view of the fact that quite a large number of comrades feel that you are one of the most hardened Left-Sectarian members of the CC responsible for a good deal of damage to the Party, particularly in Maharashtra.

We will, therefore, urge on you most strongly to answer the points raised by us in this letter as fully and as early as possible for in our opinion this clarification alone can serve as the starting point of work in PHQ.

You will notice that in our memo to the CC we have stated quite categorically that particularly in the interim period a Commission must take charge of the Central Agit-Prop work of the Party. This is the only way in which, in our opinion the Central Agit-Prop can fulfil its functions, however partially.

We would like to know your own views on this point as well as that of the CC as whole.

P.H.C. Cell Secretaries Unit.

Copy forwarded to C.C.

May 23, 1950

ON PARTY LINE

I have just finished reading the PB Documents (up to No. 18) on the Left-Sectarian deviation in the Party and have to state quite categorically that I am not satisfied with the PB's recognition of its mistakes and its attempt to correct the line. Reading the documents, one is convinced that the errors and mistakes made since the historic Second Congress of the Party are extremely grave and that the PB is failing to reflect their gravity.

I am not one who is thoroughly soaked in the science of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and Mao, but the glossing over of mistakes, the incorrect interpretation of Marxist thinkers, the extraordinary mechanical manner of changing the line without proper elaboration to continue in our theoretical work of defining the Strategy and tactics of our revolution. I shall take these issues up point by point and proceed and I shall endeavour to modify or supplement any remarks as further authoritative documents become available.

POLITICAL THESIS: If I am convinced of anything, it is this that the Second Congress of the Party was a historic turning point in the life of the Party, historic in the sense that a powerful blow was struck against the wretched Reformist Right-wingers whose policies would have led to the voluntary liquidation of the Party, historic because of the tremendous ~~importance~~ ^{importance} of the consciousness of the Party since that date.

These facts, however, do not blind me to the grave defects in the Political Thesis, defects which form the roots of the deviation, which has occurred and which it is had not been checked by the timely intervention of the brother Parties would have led to the betrayal of the Indian Revolution and the betrayal of the international Socialist movement. The PB while accepting the fact that the roots of the deviation i.e. in the Political Thesis, has failed to properly spotlight them and has been guilty of exaggerating the correctness of the Political Thesis and, therefore, of further confusing the ranks.

Taking the defects of the Political Thesis, it is not merely a question of this or that defect. In my opinion, the political thesis will have to be radically re-written. In the foreign section, for example, Zhdanov is quoted, but what is the net result. We could not miss the fact that the world was divided into two camps. But what is our following interpretation? We lump the entire world bourgeoisie in the camp of imperialism and reaction and totally fail to take note of important inter-imperialist contradictions. Not only do we misinterpret Zhdanov but we ~~make~~ - and I am stunned by the fact of the swallowing it took line and sinker - the extraordinary view that the possibilities of certain sections of the world bourgeoisie playing an oppositional role to imperialism are completely exhausted. In other words, we blind ourselves to the variations in the phases of revolution in various countries of the world. We took this line despite the fact that we were aware of Mao's formulations regarding the Chinese Revolution and Stalin's specialised writings on the colonial question. In this connection it has also to be remembered that about the same time that the Political Thesis was published, PPH also released an important speech of Mao's in which he singled out the fact that the "national bourgeoisie and sections of the landed gentry are included in the National Democratic Front. Sectarianism has its limits.

To continue: The analysis in the Political Thesis of the role of our own bourgeoisie spotlights our own bourgeois-nationalist make-up even more vividly; we lose ourselves in paying compliments to the strength of our bourgeoisie, of how it seeks foreign markets with imperialist aid, etc. etc. We fail to take note of the contradictions of the bourgeoisie within its own ranks. We fail to understand the role of imperialism in its relation to capitalism in other non-imperialist States - a formulation which Mao highlights in New Democracy. And all this happens when we correctly describe India as a colony. It only goes to show that we have merely used Marxism in a most mechanical manner and although fighting reformism, have not shed our bourgeois nationalist illusions. It passes my comprehension how we wrote the Political Thesis and failed to ~~draw~~ draw upon the brilliant generalisations of Stalin on the National and Colonial question. For in these writings is contained all the help we needed in coming to correct conclusions. The arrogant attitude towards Mao's New Democracy, which was ~~firmly based on the generalisations of Stalin~~ - based - present even in those days is inexplicable because what Mao has written is firmly based on the generalisations of Stalin. So deep is our bourgeois nationalism that even when we had not made the cardinal mistake of considering India an independent State, we treated with contempt the

experience of the Chinese Revolution.

Attempts have been made in later PB Documents to emphasize the solidity of the Political Thesis by quoting Soviet commentators participating in an Academy discussion in 1949. There is fine material for study in the PPH publication Colonial People's Struggle for liberation, but to take extracts of this material where it applies to certain aspects of the Political Thesis is opportunist and will cause further confusion. Soviet commentators at that time also could not without exercising restraint expose the weaknesses and grave errors in the Party line. In the Political Thesis, for example, a call in general terms is given for an attack on the rich peasantry. How/ came to such a conclusion at that time when we considered India a colony is another question but ~~that the~~ to quote Balabushevich in support of our agrarian programme as embodied in the Political Thesis is wrong. It is wrong to write important PB Documents correcting a wrong Party by quoting Soviet commentators participating in an academy discussion almost one year before the event. Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao should be quoted to correct a line. It is not without significance that in the PB Resolution for discussion by the CC, Mao is not quoted at all.

We need a new Political Thesis. No patchwork will suffice. It must be a comprehensive document fully discussed by the ranks, embodying their opinion and not a hastily drafted document which will be liable to many interpretations. Let us not delude ourselves with the thought that because the Second Congress was a historic turning point for the Party, the Political Thesis also is a landmark. The fact that the Political Thesis is correct in many parts is due entirely to the fact that comrades straight from the fighting fronts participated in the discussion and brought their practical revolutionary experience to bear on the leadership. It is to these comrades, tested in the battle of many fronts, that we must turn for dynamic Marxism, rooted in our peculiar conditions.

ON PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY: It is not necessary for me to deal at any length on this document for it is choked with false Marxist demagogy. I remember being shocked by the manner in which Satyapal Dang's contribution to the Congress discussion was highlighted, the contribution which said that the Democratic Front was monolithic - a Titoist approach. In People's Democracy Document we see the fruition of all the mistakes in the Political Thesis. It is also an exposure of the manner in which our bourgeois-nationalist deviation developed, how we set before us a certain goal, winning of revolution - proceeded to find the facts to support it. The fact that we were able to continue to base ourselves on the polemic in this Document shows the scant respect we had for the rich material appearing in the organs of the international movement, material which explained what was People's Democracy, what was the character of the Democratic Revolutionary Front, what was the period necessary before the People's Democratic Revolution could pass over to the Proletarian Revolution, what was the difference between People's Democracy in independent countries and colonial countries.

In passing I would like it to be noted that we are still indulging in more or less the same sort of confused thinking. We have still not drawn in the PB Documents the difference between People's Democracy in Eastern Europe and People's Democracy in China. We are still talking of how the People's Democratic Revolution moves "directly" or "rapidly" in the proletarian revolution, forgetting that being colonial countries necessarily involves a more gradual development.

AGRARIAN THESIS: Here again is a document that should be studied by us so that we can properly estimate the extent of our deviation and our illusions about the obvious mistakes and distortions. But I would like to draw special attention to the manner in which the PB dismisses its own thesis in its resolution for the CC. It is done in one sentence. As far as I know, this is no method of correcting our mistakes. Having ~~scanned~~ drilled into the ranks every distortion about capitalist relations in the countryside and the need to fight the rich peasants, it is not enough to say now that these relations do not exist to a marked degree.

Then again, there is no mention of the ~~serious~~ Leftist mistake of allying the unions of agricultural labourers to the AITUC an important point which is completely missed in the PB Documents. As far as I am aware, there is a poor peasant league which works as part of the peasants movement - as its main base and leader carrying out all reforms. Finally, not a word about the virtual liquidation of the Kisan Sabhas. How deep are the mistakes. We cannot even extricate ourselves rapidly from the more obvious mistakes.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS: The less said the better. It is a horrible distortion of the Andhra Document which has now almost proved correct. Why was this Document not circulated to the ranks? Why was it distorted in the manner it has been done? It is with great bitterness that I re-read and re-read this document. I recalled the manner in which we mocked at the Andhra comrades, the manner in which we justified the attack on Mao. And yet in the same COMMUNIST there is an article by Zhukov that should have opened our eyes. I hope that in later PB documents these articles will be squashed in detail for until this is done, the disease for which we have suffered will remain with us.

Reading the PB Document on Mao, I still get the impression that the PB is still of the opinion that New Democracy carried wrong or weak formulations. I may be wrong and hope to be enlightened. Moreover, there is still the emphasis in the document on Mao on the rapidity with which we move into the proletarian revolution. This is wrong, absolutely wrong. Mao has repeatedly declared that it will be gradual and will take a long time. Thus, world conditions are changing but they do not warrant the conclusion of "direct" and "rapid" moving into the next stage. Moreover, there is a difference between the "speeds" in colonial countries and independent countries.

ON REVISIONISM, ON WAR DANGER ETC. ETC. These documents reflect the general derailment, the crimes against proletarian internationalism, the arrogance and conceit with which we narrowed our approach. All these documents must be dealt with in the detail.

ON PB DOCUMENTS: As I have stated above, the PB Documents are far from satisfactory. Only grudgingly and gradually is the gravity of the position being appreciated. The first correction was hopelessly off the mark. The second document came closer to the facts and it appears largely as a result of the ranks writing in. The one good result has been the inauguration of open forum which I hope will remain a permanent feature of Party life. To begin with, and before I proceed point by point, I must protest that in both major PB documents for CC (excluding one on Mao) ~~in~~ Mao is not quoted but Soviet commentators who base themselves on Stalin and Mao are quoted to correct the line. Secondly, the corrections are rather mechanically formulated. Suggesting an acceptance which does not have at its root a proper understanding. Now point by point -

(1) India colonial or semi-colonial status is realised, but there is little or no intention of how the Party arrived at the understanding that the bourgeoisie had won a national State. The bourgeois-nationalist deviation, therefore, is not brought out in the manner it should have been. It is not merely sectarianism but something far worse.

(2) The stage of revolution glossed over at a time when it is most necessary in the initial document to deal with it in detail. Stalin in his writings on the national and colonial question has dealt with the stages of revolution in colonies. He divides them into three: A. Liberal bourgeois; B. Bourgeois-democratic; C. Proletarian. China is at the present completing the second and moving towards the third which will take time. We do not explain how we are moving towards a Revolutionary Democratic Dictatorship of workers and peasant. We do not adequately blast the theory of mixing and interlacing of revolutions; until this is done illusions will remain and there will be confusion in the Party and the mass front as to the tasks of the present period. We are in the second phase - against imperialism, feudalism and big bourgeoisie - and we must reflect these tasks in our own work and not attempt to import the tasks of the later phase into the present period. Stalin lays down that the agrarian revolution is the main axis of the second phase. We speak of Peace as the pivot. We fail to show how the movement for Peace in the colonies is closely linked with the struggle for national liberation. The pivot, as I see it, is the agrarian revolution and our contribution to the strength of the peace movement is just that plus other activities such as signature campaign, etc.

(3) The composition and character of the Democratic Front needs to be dealt with in much greater detail in the initial documents. It is not enough to merely mechanically specify the elements - the new ones - which will now enter but to state emphatically that we do not believe in spontaneous developments, that we must have a positive policy towards these elements. This matter involves not only elements of the bourgeoisie but our approach to the question of broadening the front. So far we have refused to talk of cooperating with elements who are not one hundred per cent with us. We have also dismissed every revolt in the ranks of the Congress and other such groups as quarrels within the camp of vested interests. These facts should have figures in the PB Documents. One part of this whole question is the self-determination of nationalities and our approach to the problem. There is an article in People's China

which shows how far back the Chinese Party gave detailed attention to this question - a fact which is now paying dividends.

A most important question in this connection is the matter of building up cadres, of placing trusted persons in key positions in the organisations of the enemy, of adapting our tactics to the varying conditions that exist in our country. The Democratic front must become broader and deeper and it cannot unless we consciously strive to strengthen ourselves organisationally. Struggles alone cannot achieve these tasks, we have to work for them with all the weapons at our command. China has rich experience to offer us in these matters. In other words, we have to use and mobilise people to whatever extent they can be, always consciously keeping before us the tasks that have to be accomplished and avoiding the pitfalls of reformism. Work in the army, police, etc. is of paramount importance as it has so far been neglected.

The PB Documents maintain that the pivot of our activity will be peace. This question is a fact somewhat loosely approached and will cause confusion. The organs of the international movement leave no doubt about the fact that the Communist and Workers Parties are to make Peace their main activity. True. But the PB documents fail to show how the battle for peace in colonial countries is very closely linked with the battle for national liberation. As I have said, the agrarian revolution is the main axis of our activity. No doubt it is the major contribution to peace but to describe it as such will again derail the peace movement. As I see it, while peace is one of our major activities, the agrarian revolution remains our main axis. I must submit that I am not very clear on this.

Quite correctly the PB documents have nailed down our adventurism in urban areas and have stated that the main blows must now be delivered where the enemies of the people are the weakest - in the countryside. This is the historic experience of the Chinese Revolution. These tactics will need detailed working out particularly in terms of how leading cadre will shift to the countryside and how the proletariat will help directly and indirectly. The tendency to demobilise the movement in the cities will have to be fought. We build up our strength in the cities through various legal and illegal activities. But the burden of our propaganda and activities must be closely integrated in order to sustain the agrarian bases from which the enveloping and destruction of the enemy will proceed. In the building up of these bases partial limited struggles will amount to major struggles leading to embryonic state forms. We must fight adventurism in the countryside which will preach heroes everywhere and anywhere. Armed struggle requires the highest qualities. Those who advocate the abandonment of armed struggle would lead the Party back to the days of wretched reformism, but those who advocate that armed struggle must proceed as a result of the people proclaiming "Give us the ARMs" are not to be lumped with the reformists. The Chinese Party has again much valuable experience to offer us in this respect. It has always insisted that the slogans of the Party must become the slogans of the people before they can be implemented. Any other approach is adventurist.

(5) The PB Documents have failed to sharply characterise the grave errors committed in the mass organisations, the majority of which have either been demobilised or virtually liquidated. We will not only have to build up these mass fronts, but to properly indicate their respective roles as mobilisers for the Democratic Front. Naturally overlapping of functions does occur and coordination is necessary but all this must not lead to the present spectacle of over organisation, doing the same jobs and from the same angle. Also in the period of developing fascism, it will be necessary to create new organisations with limited tasks as also to intervene positively in other organisations so as to win theirs over to the Democratic Front; look at the tremendous work done in China where numerous political groups even composed of all types of opportunists were helped in their united struggle against the KMT - groups which later declared their support to the People regime. The depth of our own sectarianism in these matters can be measured by the manner in which we callously neglected in the English journal to publish messages from USO and S.S. etc. This horrible arrogance will have to be fought ruthlessly. Whenever the Party has been banned some such steps of forming new groupings to carry on united action will have to be taken. To use every contradiction in the camp of the enemy to push forward the armed national liberation struggle is the task before us.

* Also missed in the PB Documents is the need to draw the difference between India and China as Stalin has done. After giving it more thought, shall write separately on it. This fact is most important.

GENERAL: It is not possible for me to go into a more detailed picture

I shall submit further notes - one at least in relation to my own work to show how our wrong understanding was deeply reflected. I must admit that at first I ~~did~~ not feel there was much correction to be done. It was only later that I realised the gravity of the situation. I am firmly of the opinion that if sectarianism, dogma and bureaucracy is fought together with reformism we shall have to devote our minds to including in the leading cadres comrades who have direct knowledge of the front line. And it will also be necessary from time to time rejuvenate ~~and~~ ~~maintain~~ the leading cadre with such contact. Many of our mistakes in the past and today is due to the fact of far too much intellectualising and too little contact with practical affairs. I trust that the discussions that have been allowed in ~~practical affairs~~ the Party will continue for it is a vital factor to the making of a Party.

Although these are difficult times, it is necessary for the Party ranks all over the country to review the work of the PB and to reconstitute it in order to equip it to face the hundredfold difficult tasks that will confront the Party in the coming years. As Bolsheviks, we cannot gloss over a situation which has almost derailed the Party completely. True, the Party cadre that has stood up to the test for last two years is the core that represents the best. Much blood and tears have flown in an advanced bases unnecessarily blood and tears, because of the mistakes of the leadership. Let us now make absolutely certain that we will tread the path of Marx, Engels, Lenin Stalin and no and no other path. Let ^{us fight} the right Reformist disruptors and renegades who would liquidate the party. Let us liquidate the Sectarian aspects of our policies. Let us critically examine our individual work during the past two years and emerge the more and stronger. Let us march forward, not ~~four~~ tens of thousands but tens of millions, to establish national independence, democracy and peace - the first pre-requisite for our march to Socialism.

Greetings,

To all u.g. cells:

u.g. edit
cell

23.5.50

Dear comrades,

The minutes of the various cell discussions in Fort will be circulated in futre to all u.g. dens.

Owing to typing difficulties however it is not possible to send one copy to each den. Hence there will be one copy which will be circulated to all dens in turn. The copy should stay in the den a maximum of 48 hours, but if possible it should be sent on in 24 hours.

The procedure that we are adopting is as follows:

From Fort the copy of the minutes will be sent direct to the u.g. editorial cell; from there it will be sent on to Com. cell secy, D4; from there it will go on to Com. cell secy, D1; and from there to Com. Cell Secy, D2. After D2 has finised with it, it will be returned to Com. Cell Secy D4 for filing and will be available to any den cell for reference from him.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

We have already informed the Fort comrades to send on ~~the copy~~ the copies of the minutes to the u.g. editorial cell which should forward on these copies to the D4 Cell Secretary as mentioned above.

Greetings,
PHQ Committee.

Edit cell

THE REPORT OF ENGLISH CELL MEETING.

17.5.1950.

The cell meeting was held on 4-5-1950 at 7.30 P.M. and on 5-5-50 at 10.30 P.M. Coms. Murti, Iran, Ragh, Gama, Capital, CB, Bhargava and Bina were present.

The Cell ~~then~~ discussed the PHQ Committee circulars and passed the resolution which was forwarded to the PHQ Committee. The Cell also demanded a list of documents etc. from the PB which was sent to PHQ Committee Secretary for forwarding.

Apart from this only one other matter was discussed, i Gama's talk with Bina re. Murti.

Com. Murti first raised the question. He read out what he had written on this, which is being enclosed herewith.

Bina said she did not think the way Murti had raised the question will help the discussion. Of course, Murti can raise the question and also make a written statement - but this should be in a manner which will help the discussion and understanding forward.

Bina said that she herself was going to report the matter, as even if Gama had accepted his mistake, the question he had raised was important and at this time, we should try to have some understanding about it. Bina then gave the following report: Gama had told Bina that he had no further faith or confidence in Murti from the way he had been functioning in the past and after the Doc. 14 and felt that he should place this matter before the Cell, and his idea was that Murti should be removed from the cell and either someone from a Higher Committee, or some other Unit member should attend the cell meetings.

Bina discussed with him and told him that it would be wrong to immediately demand re-organisation, unless one feels that there is in any way immediate danger to proper Party functioning etc. We should study the documents etc. and take up re-organisation on the basis of the new understanding. We will have to demand full reports from comrades and committees, how they have acted etc. On the basis of their past, the understanding and self-criticism they make now and show the turn or otherwise - we shall judge whether comrades can hold responsible jobs or not. Also today to say we should ask for someone else from the unit to attend instead of Murti would be wrong, because there is no basis to say that any other Unit member has acted in a better or worse manner. Besides, we have to look at the matter as a whole, and see the mistakes from top to bottom and not pick on ~~ix~~ individuals without hearing from them and judging the mistakes as the part of the whole. Further, the Party has to function, and until full reporting etc. is done, we have to carry on as at present - unless we feel that without someone's removal, further discussions etc. will be sabotaged.

After discussion, Gama said he fully agreed that today to raise question of change without having a correct basis of judging or ~~ix~~ without hearing what that comrade has to say, would not be correct.

Comrade Nagpuri and Capital came in while the discussion was going on, and while some other questions re. certain Unit members' remarks about Stalin etc.

Nagpuri and Capital went and reported to Murti, and Capital without enquiring thought that the remark re. Stalin was made by Murti. In the morning Capital came and told Bina that she should have enquired before doing this, as Murti unnecessarily got a wrong impression re. Gama saying that Murti had made the remark re. Stalin.

After this Gama spoke and said, he had raised the question with Bina, as Cell Secretary, and asked her whether it would be correct to raise the question re. Murti or not. He had been thinking of functioning in PHQ, Cell etc., and he had out of this come to lose all confidence in Murti. Further the way he had denounced Gama and others who had said it was a change in strategy, his bureaucratic and contemptuous attitude towards other P.M.s., his behaviour towards Gama - all made him feel that Murti should not be in charge of Cell. But Bina had explained how this would not be correct to raise at this stage and disruptive without full facts he was convinced and did not want to raise the question immediately.

Murti said Gama before coming to conclusions should have asked him about full facts, how far he was responsible etc. He could have come to him and asked.

Gama said this was not possible as Murti was always in his own room and not possible to approach. Murti's remarks, his work in the Cell etc. were enough facts, Gama felt, for him to come to the conclusion that he could not have further confidence in Murti.

Murti said everyone's functioning and bureaucracy will have to be taken up when the time comes.

Capital said Gama's remarks showed lack of responsibility and seriousness and without ascertaining facts.

Fran said that he thought it is right for comrades to raise doubts with Secretary. Sometimes the wrong thing may be said - but it was not wrong to raise questions with Cell Secretary. Also Gama saw his mistake after Secretary pointed out.

Ragh. said raising questions re. Murti with Secretary was OK. Question of confidence in Murti without facts would be wrong and Gama accepted it would be disruptive.

Murti said: "You put the question as if I want a vote of confidence. This is not so."

Bhargava said she also felt that, because after Gama's admitting mistake, she could not understand why it was raised thus.

Murti said that the correct procedure is to get all facts and then raise questions etc. Otherwise they will stop functioning because without confidence how will Murti and Gama function in CR etc. ~~xxxx~~

Bhargava said it was correct to raise doubts with Secretary. Also danger shown by Murti is correct. But Secretary showed him and Gama agreed. But way Gama said again that without further facts he has no confidence in Murti, shows he has not properly understood how it is disruptive.

Capital said she went to Murti to ask whether he had said Re. Stalin. But she should have found out from the Secretary first as she realised later and told the Secretary. Other comrades also felt that Capital should have enquired from Secretary before reporting to Murti in this way.

CB said it was correct to raise in cell. All of us should know how everyone is feeling. Felt Gama still not fully understood. Showed irresponsibility. Murti had said certain wrong things re. tactical change, but that was also general understanding of some. ~~xxxx~~ Raising question as Gama had was not helpful.

Then Bina said that the way Gama had spoken again of lack of confidence and not wanting more facts re. Murti - showed that he had understood what she had tried to explain, but perhaps insufficiently, in a general way - but was still not properly applying it to Murti's case. Therefore this was probably still formal. He should try to see this. Bina said she was not able to concretely say how, but the way Murti had raised matter she felt it would not be helpful.

CB raised the question re. Bina's bureaucratic attitude about deciding to scrap the front page of Anniversary number. She should have called a cell meeting of the comrades present and taken a decision, instead of which she asked comrades individually, not only of the Cell, but also Darcy, Yeshwant, Gokul and others and showed more confidence in their opinion than in the comrades of her own cell.

Bina said that she did not think it was wrong to get the opinion of other cell comrades when question of Party cash was involved and when there were different opinions in the cell. But CB was right that showing lack of confidence in her own cell members and not calling a meeting of those present to take a proper decision was wrong on her part.

Meeting adjourned at 1 A.M.

20.5.50.

The Cell meeting was held on 11th May. Coms. Fran, Ragh, Gama, Capital, CB, Bhargava and Bina were present. Com. Murti could not attend due to other work.

Gama reported re. main points concerning production of CR.

Gama felt that if articles are written here, such as on Peace Week in Bombay, they must be prepared in time and not kept for the last minute. This creates unnecessary delay and trouble for all production comrades.

He also said that comrades of other Editorial Cells are taking blocks and not returning them in time, which causes delay in CR printing.

Bina said she had not re-read the Peace Report, but apart from delay, comrades of other cells had said it did not reflect our new understanding re. peace campaign. This we should discuss later. Then there were legal mistakes in it - but Lawyer felt that most probably they could be defended, though we must avoid such things in future. ~~xxxxxx~~ Further, the daily reports were still not given to Press Comrade, and some proper method must be done about this. Bina also suggested that comrades from the Edit. Cells should take up the job of following NCNA, Soviet Monitor etc. - so as to choose news-items for CR. Capital was asked to follow NCNA regularly. Fran was to follow and suggest materials from Soviet Monitor.

Bina said that UG Editorial Cell had sent certain suggestions re. bringing out of CR - but Murti would report on this fully as she knew something only and had not had a full discussion.

I. B. CELL DISCUSSION ON DOCUMENT NO. 16, 17, 18.

1. PB Document No. 16 is a departure from No. 14 document. In No. 14 document PB belittled the significance of the Editorial article which is admitted in passing in No. 16 document. No. 14 PB talks of "lagging behind the actual possibilities". certain ~~and~~ errors in dogmatic and sectarian directions." The PB made grossly exaggerated claims on the achievement of the Party, and explained that "main stress" was not laid on this or that etc. On the roles of the middle bourgeoisie and rich peasant: It claimed to have developed struggle against bourgeoisie of undeveloped nationalities, and agricultural workers' struggle against rich peasant, fighting reformism, but fails to mention that the cost of the struggle was disruption of the Democratic Front. Furthermore, PB was arrogant enough even after the editorial, to claim in No. 14 that it had correctly applied on many points in the report on strategy and tactics; and claimed credit for the struggles led by the ranks saying that the above report gave the line for such struggles. This was a very serious situation.

No. 16 ~~marks~~ a clear departure from this position. But it should be remembered that this departure was brought about by the firm intervention of the Party ranks generally correctly reacting to the editorial article and feeling the reservation of the P.B. Statement.

In No. 16 P.B. has admitted that mistakes of a fundamental nature has been committed. The understanding of the stage of the revolution has been wrong from which wrong strategy and tactics followed. Admitting these basic mistakes, we consider, is a valuable initial step towards a real understanding of our mistakes and hammering out a correct strategy and tactics.

However, No. 16 is not a satisfactory document. Its understanding is incomplete - patchy. It deals with the main mistakes in a too general and vague way. It does not unmask unreservedly the mistakes of the Party leadership. The general reference to Tito agents and Nehru Government in PB's covering letter is an attempt again to restrict discussion, raising the cry of disruption. It will have been useful only if concrete charge was pointed out. More about this later.

2. The PB Document claims to define the present main features of Indian people's democratic struggle and the tasks of the Communist Party. Yet, to begin with, the document does not deal with international situation. It seems the omission is not accidental. The PB apparently thinks that the treatment of the international situation in the Political Thesis is correct, and valid today. Otherwise it cannot be explained why the PB has not referred to international situation when dealing with mistakes in the Thesis. The understanding of the international situation in Political Thesis is faulty. (Comrade Chandrakant says it is basically left-sectarian), which has to be recognised by the PB. It contains Left Sectarian formulations in the direction of belittling intra-imperialist contradictions in the Imperialist and anti-Democratic camp. The conflict on the international arena and between the two camps is defined as a conflict between Socialism and capitalism. With regard to colonies, it has visualised the stage of revolution similar to the stage of People's Democratic Revolution (PDR) in Eastern Europe. (More about this when we come to Political Thesis). This understanding has to be changed. The international situation has to be rewritten, making a correct and up-to-date evaluation. This analysis should bring out sharply the significance of the historic victory of Chinese people led by the CP of China and the significance of the national liberation struggle of colonial countries in SE Asia, drawing its general lessons, in the context of international struggle of the Democratic Camp led by USSR for peace against war-mongers. This is the prerequisite in working out correct tactics in a revolutionary situation, in our struggle.

3. The PB Document No. 16 nowhere states in a categorical fashion the present stage of Indian revolution. In the beginning it refers vaguely that our revolution is anti-imperialist, anti-feudal in character. But that is not enough. In Part III, immediately after reference to the colonial character of the Indian economy, the stage of the revolution should have been defined in clear-cut terms. The economic content of the stage of our revolution is bourgeois democratic, it is led by the working class under conditions of world proletarian revolution. Therefore it becomes a People's Democratic revolution. But as Com. Shukov explains, there is a difference in the tasks of ^{our} Democratic revolution and that of Eastern European democracies which did not suffer from colonial economy. Our revolution aims at overthrow of imperialism and liquidation of imperialist feudal economy and all traces of colonial impress. From the stage of revolution and its tasks, follow the alignment of the classes that are to accomplish it under the leadership of the working class, i.e. the class alliance of the democratic front.

In the light of our serious mistakes of confusing two historic stages and wrongl

understanding the interlinking of two revolutions, it is very essential to state in categorical fashion the stage of the revolution and the class alliance of the democratic front and admit here clearly that we ignored Stalin's teaching on the difference between revolutions of oppressed and oppressor nations. Only then should we proceed to enumerate the mistakes which have to be examined from this premise.

The PB writes a document on 'Main Features of Indian Peoples' Democratic Struggles' without repudiating the tactical line in its entirety. We think that this is not permissible. TL is a document which guided the Party in left-sectarian direction for 1½ years. This document deserves total and detailed repudiation. Only on the basis of such a repudiation, we can start working out a new line.

PB's failure to start with repudiation of Tactical Line document is clearly revealed when it refers to the historic document ~~and~~ of the Andhra Secretariat in No. 16. The PB half-heartedly admits that Andhra Secretariat document is correct in the main in spite of some 'weaknesses'. We have failed to find out 'weaknesses' which PB refers, from which serious deviations can arise. This does not mean that Andhra Secretariat document is complete in itself (e.g. it does not give International perspective, It does not repudiate in a clear-cut terms the economic analysis of Political Thesis which failed to clearly state our colonial character). But we definitely think that it does not contain weaknesses in the sense in which PB is speaking of them. The PB in No. 16 says it thought "in terms of ~~removing~~ removing these weaknesses". This is a dishonest self-justification on the part of the PB for rejecting that document. Apart from other things, "thinking in terms of removing these weaknesses" will not explain the treacherous mutilation and distortion, twisting the real meaning in quoting from the document.

We believe that the new document should be based on the present Andhra document which contains valuable concrete application on Peasant Front etc. and make it complete.

In No. 14 also PB quite appetiatingly refers to tactical line document.

These facts mean that PB is reluctant to repudiate this document in its entirety. It should not be. PB should make unreserved and total repudiation of TL as the starting point of hammering out a correct Party line. Then, it will also understand the significance of the Andhra Secretariat document in a clear light.

5. No. 16 gives a general call to fight right reformism and 'left' sectarianism, equating in the process both deviations. This general call will not help in the fight against the deviations.

The warning against right reformism is very essential. The right danger will arise in the process of building up of the Democratic Front and leading the armed struggle for liberation, in various forms of belittling the hegemony of the proletariat. We have fought reformism mainly from the sectarian angle. Hence the real face of reformism has not been concretely exposed yet. This makes it all the more important to be conscious of the danger from right. We should not give up the right of criticism in the Democratic Front, and the independent platform of the Party. At the same time, particular care must be taken not to repeat a witch-hunt against reformism. We must bear in mind Com. Dimitrov's words that "we must increase to a maximum our vigilance in regard to and struggle against right opportunism, and against every one of its concrete manifestations, bearing in mind that right opportunism will increase in proportion as wide United Front will develop more and more."

Nevertheless a general call to fight reformism will not facilitate the struggle against the real danger from right. Nor is it correct, in our opinion, to equate deviation from right and left in the way it is done in No. 16.

Sectarian deviation has played havoc in the Party and the Democratic front in the last two years. It has disrupted the TU front, almost liquidated the AIKS, led to the disintegration of the Party. Secondly, it is a fact that our Party, on its own, failed to discover the left sectarian deviation. Only international corrective enabled us to understand that serious 'left' sectarian deviation exists in our Party. Further, in the new period, the basic task of building up of the democratic front can be accomplished only by overcoming the serious left sectarian deviation. Hence the fight against 'left' sectarian deviation becomes the major task, in the immediate future.

In this context equating the two deviations amounts to minimising 'left' sectarian deviation. The left sectarian deviation is treated very superficially in the document. This will not help to really spot out and nail down the deviation. The important task in the fight ~~and~~ against 'left' deviation is to trace it to its historical and ideological roots and unearth the concrete manifestations of the deviation in the work of the Party in the last two years.

Lenin discerned ideological affinity between Economism and Menshevism, and again between Trotskyism and Menshevism, tracing it historically. This is what we mean by ideological roots. We must discern the ideological affinity that may exist between reformism and 'left' deviations in our Party, tracing it historically.

6. There is reason to believe that the roots of the present day sectarianism lies deep in the Bombay period of the Party history. We are not in the know of the history of the Party, even in outline to definitely say so. But the PB document on Tamilnad resurrects and glorifies the Bombay period as an example of proletarian hegemony, a period that has been termed in the main by the Comintern, as sectarian. It is also not an accident that the Party leadership drew the attention of the ranks only to the Sixth World Congress Thesis and kept silent on the Seventh Congress which took place seven years afterwards.

The history of our Party has been a swing from right to left, from left to right, and again right to left. But in these years of its existence, in spite of the deviations, the Party has advanced, i.e. with the many mistakes, the Party has positive achievements to its credit. It has been the practice of right reformism to ridicule the 1929-33 period, ignoring its positive aspects. Same way, left sectarianism, in its turn, belittled the achievement of the United Front period. Our Party leadership's understanding in report on right reformist deviation and the evaluation of Com. Balabushevich of the period of 1936-47 are not the same. In all these, an element of falsification of history has crept in.

It is essential, therefore, that the members of our Party should know its history. This would enable us the ranks to fight deviations from both right and 'left'. We should have an authoritative history of our Party which should provide the guidance for us in the fight against all deviations from right to 'left'. Naturally this task cannot be undertaken by the present PB which does not hold our confidence. The history of the Party has to be prepared by a Commission of the new CC with the help of the older comrades for verifying facts and through widest criticism and self-criticism in the entire Party ranks, reach a uniformed understanding on Party history. As soon as the preliminary confusion is over and new setup is established, new CC should undertake this as an urgent job. This is very essential as in a growing Party, new cadres must be armed to judge its leadership and ensure their political vigilance.

7. Com. Dimitrov's characterisation that left sectarianism today is no more an infantile disorder, but an ingrained vice, further he says that left-sectarian replaces the method of leading the masses by the method of leading the Party, word for word applies to us. We wrongly estimated the objective reality. The sectarian blindness led us to overestimate the revolutionary consciousness of the masses. This is clearly seen in our strike calls and our trade union tactics. The Party gave many infantile calls for general strikes. In justification of the calls the Party leadership argued that the objective conditions warranted the calls. That is, we are in a period of revolutionary upsurge, that the economic discontent among the workers is terrific and all that is essential is to call for strike to channelise the discontent. This was reliance on spontaneity. And when the struggles inevitably fail, the failure is attributed to reformism in the Party.

We have underestimated the influence of bourgeois national reformism, represented by the National Congress and the Socialist Party in the working class movement. The concrete tasks of struggle against bourgeois influences has been replaced by general strike calls and a few words like Socialist traitors etc. We did not see that such strike calls and slogan-mongering cannot bring working class unity. It can only be brought about by day to day work and propaganda through trade unions, including those controlled by reformists and reactionaries; by advancing those forms of struggle which correspond to the consciousness of the workers. The organisational tasks have to be systematically carried out. In this work the objective situation of revolutionary upsurge is a favourable factor for us. But with our sectarian blindness, we only saw the objective situation and almost ignored the subjective factor. In our opinion, this is the root of our mistakes in tactics in leading struggles. That we concentrated in cities instead of villages alone will not explain the disruption that has taken place in mass fronts, especially trade union front.

We do not expect No. 16 to give detailed review of all the struggles. But the main deviations on various fronts and a way out in a generalised form must be included here, so as to give guidance to various fronts begin nailing down the

past mistakes in a detailed way on various fronts. The findings of these details, may necessitate the corrections in some of our generalisations. That would only ~~enrich~~ enrich deepen our understanding, [PB coolly refers to some of the jail struggles as being adventurist. It is not a question of some struggles being adventurist, The conception that jail is an independent front of class struggle is wrong. Also PB's understanding of preservation of cadres is wrong. The Bombay Jail Document expresses these two wrong conceptions and on this question CCMs and PBMs, were criticised, called towards, and were given ultimatums. Many very valuable comrades were lost to the Party by this adventurism. Yet the PB refuses to admit that their conception of jail as an independent front is wrong.

This adventurous conception of jail as an independent front arose out of desperation. The Party leadership followed a wrong political line which failed to mobilise the masses of people under Party banner, to organise mass action. Then the Party was plunged into action. A few ~~hundred~~ hundred members of the Party were thrown into action in Calcutta streets. Comrades in jail were ~~not~~ thrown into action against them, where he is best prepared and well-concentrated. Out of sheer desperation due to failure to organise mass action, vanguard is thrown into desperate clashes with the enemy incurring disastrous losses to the Party. It is a significant fact, that the jail document was not accepted by everybody inside prisons. Among those who did not accept it, were comrades who were always in the forefront when any action actually took place. (We of course accepted it and that too 'genuinely convinced').

This does not mean that all jail struggles are wrong. Hungerstrikes and even clashes will take place in future also. But the main factor in jail struggles is firm reliance on the movement outside. Sectarian adventurism emphasised that comrades inside prisons should firmly rely on their own strength. This is wrong. The main reliance should be on outside movement.

8. The document does not define the tasks of the Party, though it claims to deal with the tasks in a general way. The covering letter promises us detailed documents on various fronts. But that is not enough. In a brief and precise manner, general tasks of the Party has to be defined in a document of this nature. On the building of democratic camp, United Front tactics, etc. tasks have to be clearly defined. Nothing should be left to spontaneity. Roles of different classes, parties, groups have to be re-analysed and clear perspective in the fight for unity be worked out. Some comrades in No. 17 have emphasised on top unity between CP and bourgeois left parties. While top unity as such should not be opposed, we must be alert enough to combat any danger of right deviation that may arise from top ~~unity~~ unity in the form of compromises, our right to criticise the reformist leaders, relaxing efforts to build unity ~~from~~ from below and establishing proletarian hegemony in united front and so on.

On the perspective of agrarian revolution, the document refers to Telengana way, gives a call to develop Telenganas. But the call is only in a very general way. It does not lay down in concrete terms the strategy and tactics that has to be consciously followed in developing Telengana. Andhra Secretariat document concretely lays down the class alliance on which Telenganas are to be based and the tactics that is to be followed in building Telengana, but the PB fails to mention.

Secondly the experience of the actual building up of Telengana has to be properly assimilated and made available for the whole Party. The attitude of Party leadership towards Telengana was not correct. This and the effects of the mistakes arising out of wrong policy will have rich lessons for the entire Party. A commission should study Telengana, Hajang and failure of Kakdwip etc. and circulate its findings to the ranks.

In view of our serious mistakes, No. 16 must quote the teaching of Stalin that colonial liberation movement is in essence a peasant problem. And our understanding of the tasks and clarity needed regarding it should be emphasised in correspondence to its importance. No. 16 fails to do this. It is a prerequisite to organise the peasantry under the leadership of the Party, but where does AIFS stand in this respect? Com. Menon in No. 17 raised a question why we should not have poor peasant leagues comprising of agricultural workers and poor peasants ~~and~~ instead of agricultural workers' unions affiliated to AITUC. The PB has violated the Political Thesis directive which has called for Poor peasant leagues affiliated to AIFS. No. 16 document does not answer this question. We think that poor peasant leagues are the correct rural organisations because in a colonial country agricultural workers are different from their counter-part in imperialist countries and their problems are quite different from that of industrial workers.

The cardinal task of the Party in the present period is the development of liberation army led by the working class. But this is not emerging as the central task from the document. The liberated bases are to be created and liberation armies are to be built. But on this question also clear perspective are to be built. But on this question also clear perspective has to be worked out and not left to spontaneity. The rich Chinese experience has to be utilised. The Party should take ~~responsibility~~ up military education of its cadres as a serious task.

On liberation army and liberated bases, we have to guard against two deviations. One is expressed by one comrade in No. 17 document, that as a whole armed struggle is not on the agenda. This is a deviation from the right. This is an erroneous view, because conditions are mature enough in many parts of India for armed struggle. Danger of second deviation is from the 'left' that of transplanting adventurous bomb-throwing from Calcutta to the rural areas. In the background of our sectarian deviation this danger has to be viewed seriously. Both dangers have to be combatted. "Whenever and wherever necessary internal conditions permit" liberation armies should be built. But this "necessary internal conditions" have to be specified and elaborated. In developing liberated areas, we should see the topography, the depth of the dependable area, and other factors, and should strive to develop simultaneously a number of bases in order to off-set the enemy's advantage in India, over his counterpart in China, in the extensive communication system. Even today, Statesman report ~~xxx~~ shows how difficult it is for Nehru to supply the demands for more police and troops etc. for Telengana and Andhra. Imagine his plight, if we succeed in bogging up his troops in various directions. This, of course, involves planning and extensive ~~training~~ of cadres.

~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ In the cities, the document fails to take into account the ~~xxxxxxxx~~ concrete situation in India. It mechanically transplants the Chinese experience and emphasises on white terror alone. No doubt, in some of our southern cities white terror is a reality. But on an all-India plane, it has not reached the same intensity as was in China.. The democratic consciousness of our people imbibed from the 16 60 year long bourgeois national movement still exists. With a correct understanding of the class alliance, if we are able to mobilise widest sections of the population in the cities on vital issues as civil liberties, etc., we can effectively withstand white terror, and repulse enemy attacks in that direction.

If the concrete situation is not taken account of, and this peculiar aspect of Indian cities is not taken note of, there is a danger of ignoring the struggles in cities. The document warns against running away from the concrete tasks in cities. It specifically mentions that even political strikes are not ruled out, circumstances permitting. Nevertheless, its failure to take account of concrete reality in Indian cities leaves the danger of right deviation of betraying the interests of the working class. Yet, we should take note of ~~theworkingclass~~ this fact, that in a colony, opened up by a modern network of communications, the widest organisation and mobilisation of the masses in cities has a vital role to play in the liberation struggle in rural areas. When the white terror has not yet become unbearable, the possibilities in the cities cannot be ignored.

ON STATES, the Political Thesis says that "with their rotten autocratic and feudal structure and the long oppressed masses awakening to struggle, constitutes the weakest link in the collapsing imperialist feudal structure." (Emphasis ours) The States still remain the weakest link where the broadest masses can be mobilised in the struggle against feudalism under Party's leadership - the bourgeois leadership there being weak. In the States, local Prajamandal's progressive possibilities has to be investigated. And it is there because the big bourgeois alliance with feudalism conflicts with the developing local bourgeoisie, especially in most backward feudal areas such as Rajasthan, Nepal, etc. In the States we should work towards establishing the hegemony of the working classes in the anti-feudal struggle. In this we should actively participate in whatever form of struggle unleashed by local State Congresses, strive to capture leadership and take the struggle towards higher forms. The State front is a vital sector in our liberation struggle. But No. 16 fails to bring out the tasks on the States Front. We have so far put States as one of the least important fronts of Party (at least in practice of allocating cadres and guiding their work). We must change this emphasis. States is also essentially a peasant problem in a most acute form. This means capable cadres have to be sent there as organisers and their work guided by a PBN which would ~~indeed~~ enable us to hit the hardest, where the enemy is the weakest.

Re. Kashmir - ranks are kept so far ignorant of what is happening there. This is impermissible, ~~xxxx~~ looking to its strategic importance. As various

New Times articles have pointed out various contradictions in enemy camp are at work there. Their position is shaky if peoples forces intervene. Proper concentration of our cadres and its direction must form an important item on our agenda. If we succeed in strengthening liberation movement there, taking advantage of all the contradictions of enemy camp, and we can do it, it will be a big blow to the Anti-Soviet war mongers. Kashmir liberated, will also be easily defendable militarily. ~~A~~ Forstarting work there with this perspective, roles of various leaders of National Conference will have to be re-examined, with our new understanding of class alliance. Sheikh Abdullah, perhaps might have got too many links with Indian big bourgeoisie, preventing him from crossing over the people's camp, but this may not be true of other leaders of the Conference. In the same way, situation of Muslim Conference composition also should be carefully studied. We must not let slip any possibility of winning over new allies for the people's front. We must cleverly widen the contradictions in enemy camp through our propaganda and organisation.

Question of Nepal should also be specially studied, with a view to strengthen people's movement there. After liberation of Tibet, it will be all the more easier, importance of Nepal snatched from imperialist reserve and made people's reserve, to an armed liberation struggle as well as S.E. Asian struggles need not be stressed.

Again, it is a serious omission to have left out the nationality problem. Com. Balabushevich speaks of the tremendous pull of the slogan of reunification of nationalities in Telengana struggle. ~~Our~~ Our Part leadership has made ~~xxx~~ mistakes on this question by opposing liquidation of Hyderabad State by merging its areas into linguistic boundaries. We have to correct this. There is unlimited possibilities for developing this movement all over India as it has become a big issue before widest sections of the peoples, including sections of bourgeoisie of these national units. We think, we should strive to establish our leadership in the movement for linguistic Provinces, which is led by the Provincial Congress leaders. Linguistic provinces is the form given to the aspirations of various peoples to have their national homes by the present non-proletarian leadership of this movement. Our failure to tackle this problem even today, arises out of not properly grasping the fact that colonial problem is basically a peasant problem, ~~xxx~~ in a multinational colony like ours, national problem which is also basically a peasant problem ~~xxxxxx~~ ^{becomes} very vital in our liberation movement.

Here it is important to note that we should define our attitude to the various classes that we envisage, will come in the Democratic Front. Com. Li Li San tells us that middle bourgeoisie though they may have links with imperialism, out of their own economic interests will come in the people's camp. A correct attitude to these vacillating sections is essential. We should defend their economic interests without, at the same time compromising the vital interests of the working class. In this respect, Seventh Congress (CI) lessons should be our guiding line. This general directive must be translated in Indian terms, by studying concretely each section of the middle bourgeoisie, in ~~x~~ each province, e.g. in Hyderabad, our attitude to Maratha and Andhra bourgeoisie cannot be same on all issues. Andhra bourgeoisie opposes liquidation of State, while Maratha which is less dominant supports it. Our attitude to them will vary from issue to issue.

9. Coming to 'Peace as the pivot': In No. 17 two comrades have raised the question of the pivot of Party work. Opinion of three comrades unit poses the question giving impression that there is some contradiction between the central slogan of Peace and slogan of national liberation movement. There is no such contradiction. We agree with Com. Menon (of No. 17) re. approach to peace work.

Today, work for Peace is the central task of ALL the Communist parties in the world. In colonial and semi-colonial countries, through fight for their freedom, Communists are contributing to the world peace by undermining the base of the imperialist war-mongers.

But, No. 14 document states that peace movement has to be the pivot of the Party work. This formulation is incorrect, so far as it gives the impression that Peace Committee's work becomes the central task of the Party. (No. 14 begins by saying that peace movement which is already broad-based etc.) In Cominform No. 13, a report of Stockholm Executive Committee (by.....) gives clear directive on the peace work to be done by the Peace Committee and other mass organisations. (Scope of the work of Peace Committee and that of TU, Kisan Sabha, etc. is quite different. Each organisation will approach the problem from different angles, corresponding to the consciousness of the masses united under that organisation. Of course, all the actions of different organisations will be aimed at strengthening the world peace front,

directly or indirectly. Cadres of CPI working in peace committee, TU, ~~Kisan~~ Kisan Sabha, etc. will follow the limit of these organisations. The platform and organ of CPI will naturally give the clearcut directives and play its vanguard role through its own platforms and its fractions in various mass organisations. CPI will strive to prevent India from becoming a war base, will aim at overthrowing imperialism and its stooge, Nehru Government and setting up United democratic front Government which will take India out of Imperialist camp to the Peace Camp. This it will do, by leading the national liberation movement, through building democratic front. Thus pivot of the Party's work is national liberation movement, content of which is the strengthening of the forces of peace.

The work for peace, needs to be specially emphasised at this juncture, because, in spite of the fact, that in Political Thesis, fight for alliance with USSR and quitting Commonwealth is given first place, while enumerating the tasks of the Democratic Front, in actual practice, in ~~xx~~ last two years, we have ~~x~~ miserably failed to campaign for this. Neither our Central organ nor mass organisations have seriously taken up questions like, opposition to Burma loan, ~~xxxxx~~ Gurkhas fighting Imperialist war in Malaya, Nehru not recognising Ho Chi Minh, India in UNO not fighting for People's China's entry and acting as American stooge in Korea and so on. On many of these questions, as even the bourgeois Press reflect, public opinion is very sensitive and our determined campaigning CAN isolate Nehru's Government and make it extremely awkward for it to refuse concrete demands of the mass movements. This ~~xxx~~ work should be linked up by various organisations to show how American stooge Government, ~~xxxx~~ ^{pieces} criminal war burdens on the masses under the influence of these organisations. In this sense alone Peace can and must become the pivot of our work.

No. 16 document does not give clear answers to the various questions raised re. Peace work. Our new document must give detailed stages re. peace work on different fronts based on clear understanding how slogan of peace will run as a central threat through all the activities of our national liberation movement. In reformist as well as in left sectarian period, we have avoided giving clear directives in the name of not being schematic. The May Day Manifesto of China Party shows how essential it is to work out detailed slogans for immediate period.

We are still continuing the discussion on this question. This is not yet ~~xxx~~ conclusive.

CADRES:

10. The Document fails to give any idea regarding the demobilisation of the Party. In the whole of No. 16 there are only two lines about the Party saying that disaster has come to the Party organisation. Even in a general political document this is not enough. The document has to estimate the disaster in a general way and give general lines on where to begin as the rebuilding of the Party is the essential primary task.

The Party leadership has brought the Party on the brink of complete liquidation. This was done in the name of bolshevisation and purging of petty-bourgeois alien elements.

The sectarian Party line which the Party leadership was pursuing did not correspond to objective reality. Inevitably their adventures in this wrong Party line ended in failures, one after another. They found a scap-goat in reformism in the Party. With this spectre, they explained away everything. But if this nonsense did not convince many Committees and leading comrades, then the answer was the introduction of a terror regime, in the name of maintaining centralism, to call to order those who had the 'misfortune' of disagreeing with the PB. We do not know all the facts ~~xx~~ of this tragic disaster. The Party leadership should place unreservedly all the facts of its liquidationist activities ~~xxx~~ before the entire Party.

To the extent we know three Provincial Committees have been dissolved, ~~xxx~~ one D.C. dissolved and many members of the Committee expelled. Members of the C.C. elected by the Congress were just removed from the CC at the whims of the top Party bureaucrats, members of the PB were treated as political infants. Now when we see, in the majority of cases we know, the action taken was the reason that they at one time or other they all had disagreements with the wrong Party line of the PB which they dared to express.

In this period the Party ranks were given all the PB documents. But when releasing them to the Party ranks, PB also fostered a methodology in the discussion and understanding of the documents. The Party ranks are only to understand the PB documents. This practice, instead of leading to serious discussions on whether the PB documents correspond to the Party line, international and national, became only a weapon in the hands of the leadership to orientate the ranks submissively towards their own line. Free discussion was not permitted and ranks dared not disagree, because

any disagreement would be dubbed as reformism.

In making the leading comrades and ranks submissive, the gross misuse of criticism and self-criticism, on an extensive scale, played their part. Inside our Party Committees and members were criticised not for their mistakes and not on their mistakes. It had become a fashion to use very 'profound' and strong words in criticising comrades. All the words of abuses in your vocabulary, petty-bourgeois, arrogance, conceit and what not have to be hurled at him, of attainment of 'profundity', a resolution of criticism will fail to focus on what exactly is the particular mistake it is criticising. After all this, if a comrade is unable to understand what all is the meaning of the phrases used to express his mistakes, it is refusal to 'self-criticise' and expression of petty-bourgeois ego. In short, if the higher Committee calls you a fool, you should protest against the 'mildness' of the term, and say that "I am a bloody, damned...fool." Then only your "self-criticisms" will be considered genuine. This sort of "criticism" paved the way for demoralising the comrades and fostering a 'petty-bourgeois complex' in them. This petty-bourgeois complex is fostered in them deliberately in order to impose the leadership's line and stifle any healthy resistance to the wrong line. It has led the comrades even to lose self-confidence. The leadership continuously emphasised the bad instincts in the comrades and considered it arrogance if comrades say that they are revolutionaries first and their class origin is of secondary importance.

But none of this criticism can really help anybody to improve. It is only by posing the positive aspects and mistakes together and pointing out the way for overcoming the mistakes that criticism really helps. Let Com. Dimitrov's directive in this respect be our guide for future, and re. petty-bourgeois complex, read Com. Li Li-san.

If this was the cannons of criticism and self-criticism for the ranks, the exact opposite is the case with the higher Party committees. The Constitution makes it obligatory on the part of the higher committees to produce periodical reports of their activities to the lower units. We do not know the facts regarding PB and CC, i.e. whether they were doing this reporting to the PCs. But if the CC documents can be taken as evidence, it appears that the CC was not even functioning in the last two years as a collective, not to speak of reports of its activities. For us in PH, we know our Higher Committee has refused to give any serious report on its functioning, even when demanded by C.C. Unit ~~xxxxx~~ and ranks, though it was not lagging behind the Central leadership in the reformist witch-hunt in PH and extraction of 'self-criticisms' from a number of PH comrades.

The seriousness with which our Party leadership starts implementing the line is questionable from the attitude it takes in running the Central Organ of the Party. PH Circular stated then, that the Party leadership is engaged in vital inner-Party struggle and cannot give day-to-day guidance to the Central organ. A CC Unit of the Party is entrusted to give political guidance (!) to the Central organ, of course, with the overall guidance of a CCM. Yet, the Constitution obligatorily lays down that Party organ should be guided day to day by CCM.

We demand, that this circular be placed before the CC, which should investigate who is responsible for this gross irresponsibility. It should also answer how can 'vital inner-Party struggle' be conducted without unifying the Party ranks and masses on the basis of the current political problems. We consider this as the crassest example of what Com. Dimitrov calls neglecting the method of leading the masses by the sectarians.

Disruption and disorganisation has taken place in almost all the mass organisations.

The Party leadership reduced its function into leadership of a narrow strata that is the Party (engaged in inner-Party affairs). It failed to lead the Party in the leadership of the rising masses of people.

'Left' Sectarianism has taken advantage of illegality in the pursuit of its policies. It reduced the importance of vigilance by emphasising on 'tech' vigilance alone. In the name of 'tech' vigilance, political vigilance of comrades was lulled. The sectarian blindness and absence of political vigilance is the favourable ground for enemy to plant his agents in the Party. We heard an example of this (which is not yet confirmed but we state it here so as to be corrected if not it is not a fact). Dhulia D.C. Secretary expelled from the Party out of 250 members, all except 15 members. Later he was exposed as an agent of ~~xxxxxx~~ Govt. Intelligence Service.

This is how enemy agents worm their way into the party committees and liquidate the Party from within. Here we should remember the Cominform article and

radio Moscow's warnings. The PB should make a thorough investigation on these lines and make the results known to ranks. Only the political vigilance of the members as a whole can save the Party against attempts of enemy agents from within.

We should further point out the fact that in the Second Congress, in the determination of the Party line, the Yugoslav delegates must have played a prominent part. It is only natural then, as the Headquarters of the Information Bureau was in Belgrade and we are justified if we take them as representatives of Cominform. But then, it was very essential for our Party leadership to have undertaken a self-critical review of our own Party's policy and work when the Tito clique was exposed by the Information Bureau. Many Communist parties reviewed their work self-critically, but our leadership did not, in spite of the role of the Yugoslav agents in our Party Congress. On the other hand, the PB issues Dhilas' slanderous 'reply' to Cominform resolution on Yugoslavia is issued as an Information Document! Today when we see in our left sectarian mistakes certain Titoist features, the PB owes an explanation on this very serious question.

In this period again, the attitude of the leadership of the Party towards cadres has been very wrong. The Bombay Jail document is the extreme manifestation of this reckless attitude. But this is expressed in the Party on a very extensive scale. There has been a reckless expenditure and waste of cadre. In the selection of cadres for particular jobs, the capacity of particular comrade for a particular job is not taken into consideration. The valuable experience of older cadres has been neglected and their capacity was wasted. Of course, this has taken place in the name of fighting the reformism of older cadres. In this way was liquidated many a middle leadership with years of irreplaceable experience. Now inexperienced younger elements were put in responsible Party posts irrespective of capacity. This happened because the experience of older leadership became an impediment for the PB in its implementation of its sectarian line. While the younger comrades can be easily moulded by the sectarian leadership in the direction it wants. The explanation was that a new leadership free from reformism has to be prompted.

Here we must make clear that we are not saying that older comrades were free from reformism. Nor are we denying the necessity of prompting younger capable comrades to the leadership. Reformism wherever it is expressed has to be fought. But a correct approach to this question should take into consideration the experience of the older cadres and the pull and capacity of the new cadres and a harmonious blending of the two is essential. This is Comrade Stalin's teaching on cadres. This has been recklessly violated.

The other side of the same attitude is expressed in the allotment of Party jobs. Any comrade is put anywhere without taking into consideration whether he will be useful there or at a different place. This method of reallocation was strengthened by the dearth of ~~xxxxxx~~ cadres for Party jobs. Left sectarianism has restricted the growth of the Party which resulted in lack of cadres.

This position has to be changed in order to start the regular rebuilding of the Party and mass organisations. There should be a correct attitude towards cadres. A careful reallocation of jobs in the mass fronts and the Part on the basis of experience and capacity has to be undertaken. Cadres have to be provided to those fronts where there is a real dearth, due to our wrong attitude during the Left Sectarian period.

Com. Solarov's Book Review (Cominform No. 5) gives revealing symptoms of Trotskyist organisational methods. In coming document, we should ~~xxx~~ nail down these symptoms in our Party, which were glaringly present, so as to avoid its reoccurrence in future.

The results of all these have been demobilisation of the Party and disruption, and mass exodus from the Party. The responsibility for the disruption in the Party, in the main, rests with the leadership of the Party. The wrong politics, complete denial of inner-Party democracy and refusal to understand anybody else's point of view and resistance to criticism. In this connection, it seems to us those Provincial units almost directly guided by the Central leadership, BC, Gujerat and Maharashtra PCs have fared worst in the last two years. An explanation as to why this happened is called for.

The Party cannot

The Party cannot be united on wrong politics. Iron discipline, bordering military discipline must be practised inside the Party. But this discipline cannot be imposed upon, in the interests of implementation of an incorrect Party line. That way leads to disruption and disintegration. The Party can be united and iron discipline be maintained, only on a correct line and the practice of the broadest inner-Party democracy.

11. The Party leadership defied the international leadership on the one hand and showed obstinate resistance to self-criticism. In the last two years international Communist leadership tried their best to make our leadership realise their mistakes through Cominform and Criticism from brother parties (Com. William Fick and Wang Ming in 7th Congress asking us to go China Way; Dykov's article in NT No. 1 January 1948 saying only Marwari-Gujrati bourgeoisie has benefited from Mountbatten Award and spotlight the role of nationalities in India, .. and many other articles.

But our leadership showed contempt for such indications. They criticised many parties very arrogantly and refused to learn from any other Party. They almost thought that they are the only source of Marxism and ~~now~~ assumed infallibility and charged leaders of great international parties with 'refusal' ~~and~~ to 'self-criticise'. What are the roots of such arrogance? General Secretary, as we now know, dared to quote Stalin against Stalin by printing that Editorial Note and emphasising wrongly Stalin's article in CR. (No....) before printing Cominform editorial. This is nothing but bourgeois nationalism ~~regarding~~ repudiating proletarian Internationalism. No. 19 document on Mao withdraws criticism on Mao, but it should have traced its roots in utter repudiation of international leadership by our P.B. which goes to the length of misquoting Stalin.

Com. Stalin in his speech to U.T.E. students (May 18, 1925) says:

"No lasting victory can be achieved in colonial and dependent countries unless a real bond is established between the movement for emancipation in these countries and the proletarian movement in the advanced countries of the West.

The 'real bond' that exists ^{today} between the struggle of French workers and Vietnam people, brings home to us this truth with added clarity, which Lenin and Stalin had repeatedly emphasised in their teachings on National and Colonial problem.

India is still a colony, but because of our bourgeois nationalism, we have not established a real bond between the struggles of English labour movement led by the CPGB and Indian people's liberation movement led by CPI. All our recent documents keep quiet about this factor - which Stalin lists as one of the fundamental factor - contributing to the victory of our national liberation movement. On the contrary, in the last ~~xxx~~ few years we had adopted a very arrogant attitude towards CPGB. Our main political document must make self-critical review of this and must state categorically our policy on this point.

In this respect the contemptuous attitude to the CPGB should be particularly mentioned. It ~~x~~ should be mentioned that this contemptuous attitude had permeated us, as Party ranks to an extent as we were assimilating the PB's teaching.

We think the Party leadership has not fully understood its defiance of international leadership. The PB has unreservedly withdrawn the slander against Com. Mao which went in the Party Press as 'criticism',. But the PB has kept silent on revisionism Article (Communist No. 2, 1949).

The resistance to self-criticism has been all through on the part of PB in the past two years which has been ~~an~~ a corollary of defiance of international leadership. It is a very serious state of affairs, when the central leadership of the Party in whom is entrusted the responsibility for implementing the Party line, shows extreme resistance.

In this light it is pertinent to demand of the PB to place before the Party ranks the stand of the individual PBMs and CCs in the last two years on every important questions. We have to judge every Party leader on the basis of the stand he has taken. We have lost confidence in the PB. The PB itself should categorically state whether they think they deserve the confidence of the Party ranks after all that has happened. We think such an honest evaluation ~~x~~ of itself by the PB will help in speedy solution of the crisis in the Party.

12. The following demands on the PB emerges from our discussion:

1. PB should release all the documents that are with it sent by the PCs and leading comrades to the Party ranks. Tamilnad document which led to the dissolution of the PC, their document on People's Democracy, Assam PC's documents, Com. Ajoy's, SAD's replies to PB's ultimatum to them, Ajoy and Ghate's criticism of PB's Jail policy are those which we know. PB should release these and others if ~~ay~~ immediately.

2. The functioning of the Central Committee in the last two years. We want to know whether PB was running the Party alone, to what extent CC has collectively

- 1 -

did
functioned? How/this state of affairs last so long? What are the actual facts about the PB's resistance to self-criticism?

3. Political history of individual PBs and CCs in the last two years. What was their individual stand on all important questions of Party policy? How they reacted to the international advices and suppression of Andhra Secretariat document and suppression of Andhra Secretariat document and the Andhra demand for inner-Party discussion of the document etc.

4. A Telengana Commission.

5. A Commission to review the expulsions cases. This has to be reviewed in individual cases.

6. A Party History Commission - All-India and Province-wise.

(We realise that the last three questions have to be decided by a reconstituted CC and PB.)

7. The crisis in the Party is very serious which we are not confident that CC on its own will be able to overcome...Hence, consistent with the safety of the UG apparatus, widest possible consultation should take place. An enlarged Plenum or some such wider consultation.

8. The CC and the PB has to be reconstituted. In the light of record of the Central Committee in the last two years and in the absence of the Party Congress CC should not take upon itself the responsibility of reconstitution of itself and the PB. It should consult the Party lower Committees and ranks and their opinions should be considered before finalising the reconstitution. Some method should be evolved for this consultation. After placing the last two years' political history of the CCs, the CC may circulate a provisional list of the new CC and PB, and seek approval of the PCs and opinion of the ranks, before finalising. Only this way can the CC expect the confidence of the ranks.

13. In the reformist period, no Party leader was free from guilt of reformism. In the last two years as far as we know, the whole CC has plunged into the 'left' sectarian line in a greater or lesser extent. In this light our leadership should understand its essential limitations, proved in the last few years. To avoid such disasters in future, we, the whole Party must be alert enough to what the international leaders say; the PB and CC should ~~not~~ adhere strictly to collective functioning and constantly consult the ranks and respect the opinion of the ranks. This means inner-Party democracy has to be strictly maintained and Marxist-Leninist education has to be seriously taken up both by the leadership and the ranks.

Minutes of the Gujarati Cell on the discussion on PB Document No. 14 on the Editorial of "For Lasting Peace" on "Eighty Advance of National Liberation Movement in Colonies."

Following comrades were present. From C.G. Unit Com. Kalin, Hata, Narotam, Chiman, Harshad, Tarla and Arun.

CHIMAN: I have not been able to read all the necessary and related material. So my understanding is bound to be incomplete. Hence understanding which is today may change after further discussion. I am giving my first impression.

Editorial of Lasting Peace... "Revolutionary Movement in Colonies" is a great contribution to our movement. Armed struggles have spread in many colonies. Scope and sweep of National liberation movement is unprecedented. Main reasons are:

1. ~~Success~~ October revolution and solution of national questions.
2. Victory of democratic forces headed by USSR in Second World War - defeat of Fascism and weakening of imperialism.
3. Establishment of People's democratic power.
4. Vigorous battle given by USSR against imperialism.
5. Victory of Chinese revolution.

Because of these factors movement in Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma has so developed and assumed new forms. Armed struggle, Liberation Armies.

Editorial of Information Bureau reminds us that we are lagging behind. There is only one Telengana.

To correct us Editorial asks us to draw lessons from Chinese Revolution and shows us that correct class analysis and proper understanding of the stage of the revolution will move us forward to victory.

To understand the alignments of different class forces at different stages in the revolutions of colonial countries we must study carefully Stalin's speech on China.

There are three stages in Chinese Revolution:

"~~First stage~~

"First stage was the revolution of the general national under united front. When the revolution was striking chiefly at foreign imperialism and the national bourgeois supported the the the revolutionary movement, the second stage ~~the~~ is the Bourgeois democratic revolution. When the national bourgeois deserted the revolution and the agrarian movement grown into mighty revolution of tens of millions of peasants,.....the third stage is the Soviet Revolution.....(p.1-8, Colonial Question)

I think above formulation is applicable to India also. We have also to pass through these stages.

Of course there cannot be a mechanical application. We know that Indian bourgeoisie had never come out as Chinese bourgeoisie had come out against imperialism. Canton could never be dreamt in India. Difference between both the countries also should be kept in mind.

Our main task during the stages of the revolution should be to reestablish the hegemony of the proletariat and consolidate it.

While not establishing ~~our~~ our final opinion we can say that we committed the same mistakes which were committed by Chinese Party.

Because of the first stage time tasks of establishing hegemony of the working class was not done. Same thing can be said in India. During the period of national united front joshism subordinated working class...

But in the next stage Chinese party also suffered from sectarianism - Li-li-Senism & - it can be said that we also did the same thing. Like Chinese bourgeoisie Indian bourgeoisie went over the camp of imperialism. Our task should have been to extend the hegemony of the proletariat and consolidate it and isolate and dislodge the treacherous bourgeoisie.

But we see that we cannot do this job adequately. PB document was pointed out this.

Letter of Chinese Party to CPI in 1933 helps us in understanding our sectarian mistakes.

Letter of Chinese Party shortly nails down our sectarianism in the first stage of the revolution. We did not participate in 1930 struggle. Afterward we started split in TU organisation also ie. carried further our sectarian understanding.

This sharply nailed down. We see that after this Right-reformism was playing dominant role in our party, Joshianism was washed to pieces in Second Party Congress. But while doing this left sectarianism started asserting itself inside the Party.

Joshism said no change.

He said bourgeoisie has crossed over the camp and has become main enemy.

Joshism absured the struggle against rich peasantry. We said we must fight against rich peasantry. This was correct - but we made Rich peasantry the main enemy in the villages.

Thus right-reformism failed to understand the re-grouping of class forces at the time of Mount batter award. But after second Party Congress we also failed to understand the revolutionary potentialities of different classes. Right reformism betrayed the revolution - we hindered in fact to a certain extent sabotage the revolution.

This happened, because, as PB document says we forgot that imperialism is the main enemy. Our struggle is anti-imperialist-nationalist struggle.

We also forgot that feudalism was the main enemy in the villages.

We can see that two important section - a section of bourgeoisie in cities and rich peasants were thrown into the camp of enemy. This people can be our ally of course unstable.

So this was the incorrect understanding/regrouping of class forces. Secondly our understanding was also faulty in estimating different classes of two blocks.

In the block of enemy instead of imperialism bourgeois became main enemy.

In rural side instead of feudalism rich peasantry who can be our ally - became the main enemy.

Thirdly middle peasant - a firm ally became vacillating ally.

So mistakes are done all along the line. In fact our strategy is a type of socialist-revolution. We forgot national elements and that we are in colonial country.

And so what happened. As imperialism has forgotten, the question became of straight class war battle of labour and capital, i.e. struggle for Socialism.

Result was this that we laid down wrong strategy and tactics. objective: "overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie - heading the imperialist-bourgeoisie-combine completely wiping out survivals of mediavalism and going to the transitional economy through nationalisation etc. The main force of the revolution: The proletariat - Immediate reserves: agrarian workers, poor peasants, middle peasants (also oppressed section of petty bourgeoisie in towns) - direction of the main blow: isolation of ruling bourgeois circles from the masses as well as isolation of other bourgeois circles and petty bourgeoisie parties and groups..." "The proletariat must accomplish the people's democratic revolution by allying to itself the agricultural workers and poor peasants - followed by the middle peasants in order to isolate the bourgeois and crush their resistance by force.." (Strategy and tactics 42pp.)

There is not much difference in the strategy shown by Stalin for the Socialist revolution in Russia. Stalin says:

"The Proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution by allying to itself mass of the semi-proletarian elements of the population in order to crush by force the resistance of the bourgeoisie to paralyse the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie."

Of course there is some difference between this two strategies, but ours is a wrong strategy and heavily deviates towards or almost amounts to the stage of socialist revolution.

We can see its result. As imperialism was forgotten as a main enemy the question became of class-war labour capital conflict the main struggle of the country. Our pamphlet on People's democracy says: The new features that will be found in backward and colonial countries is that the delayed democratic revolutions are breaking out in the midst of the most intense and sharpened conflict in each country between bourgeoisie and the proletariat... This heightened conflict in each country, together with the intensified conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat on a world plane interlaces the two revolutions more for more closely, inextricably, and makes it impossible to win the first without passing over to win the second....

unprecedented conflict between the bourgeois and proletariat, between the former and the non-proletarian masses as well, that underlines the character of the present revolution, as People's Democratic Revolution which emphasises its extreme nearness to the social revolution and at the same time sharply demarcates it from the bourgeois-democratic revolution... (Page 7 Communist No. 1 Vol. 1).

There is no doubt interlinking does take place, but we wrongly interpreted it. We will see it at other places more clearly. In page 9 it is said:

"This again, the task of fighting for real freedom is linked up with the defeat of capital at home and abroad and breaking away from the capitalist system."

Here again we find the main emphasis on the struggle against bourgeois. And now we see in following quotation that how the word interlinking gets a different type of interpretation than done by Mao.

"Further the revolution has, of course, to liquidate fascism but, as we have seen, even this task cannot be done without simultaneously fighting the capitalist system in the countryside and overthrowing the political rule of the bourgeois. Thus, both the anti-feudal and anti-capitalist character of the struggles gets emphasised.

And then it says:

"It is this mixing, this combination, that gives us People's Democratic Revolution in our country."

Now let us understand Mao on this question.

"Though it goes without saying that first step of the revolution which we are contemplating today will one day inevitably develop into the second step, i.e. socialism... yet present is no time to practise it. Socialism is out of the question before the tasks of present revolution, the tasks of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism are fulfilled. The Chinese revolution can only be achieved in two steps. (a) New Democracy; (b) Socialism; and we should point out that the period over which the first step will extend will be of considerably long one." (Page 21 - New Democracy).

Further in 1945 Mao says:

"Thirdly, in the present stage, while the task of the Chinese people is still to oppose national and feudal oppression, while the social-economic prerequisites are still absent in China, Chinese people cannot and therefore should not attempt to build a Socialist State." (Page 34 - New China).

And still further:

"...It is to suffer from the worst illusion to assent to the suggestion that the democratic stage of the revolution has not its own specific tasks and time-table and that it is possible to accomplish in one stage tasks which belong to an entirely different stage, a later stage: for instance to try to accomplish the tasks of the Socialist stage simultaneously (emphasis mine) with those of the democratic." (New Democracy).

We can now clearly see the difference between the correct and wrong understanding of People's Democracy. There is no doubt that interlinking is there but theory of doing both the jobs simultaneously is ruled out by Mao. There is a clear demarcation between two revolutions - though they are linked with each. There is no question of fighting against capitalist elements in rural side: "Of course this does not mean that agricultural labour will not fight for his partial demands against rich peasant."

What was the result of our wrong understanding? We narrowed down the broad front - rich peasant and middle bourgeois thrown into the camp of enemy.

Wrong interpretation of middle peasants was also done.

This led to restricting the scope of our movement because of our sectarian policy we lagged behind. Re. lagging behind, Com. Stalin says following in his speech on China:

"But that is the customary ultra-left mistakes of the opposition, who confuse their own consciousness and understanding with the consciousness and understanding of the millions of workers and peasants. The opposition is right when they say that the Party must go ahead. So that is an ordinary Marxist percept... But it is only one part of the truth. The whole truth is that the Party should not only go ahead, but should also lead the millions. To go ahead and not lead the millions is in fact to fall behind the movement, to lag in its tail..." (Page 207, Colonial Question).

So in this we lagged behind.

All these things happened because we confused the question of character of the revolution. We failed to see that we were in colonial country. We departed from the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the role of different classes.

While trying to understand our sectarian mistakes, we should not minimise our achievement also. Party Congress was a historic event. It gave a powerful

blow to reformism and smashed it. It gave a clear-cut call of struggle. It asked us to take the path of establishing the hegemony of Proletariat in the toilers' movement. Achievement of Party Congress is great. But there were certain defects which in a latter stage lead us to sectarian path.

We have ~~xxxx~~ lumped whole bourgeois class as a collaborator class. Rich peasant is also considered the enemy. Not only that; we have said in Political Thesis that "Khas land of the landlords and rich peasants must be distributed amongst toiling ~~xxxx~~ peasants,..." (Page 97).

I do not understand the meaning of Khas, but at other places also whenever there is a reference of rich, we find him as enemy.

So we see that mistakes were there in Political Thesis. Later left sectarianism developed on the basis of these mistakes. Now we are corrected by Lasting Peace Editorial and on the basis of correct strategy and tactics we will be able to move on a correct path.

NATU: Document No. 14 correctly points out that mistakes we have done, are dogmatic and sectarian.

Why that mistake? Com. Stalin has said always to keep in mind national features, and apply Marxism-Leninism to that.

NATU: Document No. 14 ~~xxxxxxx~~ correctly points out that mistakes we have done, are dogmatic and sectarian.

Why that mistake? Com. Stalin has said always to keep in mind national features, and apply Marxism-Leninism to that.

But, we could not properly understand the national features ~~xxxxxxx~~ concretely so while implementing the line, we did sectarian and dogmatic mistakes.

Today, we should properly understand the significance of the national liberation movement of our country.

Second world war ends, we see armed struggles being waged in colonial and dependent countries; against Imperialist oppressors and their national allies. But, at that time, we see that there was a lag between the struggles developing in India and the struggles developing in other colonial countries.

At the same time, we should correctly understand this that Imperialisms are trying today to make India a war base against the Soviet Union and liberation movement in China and other countries of South-East Asia.

So, in these conditions, understanding properly the significance of the movement, we shall have to ~~xx~~ overcome this lag.

Second Party Congress correctly gave a call for struggle and outlined the scope and nature of the Indian national liberation revolution.

I think, that in ~~x~~ Political Thesis~~x~~, anti-Imperialist character of the struggle was characterised; but while applying it in the strategy and tactics and other documents 'People's Democracy' and 'Agrarian Question', we see the wrong understanding on the questions such as follows:

- We could not properly understand the Colonial Character of Indian economy. Because of this, our agrarian struggles were restricted; could not become broad based, as it can be.
- Colonial economy is a peasant economy, and so the agrarian ~~xx~~ struggles has to be waged under the leadership of the working class, i.e. working class has to lead ~~xxx~~ peasant war, was not properly applied.
- At the same time, anti-Imperialist and national liberationist character of the Agrarian struggles was also not properly understood.
- Because of this, we see that agrarian struggles were restricted.
- We wrongly lumped up rich peasants with landlords and focussed rich peasants as the main enemy.
- Because of this, our approach to the middle peasants was also not so much broadbased as it should be.
- This results in restricting the scope of the developing agrarian struggles, which should rely mainly on agricultural labourers and establish organisational and ideological leadership of the working class.
- We could not properly understand the role of the bourgeoisie as a whole.
- So we did not demarcate between the different sections of the bourgeoisie.
- Also we characterised bourgeoisie as the main enemy in the Imperialist-bourgeois-feudal combine. This means that anti-Imperialist character of the Indian national liberation struggle, was forgotten.

Doc. No. 14 has put the main tasks: As making Peace movement the pivot of the movement and working class unity, agrarian struggles, struggles for civil liberties.

To overcome the lag, we shall have to correctly understanding and try and apply the No. 14, fulfil the tasks.

Questions: 1) After the Mountbatten award, what are the concrete advantages that bourgeoisie has gained?

2) How far the role of the national bourgeoisie in India than in China.

N.B. There were some other questions, related mainly to facts; so Com. Kalin said to read India Today and other related literature, for that.

NAROTTAM: The Cominform Editorial a great contribution in the national liberation movement:

- Formation of the Thesis a great step.
Before that Joshi and reformist bog was there, out of which we had not got out.
- After the Second World War, in spite of the Joshi reformism, the working class came out more and more as the leader of the national liberation movement.
- Second Party Congress was a ~~1~~ second great step forward. Why? Because there, of all, we realised the necessity of establishing:
 - 1) hegemony of the working class and started our struggle for that;
 - 2) In spite of the sectarian mistakes which are committed, the mass struggles broke out.

Following are the rudiments of sectarianism as seen in Political Thesis:

- 1) Wrong application of Zhdanov's formulation of Two Camps;
- 2) In Political Thesis we lumped up the entire bourgeoisie as enemy. Then, by the time of Strategy and Tactics document, we started seeing Bourgeoisie as the main enemy. Result was we confused two ~~xxx~~ stages of revolution.
- 3) We thought that Chinese Communist Party and Mao were wrong. And this sectarian attitude led to restriction of our movement.
 - We see the lag between us and other countries. Telengana remained a solitary example. We did not take upon armed struggle as a task immediately on the agenda.
 - Mechanical application of the hegemony of the proletariat: Against the hegemony of the bourgeoisie to the hegemony of the proletariat. We forgot that bourgeoisie can be our ally, our follower;
 - We under-emphasised the imperialist content of our movement. Roots in Political Thesis. Re. peasant struggle, there is correct anti-feudal emphasis.
 - But late the tendency grew to forget that it is an anti-imperialist struggle.
 - We did not ~~xxxx~~ look upon Nehru as the collaborator of the Imperialists, but saw him as the main figure in the combine.
 - Hence, we restricted our scope, andestablish the full possibility which was before us. Flexibility was not there in our struggle.
 - The result of these sectarian tendency seen in
 - peasant struggles;
 - Peace;
 - Exposures of Socialists.

Questions: 1) How will the new shift in policy affect our trade union movement? How shall we change our tactics there?

2) What shall be our appeal to the national bourgeoisie? How will we draw them into the movement?

TARLA: The thing which is said in the document is that we have made a series of dogmatic and sectarian mistakes in our struggle for liberation. Second World War ended, and the armed struggle started in Asian countries. And we lagged behind in this. Why? Second Party Congress made a big break with our reformist mistakes.

- 1) Got out of Joshi tailism.
- 2) Lead movements all over India under the hegemony of the proletariat;
- 3) We based ourselves on our own base - agricultural proletariats in the countryside;
- 4) We proletarianised the Party. The thing that you and I can discuss these things today in this way means that we abound ourselves with Marxism-Leninism. But then, we lagged. Only one Telengana, because:
 - 1) Anti-feudal, anti-imperialist characteristic of our struggle forgotten. In Political Thesis it was brought out but vaguely. And in the Party line it was lost lost sight off, why this?

Because we did not see our colonial oppressed economy:

- Interlacing of two stages of ... Bourgeois democratic revolution in a new phase.

Thus, we narrowed our circles of allies of the revolution and widened the circle of the counter revolution.

National bourgeois was lumped up as a whole as our enemy. In Party Thesis reference as "Indian Bourgeois" and not demarcation.

In the countryside the rich peasant became the enemy. Thus our movement did not become broad. All our slogans were also not broad. (Peace, etc.) We could not mobilise the entire democratic force around us.

Why? Because the main thing that our struggle remains essentially anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, and hence our enemies are the landlords and the

bourgeoisie collaborating with Imperialists was forgotten. That the 15th August did not make the essential change in this was forgotten.

I have not much to say because all the points are said before. But some difficulties are there which I am putting here:

- 1) What role will national bourgeoisie play in the democratic camp, concretely? On what slogans can we take up? What about demands like Samyukta Maharashtra? We were wrong in supporting ~~the~~ that national chauvinist demand or not. I do not think we were ...
- 2) Cooperation of ~~British~~ Br. Party and our Party (on demands like Telengana).
- 3) How far did these sectarian mistakes affect our fight against reformism?
- 4) How did they affect our organisations? (In Student, and Trade Union front and PWA at times used to get completely isolated from the masses. I can give examples.) It did affect.
- 5) Ninth March call was correct. But our going out of the AIRF and forming another Union was it correct? In the light of the new document I feel it was not correct. But I am not very clear about this.
- 6) How concretely shall we struggle against the Gandhian ideology, i.e. the national bourgeois ideology?
- 7) Peace slogan should be concretely and properly discussed. And should be reflected in our papers.

ARUH.

Warning given by Cominform is a reminder to us that in the wake of the rising tempo of the Mass movement and revolutionary sweep we are lagging behind. When the pitch of the revolutionary movement has risen to that of armed struggle, our ~~current~~ analysis of the situation is incorrect. Editorial says that this lag on the movement is to be removed by correctly applying Marxist-Leninist teachings regarding strategy and Tactics. We emphasised the leading role of the bourgeois in strategy and tactics while at the same time said in the Political Thesis that big bourgeoisie is a junior partner of Imperialism. In Political Thesis a call has been given for the formation of People's Democratic Front. In actual practice there is no front existing at present in India. Cominform Editorial shows the way and emphasis upon the path of the Chinese revolution and states that Indian people will have to take the same path likewise that the Chinese people i.e. path of People's Democratic Revolution. Editorial points out our dogmatic and sectarian understanding which has narrowed down the scope of the revolution. We have not drawn any distinction between the big bourgeoisie and non-collaborationist ~~small~~ undeveloped bourgeoisie. Our Strategy and Tactics ~~it~~ does not consider these possibilities and we have not taken the advantage of the vacillations of the undeveloped bourgeoisie and rich peasants.

In the countryside, we have failed to realise the growth of capitalism and see the feudalism as the main enemy. We have not taken the advantage of the conflicting interests of landlords and rich peasants and middle peasants as latter can be a ~~for~~ firm ally of the proletariat. At the same time we can establish proletarian hegemony, fight the influence of rich peasants in the countryside by organising ~~g~~ ~~and~~ leading the partial struggles of the agricultural labourers against rich peasants.

Editorial has not put main emphasis upon the fight against national reformism of every shade.

- QUESTIONS: 1) How are we going to draw the national undeveloped bourgeoisie and rich peasants to the People's Democratic Front?
- 2) ~~are~~ we giving a call for the general strike. Can we give it or not?
 - 3) How actively are we going to develop the working class unity?

HARSHAD.

Main change will be there in our policy now after the Cominform editorial and the IB note has come.

- At the time of the Second Party Congress we corrected ourselves more or less from the Joshiian right reformist bog.

- 1) Hegemony of the working class became the main slogan.
- 2) We lead the agricultural workers' struggles.
- 3) We gave a slogan for building a democratic front.

- At that time, in our time a fear was expressed that while fighting the right reformist mistake we may commit left sectarian mistakes. It was expressed also by

- Cominform editorial has drawn us of that. And thus it is a great contribution. What were the left-sectarian mistakes?

- 1) Stages of the revolution are missed;
- 2) Our working class struggles which we ~~initiated~~ led, did not become broadbased.
- 3) In the peasant struggles we alienated rich peasants and middle peasants from our alliance.
- 4) We did not lay our heart into the slogan of democratic front. We could not because of our sectarian ~~dogma~~ and democratic tendency.

QUESTIONS:

- 1) What are the organisational repercussions of our sectarianism. How will it affect our exposure of Socialist Party and others?
- 2) Peace and communal unity are the immediate slogans which can enable us to make our movement broad-based.

KALMEN.

Many points have been raised by comrades here.

- After the Second World War, colonies have entered into the arena of unprecedented struggle of a new, militant form. These conditions are developing in an ~~and~~ extraordinary world situation.

- 1) Soviet Union emerging as a world stronger power.
- 2) New democracies.
- 3) New China.
- 4) Imperialism weakened. These factors combined has changed the whole phase of the movement. Chinese liberation has taught us some worthy lessons like:
 - 1) Struggles under the hegemony of the proletariat;
 - 2) Working class has to unite all the classes, organisations, groups and individuals against imperialism.
 - 3) And no other way to fight it than the armed struggle.
 - 4) We should ally with ~~the~~ all peasantry to mobilise for the immediate land reforms.

We took a great step forward after the 2nd Party Congress.

- 1) Unprecedented wave of struggles broke out under the leadership of proletariat. ~~xx~~ A Telengana was created. We should not minimise the importance of our achievements.
- 2) At the same time our condition was not similar to Malaya, Burma or Viet Nam. And we did not emerge out as they did as the leaders of the masses.
- 3) And yet, because of our fight against reformism, we came out as a leader of the majority of the people.

What were the roots of our mistakes.

- 1) That with the change in the Government, the colonial setup had not changed. This we did not realise.
- 2) We gave the bourgeoisie main role in the Imperialist-bourgeois-feudal combine which was set up at the time of the 15th August. We forgot this basic thing and hence, could not see the national liberationist character of our struggle.
 - No difference was made between the big bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie.

Democratic Front - How are we going to organise it? We shall smash the two pillars of Imperialism - Feudal and Big Bourgeoisie. And for this ~~xx~~ we can mobilise the greatest number. Anti-feudal and anti-Imperialist sentiments can ~~xxx~~ unleash big movements as in Telengana we could develop our anti-Nizam movement.

PEACE: Unless we link it up with the day to day struggles it cannot be broadbased. (An Information - famine, ~~xx~~ blackmarkets, falling down of wages.

Civil Liberties Union - general discontent has been there and it can be directed through the channel of the democratic front.

- Bengal and Kashmir issue - big movement can be built around it. Language (Bengali in Dhaka - Hindi).

- "Unity of Bengal" - * (Sarat Chandra).

- Unity of working class - the main aim to smash the S.P. leaders and INFUC - and make it broad-based - Joint Mill Committees our solution. Through this we can make our movement and the democratic front broader.

in this document we do not see any of that sharpness, hit they contain. We feel that the P.B. still do not accept unreservedly their mistakes, do not see in all its nakedness and gravity the crimes they have committed. Their acceptance is purely formal compelled by international and national circumstances which they till the end tried to ignore.

In the last para of the document the P.B. tries to make another debut in self-criticism and says very graciously, "serious blunders and deviations have been committed by the party leadership" and says "it is due to its refusal to learn" and enumerates all sources from which they ought to have learned. It says that they lack "Bolshevik modesty", it was eager to teach every body etc. We feel to put it in this way is to look upon the matter most lightly. It is not a question of simply 'lacking modesty'. It is a question of sheer contempt for the ranks, contempt for sister parties, contempt for international leadership and contempt for all sources of Marxism. It was sheer arrogance which would not be matched by any body's arrogance in the history of any party except that of Tito - it is not just lack of modesty. They have not 'tried' to teach any one. They have not taught the Andhra comrades; they only denounced, gagged, throttled and suppressed them. To say that they were 'eager to teach' and that is why they deviated and made blunders is nonsense.

The last sentence in the document says "This make the question of functioning of inner party democracy and democratic centralism questions of supreme importance". The document that sets out to find out the roots of our greivous deviation and lays down the tasks before the party, while recognising the "supreme importance" of it, dismissed it with that statement alone. Why have not the party leadership come out with self-criticism of inner party democracy? They do not undertake any real-self criticism at all about the work of the Party and therefore we feel they are incapable of correcting the mistake. We feel that the P.B. had not realised the seriousness of the crimes and do not understand the strong feeling, revulsion and indignation in the ranks against this dead sense of our leadership.

The document does not attempt to analytically understand the historical roots of our deviation. We are certain that left sectarianism is not an accident, even as right reformism was not. But all these deviations have their root in the historical past of our party, in the ideological growth and development of our party. We do not know much of the history of the C.P.I. It is highly necessary that the ranks should be acquainted with the history of our party and its ideological development. There is one short historical sketch narrated by the General Secretary in the document on Tamilnad. We do not know whether any other document contain the same or not. This sketch, it is obvious, is a distortion of history. It is a history narrated to suit the left-sectarianism of the General Secretary. It does not significantly speak a word about the left sectarian policy that our Party was following before 1935 or the criticisms made by the Chinese, German and British Parties nor the criticisms on the left sectarian policy of the Indian Party made at the 7th Congress of the Communist International. This history gives a distorted picture and such a history cannot be accepted. We know that our party has been swinging from one deviation to another ever since its formation. It is not anchored firmly in Marxism and Leninism. Why is it that it swings like this. What is the root of this ideological confusion and inconsistency? We feel that the root of our left and right deviations throughout the history of our party is due to the persistence of bourgeois nationalism inside the party. We have never looked upon our revolution as part of the world proletarian revolution. Yes, we may have prattled in words mechanically but we have not understood what it meant, and therefore could not apply correct tactics. The party has been guilty of rejection of proletarian internationalism and of bourgeois nationalism before 1935 when we failed to realise that bourgeois democratic revolution in our country after the October revolution n

became part of the world Socialist revolution and therefore Communists should lead this movement with the alliance of all anti-imperialists, instead we pitched ourselves against the National Congress which was there in the opposition, though compromising. Again after 1935 when we merged ourselves in the welter of bourgeois nationalism in the name of united front and made ourselves an appendage of the bourgeoisie and a ginger group inside bourgeois National Congress; again in 1942 when we took 6 full months to understand the change in the character of the war; and again..... In the last two years there are on record more crimes against proletarian internationalism committed by our party than it has committed ever before. As we are passing a separate resolution on that we are not enumerating these.

While it is an undoubted fact that deviations were there inside the Party all through out its history, we have no record of the inner party struggle. We have never fought against any deviation ideologically. Even after 1942 we did not fight right reformism; on the other hand in the name of fighting reformism, made a bogey of it and therefore could not fight it. When in the document again P.B. hints that we are fighting right reformism with the help of General Secretary's report on Strategy and Tactics, etc. we feel that our leadership is attacked by an incurable disease. This attempt to find some saving grace in that ridiculous document, a document full of slander against the ranks, slander against international leaders, distortion of Lenin and Stalin writings is repugnant. We feel that P.B. does not want even now to see the ideological root of our deviation. We thought that the only deviation that exist in Marxist terminology is right reformism; any talk of left sectarianism was mocked at, ridiculed and any body who suggested the possibility of such deviation was dubbed and silenced as a coward and reformist. This is how we fought deviations in the Party. Our leadership went on arguing as to as to which deviation is the most dangerous without realising that all deviations are dangerous but the worst is the one against which we cease to fight. A thorough understanding of the historical ideological struggles inside the party must be there if we have to go ahead.

The document lacks an objective evaluation of the second Party Congress and the political thesis adopted at the Congress. We feel that P.B. in its attempt to white-wash the basis of its deviation, unwilling to go to the root of our deviation is trying to cover it up with the political thesis with the name of the Party Congress and quoting sentences from Com. Balabushevich. We feel that while we should certainly accept and try to understand the meaning of the opinion expressed by Balabushevich on the historic political significance of the Party Congress and the policy adopted at the Party Congress we should not take that, as P.B. is doing, as an excuse to refuse an objective evaluation of the roots of our deviation as well as success and failures of the Party Congress. The P.B. in its anxiety to tell us all the mistakes just came during the last two years, to minimise it even go the extent of saying that the Party Congress "asserted that the big bourgeoisie betrayed etc." which is not a fact. We feel that this confused thinking is inexcusable. The P.B. try to tell us ~~and~~ to minimise the mistakes of the P.B. by tracing the roots in Party thesis. ~~she~~ indeed is there with such audacity as to do this. The P.B. is mistaken if it imagines that anyone will excuse it for its crimes. This is not to say we should not find the ideological roots of our deviations.

We are of the opinion that the P.B. is totally wrong when it states that the political thesis is a weapon to fight right reformism and left sectarianism. The political thesis contains all the basic understanding of left deviation and therefore it is not a weapon to fight that deviation. See for example the categorical statement made in the political thesis as to the question of the stage of the revolution. It says "imperialists and their bourgeois collaborators are overthrown and power passes into the hands of the toiling people led by the working class, which assures not only complete national

independence but also the liquidation of the capitalist social order and the building of socialism at one stroke". It is obvious that left sectarianism in the Strategy and Tactics sprang from this understanding of the stage in the revolution. This understanding is exactly the understanding against which Com.Mao has warned. He said "Some ill minded propagandists purposely mix up these two revolutionary stages promoting the theory of 'a single revolution'. Further "Certain persons who do not seem to be ill-minded are also fascinated with the theory of a 'single revolution' and lend themselves to the subjective thought of 'accomplishing both the political revolution and the social revolution by one stroke'. They do not understand that a revolution is divided into stages. We can proceed from one revolution to another revolution but cannot 'accomplish everything by one stroke'. Their erroneous point of view inevitably confuses the revolutionary steps, decreased effort in realising the present task and is therefore very harmful.... Such an empty idea - the so-called 'to accomplish all by one stroke' policy - should not be adopted by real revolutionaries". The political thesis adopts this very policy and yet we say it is a weapon to fight left sectarianism. The very fact that this was a weapon in the hands of the PB to fight the correct line of the Andhra comrades shows that the political thesis was not a weapon to fight left sectarianism but a weapon to develop Trotskyism inside the party.

This does not mean that we deny the historical importance of the Second Party Congress or the Political Thesis. The fact that the Second Party Congress enabled some of the Provincial Committees to work out correct political line shows that there was an ideology though weak emerged at the second Party Congress which would have enabled the Party to come to a correct understanding if we had tested the understanding in the crucible of revolutionary experience and amplified it accordingly. It is also significant that the slogan "Telangana way" was given by the 2nd Party Congress though its implications never realised. But the dominant ideology in the thesis and at the Party Congress was that the left sectarianism which was the ideology of the P.B. who occupied the strategic position and succeeded in completely smashing the weak trend of correct ideology that emerged at the Party Congress. The second Party Congress was certainly a great political event in the sense that it saw through the right reformism inside the party and determined to fight it out. But a predominant Trotskyist political thesis is not the right weapon to fight right reformism.

It is also necessary to tell the ranks as to the extent the ideology of the Yugoslav Communist Party influenced the decisions of our party at the second party Congress, for as is well known the Yugoslav delegates actively participated in hammering out the Party line in Calcutta and our understanding of the international situation, democratic front, etc. which were based on the writings of Kardelj, Tito and other Yugoslav traitors. We are supposed to find that despite the fact that these gentlemen were proved to be international spies for long our Party leadership did not pause to ponder over the possibility of Tito's ideological influence on our party policy. Yes, we issued a statement supporting the resolution expelling Tito gang from Cominform and condemning them as nationalists etc. But we never thought that Titoism as an ideology should be fought. Even in the No.16 document we are told we must be careful against the penetration of Tito agents, etc. But we feel that it is highly necessary that our leadership should pause to think how they themselves played Tito's game consciously or unconsciously and disrupted the party and damaged the revolution.

We feel that the ranks as well as the Provincial leadership have raised doubts basing themselves on ideological arguments and were every now and then calling on the party leadership to change the sectarian line. It is necessary that the ranks should be told the full story of this inner-party struggle. No.16

document does not contain any reference to the fact that the sound Marxist sense of the ranks as well as those Provincial leadership which kept their eyes and ears close to the earth tried their best to pull the party out of this sectarian rails. These contributions were not properly posed, not even recognised. In the P.B. documents that we used to get there have been references to alternative thesis on various subjects being submitted by different Party units and responsible party units at that. We are given only a critique of these thesis and with these critiques naturally presented a garbled and distorted version of the ideology contained in the documents presented by the provincial units. We demand that all the documents relating to the ideological struggle that were going on inside the party in the last two years should be released to the ranks immediately.

The cell feel most indignantly at the way the Andhra ~~xxx~~ document is treated inside No.16 document. Andhra document in the first place was suppressed and misrepresented; Andhra leaders who are leading the mighty Telengana movement were dubbed as reformists and vilified before the eyes of the whole world without even giving an opportunity to present their real position. (We have reasons to believe the P.B. has done injustice towards Assam, Tamolnad and other provincial leaders in the same manner). No.16 document shows that P.B. even today do not recognise the great contribution made by the Andhra document. It dismisses the entire document in a few lines in No.16 document. It does not evaluate ~~xxx~~ properly the great contribution made by the Andhra comrades. On the other hand it shows great anxiety to point out that there were "weak formulations" in this document. There may be weak formulations; but these formulations are minor things and not worthy of mention in the present context. P.B. document not even care to show what are the weak formulations. It ignores the great contribution contained in the Andhra document. It ignores on the one hand the timely warning given by the Andhra document that left sectarianism is developing inside the party and unless a clear perspective is given our revolution will be disrupted. Even after this warning has come true thanks to the dead ear of the fossilised leadership, the P.B. do not feel guilty consciousness and has the audacity to talk in terms of 'weak formulations' in the document. This we think is atrocious and impermissible. Two years back when the arrogant clique, "dizzy with success" and ~~x~~ isolated from the realities were assiduously disrupting the Party and the revolution and the movement, we have in Andhra Secretariat a leadership trying to learn from the experience of the masses and humbly passing on that experience to the entire party for its consideration. We feel that P.B. do not feel the great harm that it has done to our movement by its rejection of the Andhra document and its suppression. No.16 document at least should have come out with an open admittance of this crime and a correct placing of the Andhra document. This is totally missing and this is ~~xx~~ very significant. It shows our leadership is not still prepared to take lessons from the ranks. While the document narrates profusely from the writings of Balabushevich and others, why should they not narrate from Andhra document, which in the main put forward the same analysis and sections.

In the absence of a proper self-criticism it is not possible to find the root of our failures. P.B. in this document have avoided all these inconvenient matters, by one sentence and gloss over the whole question, saying that an understanding of our deviation "can arise out of a correct understanding of the path taken by the victorious Chinese revolution and the lessons thereof". It is impermissible to take 'the lessons of Chinese revolution' as an excuse in order to skip over a thorough search of heart and this is exactly what the P.B. does. It betrays a total unwillingness of the leadership to come out frankly with proper self-criticism so as to go to the root of our deviation.

This document also do not contain a proper evaluation of the major struggles we have led. No attempt is made to draw le

lessons from the past struggles, strategy and tactics we used in conducting them. It is true that we are promised a separate document. But in this document a general analysis of at least the major struggles should and ought to be there. Without this it is impossible to understand anything. The P.B. very lightly heartedly gloss over this question as well. It just says that many of our struggles were adventurist. Is it a matter of only being just ~~adventurist~~ adventurist? Take for example March 9 strike, a strike that spell virtual disaster to the party organization. This is not even mentioned in the entire document. Take again the jail struggles. The callousness with which it is treated amazes us. Jail struggles and the jail document was the height of desperateness expressed by a ~~adventurist~~ adventurist leadership which sacrificed many best sons of the working class, which isolated us from the masses, which discredited many outstanding leaders, which disrupted many party units. This struggle is dismissed in one sentence "Similarly some of the clashes inside prisons, were examples of extreme adventurism". Just examples indeed! We feel indignant at this manner of treatment of jail struggles.

Why there is ^{no} mention of that infamous letter of the General Secretary to all party members on the eve of March 9 general strike i.e. February 22-calling the entire party to armed insurrection. Is it because that it was forgotten that it could not find a place in this document? If it is so, we think that leadership do not feel any burden of the crimes they have committed. They are totally blind to their horrible crimes. One cannot have any faith in this leadership. If the absence of 22nd February circular is deliberate one, then we charge P.B. with attempt to deception of the ranks. We feel that this is the zenith of our left sectarian policy in action. It is strange that this understanding is totally missed. Why this letter, by which the General Secretary of the Party called on all party members to take to arms at a time when we could not even distribute leaflets? Why we persisted with tenacity in this policy of adventurism and desperatism resulting in complete demobilisation of our mass organisations, complete disruption of the party organisation. These facts do not sharply come out in the document.

No.16 document which ostensibly tries to place before the party ranks "the main features of the struggle and the main tasks of the party" significantly forgets to study the international situation. We say it is significant because a study of the international situation is absolutely essential to place the tasks of the party in its proper setting. It is also significant because it is an expression of our repudiation of proletarian internationalism, not recognising the fact that our struggle is an integral part of the world revolution. It just gives one sentence from Bukhov saying that our struggle form a component part of the anti-imperialist democratic camp and it does not carry us anywhere. A thorough study of the international situation is necessary. In a separate resolution we had stated our view that the deviation inside our party has as its root the erroneous conception of international situation, two camps and people's democracy. Unless this erroneous conception is corrected we cannot regain a correct perspective. It is a well known fact that Kardle's booklet on the international situation to a large extent influenced our understanding of the international situation. In fact Zhdanov's interpretation of the international situation was totally rejected by us though we never stopped to swear by him. The CC should squarely face this aspect and include a revised and thorough study of the international situation.

In the same manner there is no reference about the economic crisis in the entire document. Our political thesis says so much on the economic crisis but we based our study of the economic crisis on the wrong understanding of Varga, who had since corrected his mistake. The independent character of the Indian bourgeoisie etc. arise out of an erroneous understanding of the general crisis of capitalism. We failed to see any

significance in the intra-imperialist contradiction, etc. Now why has not the P.B. thought it necessary that a revised understanding of the economic crisis is absolutely necessary. This lag in the document we feel is very serious.

This document does not contain a study of the Lenin-Stalin teaching on colonial revolution as well as any reference to the directives of the Communist International to the Indian movement in the past. We feel that without a proper study of Lenin-Stalin teaching it is not possible for us to properly evaluate our policy. Yes, we take lessons from the Chinese revolution and Chinese revolution was worked out on the basis of Lenin-Stalin teaching, ~~into~~ ^{into} consideration of the national peculiarities of China. Since the Chinese situation in the main is similar to ours, most certainly lessons of Chinese revolution will form a very great aid to our revolution. But this should not mean that we ~~we~~ should not go directly to Lenin-Stalin teaching and assimilate them for our guidance.

Even when we take lessons from China it will be impermissible for Communists to take them mechanically. We tried to mechanically apply the lessons of the Russian revolution without taking into consideration the national peculiarities and the historical conditions and we found that we were wrong. In the same manner if we mechanically apply the Chinese lessons without taking into consideration the national peculiarities and historic conditions we are bound to come to grief. We feel that a thorough study of the national peculiarities of our revolution should form part of the thesis. How this is being done can be seen by reading New Democracy by Mao; to an extent Andhra comrades have done this. The Andhra comrades have tried to concretise these lessons, did not shout slogans. They have tried to assimilate the lessons of Chinese revolution taking into consideration the peculiarities of the provincial conditions. Such a study is missing in this document without which it is no guide to action, but a dogmatical outburst. We feel that the P.B. does not apply consciously its mind to the actual implications of the slogans they have worked out. The slogans are only mechanically mouthed. The entire thesis looks like a university thesis with its strings of quotations and undigested conclusions and not a document of a revolutionary party to guide a revolutionary movement.

We have no doubt that armed struggle is on the agenda. We have ~~we~~ no doubt that Telengana is the way for all India. But simply accepting this does not mean anything. There are many important conditions for accomplishing this item on the agenda. Objective conditions alone cannot create revolution. We have to take into consideration the unevenness of the development, illusion of the masses in the bourgeois leadership, reformist influence etc. We have also to take into consideration that the trade union movement is disunited and that a strong united trade union congress is a vital lever in leading armed upsurge and for the formation of liberation army. The document does not say anything about all these.

We should realise that without a strong party there ~~there~~ cannot be armed struggle. Lou Sho Chi in his speech has laid down the following as one of the conditions: "In order to enable the working class and its party to become the centre for uniting all the forces throughout the nation against imperialism and to competently lead the national united front to victory, it is necessary to build up through long struggles a Communist Party, which is armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, understands strategy and tactics, practises self-criticism and strict discipline and is closely linked with the masses". Have we got such a party? The ranks must be told the present strength of the party, its organisational strength, strength of the mass organisations it leads etc. In the last two years of desperation and adventurism three thousands of our best leaders and militants inside jail, led many to death, many party units have been liquidated, many influential and experienced party comrades have

been forced to go out of the party. In all these ways the present organisational position of the party is serious and without our building of the party it is just impossible to have any of the vital tasks to be fulfilled. The P.B. do not seem to be aware of this vital aspect. The document has nothing to say about this.

Before we work out our tactics on the basis of the lessons of the Chinese revolution it is absolutely necessary to undertake a real study of the national peculiarities of our country, the organisational position of the party, working class and peasant organisations. The document does not speak a word about the organisational position of the peasantry. What happened to our kisan sabha? Does it exist in any Province? What are the possibilities of developing and strengthening them? Without clear understanding of all these, just to give a call to go Telengana way will lead to another kind of adventurism which will again lead to a isolation of the Party from the masses and smash our Party organisation and betray the struggle. We should not substitute rural adventurism for urban adventurism.

The question of peace being the pivot of our policy also is put just as a slogan without any concrete study as to how to link up peace movement with the national liberation struggle and how to develop this movement on a broad basis etc. On this question the cell is not totally clear. The document does not make anything clear either. We will be discussing this question separately and forwarding our views.

The concretisation of tasks and tactics on the basis of detailed study of the national peculiarities, organisational strength, preparedness of the masses, all these are highly necessary if we have to avoid going again into the mire of left sectarianism or right opportunism.

Exactly these things are lacking in this document and therefore this document does not advance the knowledge of the ranks in any way.

The document also skips over many serious questions, which need clear understanding and lead such as the question of nationalities, question of language, question of building united trade union movement, question of building strong kisan sabha and separate organisation for agricultural workers. In the absence of these the document cannot help a real change in our party line.

Our conclusion are the following:

1. The document lacks honest Bolshevik self-criticism. It does not betray that the leadership is conscious of the magnitude of the crime it has committed. Such a document including an historical and dialectical study of the past of our party to understand the ideological zig-zags and its roots is necessary. We must unmask the bourgeois nationalism which is at the root of our ~~is~~ swinging deviations.
2. We demand that a genuine objective evaluation of the second party Congress and the party thesis unmasking the cause of the left sectarian ideology in them and also the influence of Titoism on our party.
3. We demand a detailed and honest analysis of the numerous struggles that we have led, in particular March 9 strike, jail struggles and 22nd February 1949 letter of the General Secretary for armed uprising.
4. We demand full details of the inner party ideological struggle informing the ranks ~~of~~ the position taken by the different party units, different members of the CC and the PB. In particular we demand the documents by Dange, Ajoy and other leaders on jail struggles etc must be immediately made available. A correct appraisal of the contribution made by the Andhra comrades is also needed.

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5. The document must contain a section dealing with the international situation on the basis of the correct understanding.

6. The document must contain a real study of the economic crisis in the light of the new understanding.

7. The document must contain a section explaining Lenin-Stalin teaching on colonial question and C.I. on Indian revolution.

8. The document must undertake a detailed and thorough study of the national peculiarities of our country so as to apply the guiding line of the Lenin-Stalin teaching as well as lessons of the Chinese revolution.

9. The document must clearly work out the task on the basis of the above studies. The implications of the slogan of Telengana way, armed struggle being on the agenda must be clearly and unmistakably understood. Otherwise adventurism will be again our fate, ~~at~~ this time rural type.

10. The document must clear such questions as peace being the pivot of ~~the~~ our struggle.

11. The document must contain a study of the organisation and position of our party, of the mass organisations of working class and the peasantry.

12. Such questions as combining legal and illegal work, flexibility of tactics, preservation of cadres must also be thoroughly dealt with.

In the absence of these this document has got to be rejected as most unsatisfactory to be the guiding thesis of our party. We are of the opinion that the Andhra document must be made the basis of preparing a fresh document on the basis of the criticism from the ranks.
